1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
138 #endif
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
142 #endif
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
144
145 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
146
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149 #endif
150
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293
294 if (s->hit)
295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
296 else
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
298 s->init_num=0;
299 break;
300
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
305 {
306 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
307 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
308 }
309 else
310 skip=1;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
312 s->init_num=0;
313 break;
314
315 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
317 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
318
319 /* clear this, it may get reset by
320 * send_server_key_exchange */
321 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
323 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
324 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
325 )
326 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
327 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
328 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
329 * be able to handle this) */
330 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
331 else
332 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
333
334
335 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
336 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
337 *
338 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
339 * message only if the cipher suite is either
340 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
341 * server certificate contains the server's
342 * public key for key exchange.
343 */
344 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
345 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
346 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
347 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
348 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
349 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
350 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
351 )
352 )
353 )
354 )
355 {
356 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 }
359 else
360 skip=1;
361
362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
363 s->init_num=0;
364 break;
365
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
368 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
370 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
371 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
372 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
373 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
374 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
375 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
376 * and in RFC 2246): */
377 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
378 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
379 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
380 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
381 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
382 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
383 {
384 /* no cert request */
385 skip=1;
386 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
388 }
389 else
390 {
391 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
392 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
394 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
396 #else
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
398 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
399 #endif
400 s->init_num=0;
401 }
402 break;
403
404 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
406 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
407 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
408 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
410 s->init_num=0;
411 break;
412
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
414 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
415 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
416 if (num1 > 0)
417 {
418 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
419 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
420 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
421 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
422 }
423
424 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
425 break;
426
427 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
429 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
430 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
431 if (ret <= 0)
432 goto end;
433 if (ret == 2)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
435 else {
436 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
437 {
438 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 }
441 s->init_num=0;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 }
444 break;
445
446 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
449 if (ret <= 0)
450 goto end;
451 if (ret == 2)
452 {
453 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
454 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
455 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
456 * message is not sent.
457 */
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
459 s->init_num = 0;
460 }
461 else
462 {
463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
464 s->init_num=0;
465
466 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
467 * a client cert, it can be verified
468 */
469 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
470 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
471 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
472 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
473 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
474 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
475 }
476 break;
477
478 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
480
481 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
482 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
483 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
484
485 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
486 s->init_num=0;
487 break;
488
489 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
491 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
492 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
494 if (s->hit)
495 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
496 else
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
498 s->init_num=0;
499 break;
500
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
503
504 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
505 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
506 { ret= -1; goto end; }
507
508 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
509 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
510
511 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
512 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
513 s->init_num=0;
514
515 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
516 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
517 {
518 ret= -1;
519 goto end;
520 }
521
522 break;
523
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
526 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
527 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
528 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
530 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
532 if (s->hit)
533 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
534 else
535 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
536 s->init_num=0;
537 break;
538
539 case SSL_ST_OK:
540 /* clean a few things up */
541 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
542
543 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
544 s->init_buf=NULL;
545
546 /* remove buffering on output */
547 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
548
549 s->init_num=0;
550
551 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
552 {
553 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
554 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
555
556 s->new_session=0;
557
558 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
559
560 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
561 /* s->server=1; */
562 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
563
564 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
565 }
566
567 ret = 1;
568 goto end;
569 /* break; */
570
571 default:
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
573 ret= -1;
574 goto end;
575 /* break; */
576 }
577
578 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
579 {
580 if (s->debug)
581 {
582 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
583 goto end;
584 }
585
586
587 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
588 {
589 new_state=s->state;
590 s->state=state;
591 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
592 s->state=new_state;
593 }
594 }
595 skip=0;
596 }
597 end:
598 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
599
600 s->in_handshake--;
601 if (cb != NULL)
602 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
603 return(ret);
604 }
605
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)606 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
607 {
608 unsigned char *p;
609
610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
611 {
612 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
613 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
614 *(p++)=0;
615 *(p++)=0;
616 *(p++)=0;
617
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
619 /* number of bytes to write */
620 s->init_num=4;
621 s->init_off=0;
622 }
623
624 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
625 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
626 }
627
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)628 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
629 {
630 int ok;
631 long n;
632
633 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
634 * so permit appropriate message length */
635 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
636 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
637 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
638 -1,
639 s->max_cert_list,
640 &ok);
641 if (!ok) return((int)n);
642 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
643 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
644 {
645 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
646 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
647 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
648 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
650 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
651 {
652 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
653 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
654 }
655 #endif
656 return 2;
657 }
658 return 1;
659 }
660
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)661 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
662 {
663 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
664 unsigned int cookie_len;
665 long n;
666 unsigned long id;
667 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
668 SSL_CIPHER *c;
669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
670 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
671 #endif
672 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
673
674 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
675 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
676 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
677 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
678 * TLSv1.
679 */
680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
681 {
682 s->first_packet=1;
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
684 }
685 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
686 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
688 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
689 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
690 &ok);
691
692 if (!ok) return((int)n);
693 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
694
695 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
696 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
697 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
698 p+=2;
699
700 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
701 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
702 {
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
704 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
705 {
706 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
707 s->version = s->client_version;
708 }
709 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
710 goto f_err;
711 }
712
713 /* load the client random */
714 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
715 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
716
717 /* get the session-id */
718 j= *(p++);
719
720 s->hit=0;
721 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
722 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
723 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
724 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
725 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
726 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
727 * an earlier library version)
728 */
729 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
730 {
731 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
732 goto err;
733 }
734 else
735 {
736 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
737 if (i == 1)
738 { /* previous session */
739 s->hit=1;
740 }
741 else if (i == -1)
742 goto err;
743 else /* i == 0 */
744 {
745 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
746 goto err;
747 }
748 }
749
750 p+=j;
751
752 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
753 {
754 /* cookie stuff */
755 cookie_len = *(p++);
756
757 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
758 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
759 {
760 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
761 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
762 {
763 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
765 goto f_err;
766 }
767 }
768
769 /*
770 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
771 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
772 * does not cause an overflow.
773 */
774 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
775 {
776 /* too much data */
777 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
779 goto f_err;
780 }
781
782 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
783 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
784 cookie_len > 0)
785 {
786 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
787
788 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
789 {
790 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
791 cookie_len) == 0)
792 {
793 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
795 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
796 goto f_err;
797 }
798 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
799 }
800 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
801 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
802 {
803 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
805 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
806 goto f_err;
807 }
808 }
809
810 p += cookie_len;
811 }
812
813 n2s(p,i);
814 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
815 {
816 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
817 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
819 goto f_err;
820 }
821 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
822 {
823 /* not enough data */
824 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
826 goto f_err;
827 }
828 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
829 == NULL))
830 {
831 goto err;
832 }
833 p+=i;
834
835 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
836 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
837 {
838 j=0;
839 id=s->session->cipher->id;
840
841 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
842 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
843 #endif
844 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
845 {
846 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
847 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
848 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
849 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
850 #endif
851 if (c->id == id)
852 {
853 j=1;
854 break;
855 }
856 }
857 if (j == 0)
858 {
859 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
860 {
861 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
862 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
863 }
864 else
865 {
866 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
867 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
868 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
870 goto f_err;
871 }
872 }
873 }
874
875 /* compression */
876 i= *(p++);
877 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
878 {
879 /* not enough data */
880 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
882 goto f_err;
883 }
884 q=p;
885 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
886 {
887 if (p[j] == 0) break;
888 }
889
890 p+=i;
891 if (j >= i)
892 {
893 /* no compress */
894 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
896 goto f_err;
897 }
898
899 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
900 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
901 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
902 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
904 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
905 { /* See if we have a match */
906 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
907
908 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
909 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
910 {
911 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
912 v=comp->id;
913 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
914 {
915 if (v == q[o])
916 {
917 done=1;
918 break;
919 }
920 }
921 if (done) break;
922 }
923 if (done)
924 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
925 else
926 comp=NULL;
927 }
928 #endif
929
930 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
931 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
932 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
933 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
934 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
935 {
936 if (p < (d+n))
937 {
938 /* wrong number of bytes,
939 * there could be more to follow */
940 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
942 goto f_err;
943 }
944 }
945 #endif
946
947 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
948 * pick a cipher */
949
950 if (!s->hit)
951 {
952 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
953 s->session->compress_meth=0;
954 #else
955 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
956 #endif
957 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
958 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
959 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
960 if (ciphers == NULL)
961 {
962 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
964 goto f_err;
965 }
966 ciphers=NULL;
967 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
968 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
969
970 if (c == NULL)
971 {
972 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
974 goto f_err;
975 }
976 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
977 }
978 else
979 {
980 /* Session-id reuse */
981 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
982 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
983 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
984 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
985
986 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
987 {
988 sk=s->session->ciphers;
989 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
990 {
991 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
992 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
993 nc=c;
994 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
995 ec=c;
996 }
997 if (nc != NULL)
998 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
999 else if (ec != NULL)
1000 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1001 else
1002 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1003 }
1004 else
1005 #endif
1006 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1007 }
1008
1009 /* we now have the following setup.
1010 * client_random
1011 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1012 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1013 * compression - basically ignored right now
1014 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1015 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1016 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1017 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1018 */
1019
1020 ret=1;
1021 if (0)
1022 {
1023 f_err:
1024 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1025 }
1026 err:
1027 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1028 return(ret);
1029 }
1030
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1031 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1032 {
1033 unsigned char *buf;
1034 unsigned char *p,*d;
1035 int i,sl;
1036 unsigned long l,Time;
1037
1038 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1039 {
1040 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1041 p=s->s3->server_random;
1042 Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
1043 l2n(Time,p);
1044 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1045 return -1;
1046 /* Do the message type and length last */
1047 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1048
1049 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1050 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1051
1052 /* Random stuff */
1053 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1054 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1055
1056 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1057 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1058 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1059 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1060 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1061 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1062 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1063 */
1064 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1065 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1066
1067 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1068 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1069 {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 return -1;
1072 }
1073 *(p++)=sl;
1074 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1075 p+=sl;
1076
1077 /* put the cipher */
1078 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1079 p+=i;
1080
1081 /* put the compression method */
1082 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1083 *(p++)=0;
1084 #else
1085 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1086 *(p++)=0;
1087 else
1088 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1089 #endif
1090
1091 /* do the header */
1092 l=(p-d);
1093 d=buf;
1094 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1095 l2n3(l,d);
1096
1097 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1098 /* number of bytes to write */
1099 s->init_num=p-buf;
1100 s->init_off=0;
1101 }
1102
1103 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1104 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1105 }
1106
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1107 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1108 {
1109 unsigned char *p;
1110
1111 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1112 {
1113 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1114
1115 /* do the header */
1116 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1117 *(p++)=0;
1118 *(p++)=0;
1119 *(p++)=0;
1120
1121 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1122 /* number of bytes to write */
1123 s->init_num=4;
1124 s->init_off=0;
1125 }
1126
1127 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1128 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1129 }
1130
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1131 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1132 {
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1134 unsigned char *q;
1135 int j,num;
1136 RSA *rsa;
1137 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1138 unsigned int u;
1139 #endif
1140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1141 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1142 #endif
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1144 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1145 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1146 int encodedlen = 0;
1147 int curve_id = 0;
1148 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1149 #endif
1150 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1151 unsigned char *p,*d;
1152 int al,i;
1153 unsigned long type;
1154 int n;
1155 CERT *cert;
1156 BIGNUM *r[4];
1157 int nr[4],kn;
1158 BUF_MEM *buf;
1159 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1160
1161 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1162 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1163 {
1164 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1165 cert=s->cert;
1166
1167 buf=s->init_buf;
1168
1169 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1170 n=0;
1171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1172 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1173 {
1174 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1175 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1176 {
1177 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1178 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1179 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1180 if(rsa == NULL)
1181 {
1182 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1184 goto f_err;
1185 }
1186 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1187 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1188 }
1189 if (rsa == NULL)
1190 {
1191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1193 goto f_err;
1194 }
1195 r[0]=rsa->n;
1196 r[1]=rsa->e;
1197 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1198 }
1199 else
1200 #endif
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1202 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1203 {
1204 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1205 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1206 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1207 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1208 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1209 if (dhp == NULL)
1210 {
1211 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1213 goto f_err;
1214 }
1215
1216 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1217 {
1218 DH_free(dh);
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 goto err;
1221 }
1222
1223 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1224 {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1226 goto err;
1227 }
1228
1229 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1230 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1231 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1232 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1233 {
1234 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1235 {
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1237 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1238 goto err;
1239 }
1240 }
1241 else
1242 {
1243 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1244 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1245 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1246 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1247 {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1249 goto err;
1250 }
1251 }
1252 r[0]=dh->p;
1253 r[1]=dh->g;
1254 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1255 }
1256 else
1257 #endif
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1259 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1260 {
1261 const EC_GROUP *group;
1262
1263 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1264 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1265 {
1266 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1267 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1268 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1269 }
1270 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1271 {
1272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1274 goto f_err;
1275 }
1276
1277 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1278 {
1279 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 goto err;
1282 }
1283
1284 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1285 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1286 {
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1288 goto err;
1289 }
1290 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1291 {
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1293 goto err;
1294 }
1295 ecdh = ecdhp;
1296
1297 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1298 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1299 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1300 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1301 {
1302 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1303 {
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1305 goto err;
1306 }
1307 }
1308
1309 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1310 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1311 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1312 {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1314 goto err;
1315 }
1316
1317 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1318 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1319 {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1321 goto err;
1322 }
1323
1324 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1325 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1326 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1327 */
1328 if ((curve_id =
1329 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1330 == 0)
1331 {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1333 goto err;
1334 }
1335
1336 /* Encode the public key.
1337 * First check the size of encoding and
1338 * allocate memory accordingly.
1339 */
1340 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1341 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1342 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1343 NULL, 0, NULL);
1344
1345 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1346 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1347 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1348 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1349 {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1351 goto err;
1352 }
1353
1354
1355 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1356 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1357 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1358 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1359
1360 if (encodedlen == 0)
1361 {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1363 goto err;
1364 }
1365
1366 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1367
1368 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1369 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1370 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1371 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1372 * structure.
1373 */
1374 n = 3 + encodedlen;
1375
1376 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1377 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1378 */
1379 r[0]=NULL;
1380 r[1]=NULL;
1381 r[2]=NULL;
1382 }
1383 else
1384 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1385 {
1386 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1388 goto f_err;
1389 }
1390 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1391 {
1392 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1393 n+=2+nr[i];
1394 }
1395
1396 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1397 {
1398 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1399 == NULL)
1400 {
1401 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 goto f_err;
1403 }
1404 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1405 }
1406 else
1407 {
1408 pkey=NULL;
1409 kn=0;
1410 }
1411
1412 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1413 {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1415 goto err;
1416 }
1417 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1418 p= &(d[4]);
1419
1420 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1421 {
1422 s2n(nr[i],p);
1423 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1424 p+=nr[i];
1425 }
1426
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1428 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1429 {
1430 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1431 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1432 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1433 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1434 * the actual encoded point itself
1435 */
1436 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1437 p += 1;
1438 *p = curve_id;
1439 p += 1;
1440 *p = encodedlen;
1441 p += 1;
1442 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1443 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1444 encodedlen);
1445 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1446 p += encodedlen;
1447 }
1448 #endif
1449
1450 /* not anonymous */
1451 if (pkey != NULL)
1452 {
1453 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1454 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1456 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1457 {
1458 q=md_buf;
1459 j=0;
1460 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1461 {
1462 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1463 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1464 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1465 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1466 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1467 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1468 (unsigned int *)&i);
1469 q+=i;
1470 j+=i;
1471 }
1472 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1473 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1474 {
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1476 goto err;
1477 }
1478 s2n(u,p);
1479 n+=u+2;
1480 }
1481 else
1482 #endif
1483 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1484 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1485 {
1486 /* lets do DSS */
1487 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1488 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1489 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1490 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1491 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1492 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1493 {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1495 goto err;
1496 }
1497 s2n(i,p);
1498 n+=i+2;
1499 }
1500 else
1501 #endif
1502 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1503 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1504 {
1505 /* let's do ECDSA */
1506 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1507 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1508 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1509 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1510 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1511 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1512 {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1514 goto err;
1515 }
1516 s2n(i,p);
1517 n+=i+2;
1518 }
1519 else
1520 #endif
1521 {
1522 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1523 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1525 goto f_err;
1526 }
1527 }
1528
1529 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1530 l2n3(n,d);
1531
1532 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1533 * it off */
1534 s->init_num=n+4;
1535 s->init_off=0;
1536 }
1537
1538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1539 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1540 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1541 f_err:
1542 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1543 err:
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1545 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1546 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1547 #endif
1548 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1549 return(-1);
1550 }
1551
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)1552 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1553 {
1554 unsigned char *p,*d;
1555 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1556 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1557 X509_NAME *name;
1558 BUF_MEM *buf;
1559
1560 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1561 {
1562 buf=s->init_buf;
1563
1564 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1565
1566 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1567 p++;
1568 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1569 d[0]=n;
1570 p+=n;
1571 n++;
1572
1573 off=n;
1574 p+=2;
1575 n+=2;
1576
1577 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1578 nl=0;
1579 if (sk != NULL)
1580 {
1581 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1582 {
1583 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1584 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1585 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1586 {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1588 goto err;
1589 }
1590 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1591 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1592 {
1593 s2n(j,p);
1594 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1595 n+=2+j;
1596 nl+=2+j;
1597 }
1598 else
1599 {
1600 d=p;
1601 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1602 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1603 n+=j;
1604 nl+=j;
1605 }
1606 }
1607 }
1608 /* else no CA names */
1609 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1610 s2n(nl,p);
1611
1612 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1613 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1614 l2n3(n,d);
1615
1616 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1617 * it off */
1618
1619 s->init_num=n+4;
1620 s->init_off=0;
1621 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1622 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1623
1624 /* do the header */
1625 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1626 *(p++)=0;
1627 *(p++)=0;
1628 *(p++)=0;
1629 s->init_num += 4;
1630 #endif
1631
1632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1633 }
1634
1635 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1636 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1637 err:
1638 return(-1);
1639 }
1640
1641
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1643 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
KDF1_SHA1(const void * in,size_t inlen,void * out,size_t * outlen)1644 static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
1645 {
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1647 if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
1648 return NULL;
1649 else
1650 *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1651 return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
1652 #else
1653 return NULL;
1654 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SHA */
1655 }
1656 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1657
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)1658 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1659 {
1660 int i,al,ok;
1661 long n;
1662 unsigned long l;
1663 unsigned char *p;
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1665 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1666 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1667 #endif
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1669 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1670 DH *dh_srvr;
1671 #endif
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1673 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1674 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1675
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1677 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1678 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1679 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1680 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1681 #endif
1682
1683 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1684 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1685 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1686 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 2048, /* ??? */
1688 &ok);
1689
1690 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1691 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1692
1693 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1694
1695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1696 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1697 {
1698 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1699 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1700 {
1701 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1702 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1703 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1704 * be sent already */
1705 if (rsa == NULL)
1706 {
1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1709 goto f_err;
1710
1711 }
1712 }
1713 else
1714 {
1715 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1716 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1717 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1718 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1719 {
1720 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1722 goto f_err;
1723 }
1724 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1725 }
1726
1727 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1728 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1729 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1730 {
1731 n2s(p,i);
1732 if (n != i+2)
1733 {
1734 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1735 {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 else
1740 p-=2;
1741 }
1742 else
1743 n=i;
1744 }
1745
1746 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1747
1748 al = -1;
1749
1750 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1751 {
1752 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1753 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1754 }
1755
1756 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1757 {
1758 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1759 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1760 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1761 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1762 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1763 * protocol version.
1764 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1765 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1766 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1767 {
1768 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1769 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1770
1771 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1772 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1773 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1774 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1775 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1776 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1777 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1778 }
1779 }
1780
1781 if (al != -1)
1782 {
1783 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1784 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1785 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1786 ERR_clear_error();
1787 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1788 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1789 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1790 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 s->session->master_key_length=
1795 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1796 s->session->master_key,
1797 p,i);
1798 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1799 }
1800 else
1801 #endif
1802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1803 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1804 {
1805 n2s(p,i);
1806 if (n != i+2)
1807 {
1808 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1809 {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813 else
1814 {
1815 p-=2;
1816 i=(int)n;
1817 }
1818 }
1819
1820 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1821 {
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1824 goto f_err;
1825 }
1826 else
1827 {
1828 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1829 {
1830 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1832 goto f_err;
1833 }
1834 else
1835 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1836 }
1837
1838 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1839 if (pub == NULL)
1840 {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844
1845 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1846
1847 if (i <= 0)
1848 {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1850 goto err;
1851 }
1852
1853 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1854 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1855
1856 BN_clear_free(pub);
1857 pub=NULL;
1858 s->session->master_key_length=
1859 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1860 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1861 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1862 }
1863 else
1864 #endif
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1866 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1867 {
1868 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1869 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1870 krb5_data authenticator;
1871 krb5_data enc_pms;
1872 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1873 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1874 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1875 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1876 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1877 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1878 int padl, outl;
1879 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1880 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1881
1882 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1883
1884 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1885
1886 n2s(p,i);
1887 enc_ticket.length = i;
1888
1889 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1890 {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1892 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1893 goto err;
1894 }
1895
1896 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1897 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1898
1899 n2s(p,i);
1900 authenticator.length = i;
1901
1902 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1903 {
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1905 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1906 goto err;
1907 }
1908
1909 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1910 p+=authenticator.length;
1911
1912 n2s(p,i);
1913 enc_pms.length = i;
1914 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1915 p+=enc_pms.length;
1916
1917 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1918 ** after decryption
1919 */
1920 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1921 {
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1923 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926
1927 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1928 enc_pms.length + 6))
1929 {
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1931 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1932 goto err;
1933 }
1934
1935 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1936 &kssl_err)) != 0)
1937 {
1938 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1939 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1940 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1941 if (kssl_err.text)
1942 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1943 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1945 kssl_err.reason);
1946 goto err;
1947 }
1948
1949 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1950 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1951 */
1952 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1953 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1954 {
1955 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1956 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1957 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1958 if (kssl_err.text)
1959 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1960 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1962 kssl_err.reason);
1963 goto err;
1964 }
1965
1966 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1967 {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1969 goto err;
1970 }
1971
1972 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1973 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1974 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1975
1976 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1977 if (enc == NULL)
1978 goto err;
1979
1980 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1981
1982 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1983 {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1985 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1989 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1990 {
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1992 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1993 goto err;
1994 }
1995 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1996 {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1999 goto err;
2000 }
2001 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2002 {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2004 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2005 goto err;
2006 }
2007 outl += padl;
2008 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2009 {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2012 goto err;
2013 }
2014 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2015
2016 s->session->master_key_length=
2017 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2018 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2019
2020 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2021 {
2022 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2023 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2024 {
2025 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2026 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2027 }
2028 }
2029
2030
2031 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2032 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2033 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2034 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2035 */
2036 }
2037 else
2038 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2039
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2041 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2042 {
2043 int ret = 1;
2044 int field_size = 0;
2045 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2046 const EC_GROUP *group;
2047 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2048
2049 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2050 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2051 {
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2053 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2054 goto err;
2055 }
2056
2057 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2058 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2059 {
2060 /* use the certificate */
2061 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2062 }
2063 else
2064 {
2065 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2066 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2067 */
2068 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2069 }
2070
2071 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2072 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2073
2074 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2075 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2076 {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2078 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2079 goto err;
2080 }
2081
2082 /* Let's get client's public key */
2083 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2084 {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2086 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2087 goto err;
2088 }
2089
2090 if (n == 0L)
2091 {
2092 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2093
2094 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2095 {
2096 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2098 goto f_err;
2099 }
2100 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2101 == NULL) ||
2102 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2103 {
2104 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2105 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2106 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2107 * never executed. When that support is
2108 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2109 * received in the certificate is
2110 * authorized for key agreement.
2111 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2112 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2113 * group.
2114 */
2115 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2117 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2118 goto f_err;
2119 }
2120
2121 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2122 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2123 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2124 }
2125 else
2126 {
2127 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2128 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2129 */
2130 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2131 {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2133 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2134 goto err;
2135 }
2136
2137 /* Get encoded point length */
2138 i = *p;
2139 p += 1;
2140 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2141 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2142 {
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2144 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2145 goto err;
2146 }
2147 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2148 * currently, so set it to the start
2149 */
2150 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2151 }
2152
2153 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2154 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2155 if (field_size <= 0)
2156 {
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2159 goto err;
2160 }
2161 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2162 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2163 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2164 */
2165 if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
2166 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
2167 else
2168 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2169 if (i <= 0)
2170 {
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2173 goto err;
2174 }
2175
2176 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2177 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2178 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2179 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2180 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2181
2182 /* Compute the master secret */
2183 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2184 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2185
2186 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2187 return (ret);
2188 }
2189 else
2190 #endif
2191 {
2192 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2195 goto f_err;
2196 }
2197
2198 return(1);
2199 f_err:
2200 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2201 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2202 err:
2203 #endif
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2205 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2206 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2207 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2208 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2209 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2210 #endif
2211 return(-1);
2212 }
2213
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2214 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2215 {
2216 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2217 unsigned char *p;
2218 int al,ok,ret=0;
2219 long n;
2220 int type=0,i,j;
2221 X509 *peer;
2222
2223 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2224 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2225 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2226 -1,
2227 514, /* 514? */
2228 &ok);
2229
2230 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2231
2232 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2233 {
2234 peer=s->session->peer;
2235 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2236 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2237 }
2238 else
2239 {
2240 peer=NULL;
2241 pkey=NULL;
2242 }
2243
2244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2245 {
2246 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2247 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2248 {
2249 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2251 goto f_err;
2252 }
2253 ret=1;
2254 goto end;
2255 }
2256
2257 if (peer == NULL)
2258 {
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2260 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2261 goto f_err;
2262 }
2263
2264 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2265 {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2267 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2268 goto f_err;
2269 }
2270
2271 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2272 {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2274 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2275 goto f_err;
2276 }
2277
2278 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2279 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2280 n2s(p,i);
2281 n-=2;
2282 if (i > n)
2283 {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2285 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 goto f_err;
2287 }
2288
2289 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2290 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2291 {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2293 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 goto f_err;
2295 }
2296
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2298 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2299 {
2300 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2301 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2302 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2303 if (i < 0)
2304 {
2305 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2307 goto f_err;
2308 }
2309 if (i == 0)
2310 {
2311 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2313 goto f_err;
2314 }
2315 }
2316 else
2317 #endif
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2319 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2320 {
2321 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2322 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2323 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2324 if (j <= 0)
2325 {
2326 /* bad signature */
2327 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2329 goto f_err;
2330 }
2331 }
2332 else
2333 #endif
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2335 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2336 {
2337 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2338 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2339 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2340 if (j <= 0)
2341 {
2342 /* bad signature */
2343 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2345 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2346 goto f_err;
2347 }
2348 }
2349 else
2350 #endif
2351 {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2354 goto f_err;
2355 }
2356
2357
2358 ret=1;
2359 if (0)
2360 {
2361 f_err:
2362 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2363 }
2364 end:
2365 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2366 return(ret);
2367 }
2368
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)2369 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2370 {
2371 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2372 X509 *x=NULL;
2373 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2374 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2375 unsigned char *d;
2376 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2377
2378 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2379 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2380 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2381 -1,
2382 s->max_cert_list,
2383 &ok);
2384
2385 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2386
2387 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2388 {
2389 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2390 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2391 {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2393 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2394 goto f_err;
2395 }
2396 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2397 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2398 {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2400 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2401 goto f_err;
2402 }
2403 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2404 return(1);
2405 }
2406
2407 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2408 {
2409 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2411 goto f_err;
2412 }
2413 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2414
2415 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2416 {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2418 goto err;
2419 }
2420
2421 n2l3(p,llen);
2422 if (llen+3 != n)
2423 {
2424 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2426 goto f_err;
2427 }
2428 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2429 {
2430 n2l3(p,l);
2431 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2432 {
2433 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2435 goto f_err;
2436 }
2437
2438 q=p;
2439 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2440 if (x == NULL)
2441 {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2443 goto err;
2444 }
2445 if (p != (q+l))
2446 {
2447 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2449 goto f_err;
2450 }
2451 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2452 {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 goto err;
2455 }
2456 x=NULL;
2457 nc+=l+3;
2458 }
2459
2460 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2461 {
2462 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2463 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2464 {
2465 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2467 goto f_err;
2468 }
2469 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2470 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2471 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2472 {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2474 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 goto f_err;
2476 }
2477 }
2478 else
2479 {
2480 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2481 if (i <= 0)
2482 {
2483 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2485 goto f_err;
2486 }
2487 }
2488
2489 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2490 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2491 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2492 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2493
2494 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2495 * when we arrive here. */
2496 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2497 {
2498 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2499 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2500 {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504 }
2505 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2506 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2507 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2508 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2509 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2510
2511 sk=NULL;
2512
2513 ret=1;
2514 if (0)
2515 {
2516 f_err:
2517 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2518 }
2519 err:
2520 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2521 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2522 return(ret);
2523 }
2524
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)2525 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2526 {
2527 unsigned long l;
2528 X509 *x;
2529
2530 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2531 {
2532 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2533 if (x == NULL &&
2534 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2535 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2536 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2537 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2538 {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 return(0);
2541 }
2542
2543 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2545 s->init_num=(int)l;
2546 s->init_off=0;
2547 }
2548
2549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2550 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2551 }
2552
2553
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2555 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
nid2curve_id(int nid)2556 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2557 {
2558 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2559 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2560 switch (nid) {
2561 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2562 return 1;
2563 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2564 return 2;
2565 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2566 return 3;
2567 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2568 return 4;
2569 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2570 return 5;
2571 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2572 return 6;
2573 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2574 return 7;
2575 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2576 return 8;
2577 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2578 return 9;
2579 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2580 return 10;
2581 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2582 return 11;
2583 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2584 return 12;
2585 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2586 return 13;
2587 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2588 return 14;
2589 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2590 return 15;
2591 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2592 return 16;
2593 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2594 return 17;
2595 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2596 return 18;
2597 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2598 return 19;
2599 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2600 return 20;
2601 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2602 return 21;
2603 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2604 return 22;
2605 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2606 return 23;
2607 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2608 return 24;
2609 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2610 return 25;
2611 default:
2612 return 0;
2613 }
2614 }
2615 #endif
2616