1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
ssl3_read_n(SSL * s,int n,int max,int extend)123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,off,newb;
133
134 if (!extend)
135 {
136 /* start with empty packet ... */
137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
140 s->packet_length = 0;
141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
142 }
143
144 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
145 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
146 extend)
147 {
148 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
149 n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
150 }
151
152 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
153 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
154 {
155 s->packet_length+=n;
156 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
157 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
158 return(n);
159 }
160
161 /* else we need to read more data */
162 if (!s->read_ahead)
163 max=n;
164
165 {
166 /* avoid buffer overflow */
167 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
168 if (max > max_max)
169 max = max_max;
170 }
171 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
172 {
173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
174 return -1;
175 }
176
177 off = s->packet_length;
178 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
179 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
180 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
181 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
182 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
183 {
184 /* off > 0 */
185 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
186 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
187 }
188
189 while (newb < n)
190 {
191 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
192 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
193
194 clear_sys_error();
195 if (s->rbio != NULL)
196 {
197 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
198 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
199 }
200 else
201 {
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
203 i = -1;
204 }
205
206 if (i <= 0)
207 {
208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
209 return(i);
210 }
211 newb+=i;
212 }
213
214 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
215 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
216 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
217 s->packet_length += n;
218 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
219 return(n);
220 }
221
222 /* Call this to get a new input record.
223 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
224 * or non-blocking IO.
225 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
227 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
228 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
229 */
230 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
ssl3_get_record(SSL * s)231 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
232 {
233 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
234 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
235 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
236 SSL_SESSION *sess;
237 unsigned char *p;
238 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
239 short version;
240 unsigned int mac_size;
241 int clear=0;
242 size_t extra;
243 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
244 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
245
246 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
247 sess=s->session;
248
249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
250 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
251 else
252 extra=0;
253 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
254 {
255 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
256 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 return -1;
259 }
260
261 again:
262 /* check if we have the header */
263 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
264 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
265 {
266 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
267 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
268 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
269
270 p=s->packet;
271
272 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
273 rr->type= *(p++);
274 ssl_major= *(p++);
275 ssl_minor= *(p++);
276 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
277 n2s(p,rr->length);
278
279 /* Lets check version */
280 if (s->first_packet)
281 {
282 s->first_packet=0;
283 }
284 else
285 {
286 if (version != s->version)
287 {
288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
289 /* Send back error using their
290 * version number :-) */
291 s->version=version;
292 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
293 goto f_err;
294 }
295 }
296
297 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
298 {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
300 goto err;
301 }
302
303 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
304 {
305 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
307 goto f_err;
308 }
309
310 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
311 }
312
313 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
314
315 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
316 {
317 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
318 i=rr->length;
319 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
320 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
321 /* now n == rr->length,
322 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
323 }
324
325 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
326
327 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
328 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
329 */
330 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
331
332 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
333 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
334 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
335 * the decryption or by the decompression
336 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
337 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
338
339 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
340 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
341
342 /* check is not needed I believe */
343 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
344 {
345 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
347 goto f_err;
348 }
349
350 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
351 rr->data=rr->input;
352
353 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
354 if (enc_err <= 0)
355 {
356 if (enc_err == 0)
357 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
358 goto err;
359
360 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
361 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
362 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
363 * the MAC computation anyway. */
364 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
365 }
366
367 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
368 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
369 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
370 printf("\n");
371 #endif
372
373 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
374 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
375 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
376 (s->read_hash == NULL))
377 clear=1;
378
379 if (!clear)
380 {
381 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
382
383 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
384 {
385 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
386 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
388 goto f_err;
389 #else
390 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
391 #endif
392 }
393 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
394 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
395 {
396 rr->length -= mac_size;
397 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
398 }
399 else
400 {
401 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
402 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
403 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
405 goto f_err;
406 #else
407 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
408 rr->length = 0;
409 #endif
410 }
411 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
412 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
413 {
414 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
415 }
416 }
417
418 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
419 {
420 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
421 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
422 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
423 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
424 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
425 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
427 goto f_err;
428 }
429
430 /* r->length is now just compressed */
431 if (s->expand != NULL)
432 {
433 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
434 {
435 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
437 goto f_err;
438 }
439 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
440 {
441 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
443 goto f_err;
444 }
445 }
446
447 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
448 {
449 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
451 goto f_err;
452 }
453
454 rr->off=0;
455 /* So at this point the following is true
456 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
457 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
458 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
459 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
460 * after use :-).
461 */
462
463 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
464 s->packet_length=0;
465
466 /* just read a 0 length packet */
467 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
468
469 return(1);
470
471 f_err:
472 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
473 err:
474 return(ret);
475 }
476
ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL * ssl)477 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
478 {
479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
480 int i;
481 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
482
483 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
484 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
485 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
486 if (i < 0)
487 return(0);
488 else
489 rr->length=i;
490 rr->data=rr->comp;
491 #endif
492 return(1);
493 }
494
ssl3_do_compress(SSL * ssl)495 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
496 {
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
498 int i;
499 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
500
501 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
502 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
503 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
504 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
505 if (i < 0)
506 return(0);
507 else
508 wr->length=i;
509
510 wr->input=wr->data;
511 #endif
512 return(1);
513 }
514
515 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
516 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
517 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * s,int type,const void * buf_,int len)518 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
519 {
520 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
521 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
522 int i;
523
524 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
525 tot=s->s3->wnum;
526 s->s3->wnum=0;
527
528 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
529 {
530 i=s->handshake_func(s);
531 if (i < 0) return(i);
532 if (i == 0)
533 {
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
535 return -1;
536 }
537 }
538
539 n=(len-tot);
540 for (;;)
541 {
542 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
543 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
544 else
545 nw=n;
546
547 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
548 if (i <= 0)
549 {
550 s->s3->wnum=tot;
551 return i;
552 }
553
554 if ((i == (int)n) ||
555 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
556 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
557 {
558 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
559 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
560 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
561
562 return tot+i;
563 }
564
565 n-=i;
566 tot+=i;
567 }
568 }
569
do_ssl3_write(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,unsigned int len,int create_empty_fragment)570 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
571 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
572 {
573 unsigned char *p,*plen;
574 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
575 int prefix_len = 0;
576 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
577 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
578 SSL_SESSION *sess;
579
580 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
581 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
582 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
583 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
584
585 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
586 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
587 {
588 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
589 if (i <= 0)
590 return(i);
591 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
592 }
593
594 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
595 return 0;
596
597 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
598 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
599 sess=s->session;
600
601 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
602 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
603 (s->write_hash == NULL))
604 clear=1;
605
606 if (clear)
607 mac_size=0;
608 else
609 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
610
611 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
612 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
613 {
614 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
615 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
616
617 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
618 {
619 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
620 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
621 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
622 * together with the actual payload) */
623 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
624 if (prefix_len <= 0)
625 goto err;
626
627 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
628 {
629 /* insufficient space */
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
631 goto err;
632 }
633 }
634
635 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
636 }
637
638 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
639
640 /* write the header */
641
642 *(p++)=type&0xff;
643 wr->type=type;
644
645 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
646 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
647
648 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
649 plen=p;
650 p+=2;
651
652 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
653 wr->data=p;
654 wr->length=(int)len;
655 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
656
657 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
658 * wr->data */
659
660 /* first we compress */
661 if (s->compress != NULL)
662 {
663 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
664 {
665 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
666 goto err;
667 }
668 }
669 else
670 {
671 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
672 wr->input=wr->data;
673 }
674
675 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
676 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
677 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
678
679 if (mac_size != 0)
680 {
681 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
682 wr->length+=mac_size;
683 wr->input=p;
684 wr->data=p;
685 }
686
687 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
688 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
689
690 /* record length after mac and block padding */
691 s2n(wr->length,plen);
692
693 /* we should now have
694 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
695 * wr->length long */
696 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
697 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
698
699 if (create_empty_fragment)
700 {
701 /* we are in a recursive call;
702 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
703 */
704 return wr->length;
705 }
706
707 /* now let's set up wb */
708 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
709 wb->offset = 0;
710
711 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
712 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
713 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
714 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
715 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
716
717 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
718 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
719 err:
720 return -1;
721 }
722
723 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
ssl3_write_pending(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,unsigned int len)724 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
725 unsigned int len)
726 {
727 int i;
728
729 /* XXXX */
730 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
731 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
732 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
733 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
734 {
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
736 return(-1);
737 }
738
739 for (;;)
740 {
741 clear_sys_error();
742 if (s->wbio != NULL)
743 {
744 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
745 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
746 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
747 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
748 }
749 else
750 {
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
752 i= -1;
753 }
754 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
755 {
756 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
757 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
758 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
759 }
760 else if (i <= 0)
761 return(i);
762 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
763 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
764 }
765 }
766
767 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
768 * 'type' is one of the following:
769 *
770 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
771 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
772 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
773 *
774 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
775 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
776 *
777 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
778 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
779 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
780 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
781 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
782 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
783 * Change cipher spec protocol
784 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
785 * Alert protocol
786 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
787 * Handshake protocol
788 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
789 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
790 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
791 * Application data protocol
792 * none of our business
793 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * s,int type,unsigned char * buf,int len,int peek)794 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
795 {
796 int al,i,j,ret;
797 unsigned int n;
798 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
799 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
800
801 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
802 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
803 return(-1);
804
805 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
806 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
807 {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 return -1;
810 }
811
812 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
813 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
814 {
815 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
816 unsigned char *dst = buf;
817 unsigned int k;
818
819 /* peek == 0 */
820 n = 0;
821 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
822 {
823 *dst++ = *src++;
824 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
825 n++;
826 }
827 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
828 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
829 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
830 return n;
831 }
832
833 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
834
835 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
836 {
837 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
838 i=s->handshake_func(s);
839 if (i < 0) return(i);
840 if (i == 0)
841 {
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
843 return(-1);
844 }
845 }
846 start:
847 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
848
849 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
850 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
851 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
852 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
853 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
854
855 /* get new packet if necessary */
856 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
857 {
858 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
859 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
860 }
861
862 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
863
864 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
865 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
866 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
867 {
868 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
870 goto f_err;
871 }
872
873 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
874 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
875 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
876 {
877 rr->length=0;
878 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
879 return(0);
880 }
881
882
883 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
884 {
885 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
886 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
887 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
888 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
889 {
890 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
892 goto f_err;
893 }
894
895 if (len <= 0) return(len);
896
897 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
898 n = rr->length;
899 else
900 n = (unsigned int)len;
901
902 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
903 if (!peek)
904 {
905 rr->length-=n;
906 rr->off+=n;
907 if (rr->length == 0)
908 {
909 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
910 rr->off=0;
911 }
912 }
913 return(n);
914 }
915
916
917 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
918 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
919
920 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
921 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
922 */
923 {
924 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
925 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
926 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
927
928 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
929 {
930 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
931 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
932 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
933 }
934 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
935 {
936 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
937 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
938 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
939 }
940
941 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
942 {
943 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
944 if (rr->length < n)
945 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
946
947 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
948 while (n-- > 0)
949 {
950 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
951 rr->length--;
952 }
953
954 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
955 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
956 }
957 }
958
959 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
960 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
961 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
962
963 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
964 if ((!s->server) &&
965 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
966 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
967 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
968 {
969 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
970
971 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
972 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
973 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
974 {
975 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
977 goto f_err;
978 }
979
980 if (s->msg_callback)
981 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
982
983 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
984 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
985 !s->s3->renegotiate)
986 {
987 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
988 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
989 {
990 i=s->handshake_func(s);
991 if (i < 0) return(i);
992 if (i == 0)
993 {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
995 return(-1);
996 }
997
998 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
999 {
1000 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1001 {
1002 BIO *bio;
1003 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1004 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1005 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1006 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1007 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1008 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1009 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1010 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1011 return(-1);
1012 }
1013 }
1014 }
1015 }
1016 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1017 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1018 goto start;
1019 }
1020
1021 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1022 {
1023 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1024 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1025
1026 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1027
1028 if (s->msg_callback)
1029 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1030
1031 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1032 cb=s->info_callback;
1033 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1034 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1035
1036 if (cb != NULL)
1037 {
1038 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1039 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1040 }
1041
1042 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1043 {
1044 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1045 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1046 {
1047 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1048 return(0);
1049 }
1050 }
1051 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1052 {
1053 char tmp[16];
1054
1055 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1056 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1058 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1059 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1060 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1061 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1062 return(0);
1063 }
1064 else
1065 {
1066 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1068 goto f_err;
1069 }
1070
1071 goto start;
1072 }
1073
1074 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1075 {
1076 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1077 rr->length=0;
1078 return(0);
1079 }
1080
1081 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1082 {
1083 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1084 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1085 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1086 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1087 {
1088 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1090 goto f_err;
1091 }
1092
1093 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1094 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1095 {
1096 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1098 goto f_err;
1099 }
1100
1101 rr->length=0;
1102
1103 if (s->msg_callback)
1104 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1105
1106 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1107 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1108 goto err;
1109 else
1110 goto start;
1111 }
1112
1113 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1114 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1115 {
1116 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1117 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1118 {
1119 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1120 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1121 * protocol violations): */
1122 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1123 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1124 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1125 #else
1126 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1127 #endif
1128 s->new_session=1;
1129 }
1130 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1131 if (i < 0) return(i);
1132 if (i == 0)
1133 {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1135 return(-1);
1136 }
1137
1138 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1139 {
1140 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1141 {
1142 BIO *bio;
1143 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1144 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1145 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1146 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1147 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1148 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1149 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1150 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1151 return(-1);
1152 }
1153 }
1154 goto start;
1155 }
1156
1157 switch (rr->type)
1158 {
1159 default:
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1161 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1162 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1163 {
1164 rr->length = 0;
1165 goto start;
1166 }
1167 #endif
1168 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1170 goto f_err;
1171 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1172 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1173 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1174 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1175 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1176 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1177 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1179 goto f_err;
1180 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1181 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1182 * but have application data. If the library was
1183 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1184 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1185 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1186 * we will indulge it.
1187 */
1188 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1189 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1190 ((
1191 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1192 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1193 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1194 ) || (
1195 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1196 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1197 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1198 )
1199 ))
1200 {
1201 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1202 return(-1);
1203 }
1204 else
1205 {
1206 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1208 goto f_err;
1209 }
1210 }
1211 /* not reached */
1212
1213 f_err:
1214 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1215 err:
1216 return(-1);
1217 }
1218
ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL * s)1219 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1220 {
1221 int i;
1222 const char *sender;
1223 int slen;
1224
1225 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1226 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1227 else
1228 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1229
1230 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1231 {
1232 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1233 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1234 }
1235
1236 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1237 return(0);
1238
1239 /* we have to record the message digest at
1240 * this point so we can get it before we read
1241 * the finished message */
1242 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1243 {
1244 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1245 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1246 }
1247 else
1248 {
1249 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1250 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1251 }
1252
1253 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1254 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1255 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1256 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1257
1258 return(1);
1259 }
1260
ssl3_send_alert(SSL * s,int level,int desc)1261 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1262 {
1263 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1264 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1265 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1266 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1267 if (desc < 0) return;
1268 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1269 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1270 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1271
1272 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1273 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1274 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1275 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1276 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1277 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1278 * some time in the future */
1279 }
1280
ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL * s)1281 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1282 {
1283 int i,j;
1284 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1285
1286 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1287 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1288 if (i <= 0)
1289 {
1290 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1291 }
1292 else
1293 {
1294 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1295 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1296 * we will not worry too much. */
1297 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1298 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1299
1300 if (s->msg_callback)
1301 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1302
1303 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1304 cb=s->info_callback;
1305 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1306 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1307
1308 if (cb != NULL)
1309 {
1310 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1311 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1312 }
1313 }
1314 return(i);
1315 }
1316