kauth_cred_hold(): return cred verbatim so that donating a reference to
another data structure can be done more elegantly.

kauth_cred_groupmember(): check egid before a tedious scan of groups.

kern: Eliminate most __HAVE_ATOMIC_AS_MEMBAR conditionals.

I'm leaving in the conditional around the legacy membar_enters
(store-before-load, store-before-store) in kern_mutex.c and in
kern_lock.c b

kern: Eliminate most __HAVE_ATOMIC_AS_MEMBAR conditionals.

I'm leaving in the conditional around the legacy membar_enters
(store-before-load, store-before-store) in kern_mutex.c and in
kern_lock.c because they may still matter: store-before-load barriers
tend to be the most expensive kind, so eliding them is probably
worthwhile on x86. (It also may not matter; I just don't care to do
measurements right now, and it's a single valid and potentially
justifiable use case in the whole tree.)

However, membar_release/acquire can be mere instruction barriers on
all TSO platforms including x86, so there's no need to go out of our
way with a bad API to conditionalize them. If the procedure call
overhead is measurable we just could change them to be macros on x86
that expand into __insn_barrier.

Discussed on tech-kern:
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2023/02/23/msg028729.html

show more ...

sys: Use membar_release/acquire around reference drop.

This just goes through my recent reference count membar audit and
changes membar_exit to membar_release and membar_enter to
membar_acquire -- t

sys: Use membar_release/acquire around reference drop.

This just goes through my recent reference count membar audit and
changes membar_exit to membar_release and membar_enter to
membar_acquire -- this should make everything cheaper on most CPUs
without hurting correctness, because membar_acquire is generally
cheaper than membar_enter.

show more ...

Expose groupmember as kauth_cred_groupmember and use it.

sys: Membar audit around reference count releases.

If two threads are using an object that is freed when the reference
count goes to zero, we need to ensure that all memory operations
related to the

sys: Membar audit around reference count releases.

If two threads are using an object that is freed when the reference
count goes to zero, we need to ensure that all memory operations
related to the object happen before freeing the object.

Using an atomic_dec_uint_nv(&refcnt) == 0 ensures that only one
thread takes responsibility for freeing, but it's not enough to
ensure that the other thread's memory operations happen before the
freeing.

Consider:

Thread A Thread B
obj->foo = 42; obj->baz = 73;
mumble(&obj->bar); grumble(&obj->quux);
/* membar_exit(); */ /* membar_exit(); */
atomic_dec -- not last atomic_dec -- last
/* membar_enter(); */
KASSERT(invariant(obj->foo,
obj->bar));
free_stuff(obj);

The memory barriers ensure that

obj->foo = 42;
mumble(&obj->bar);

in thread A happens before

KASSERT(invariant(obj->foo, obj->bar));
free_stuff(obj);

in thread B. Without them, this ordering is not guaranteed.

So in general it is necessary to do

membar_exit();
if (atomic_dec_uint_nv(&obj->refcnt) != 0)
return;
membar_enter();

to release a reference, for the `last one out hit the lights' style
of reference counting. (This is in contrast to the style where one
thread blocks new references and then waits under a lock for existing
ones to drain with a condvar -- no membar needed thanks to mutex(9).)

I searched for atomic_dec to find all these. Obviously we ought to
have a better abstraction for this because there's so much copypasta.
This is a stop-gap measure to fix actual bugs until we have that. It
would be nice if an abstraction could gracefully handle the different
styles of reference counting in use -- some years ago I drafted an
API for this, but making it cover everything got a little out of hand
(particularly with struct vnode::v_usecount) and I ended up setting
it aside to work on psref/localcount instead for better scalability.

I got bored of adding #ifdef __HAVE_ATOMIC_AS_MEMBAR everywhere, so I
only put it on things that look performance-critical on 5sec review.
We should really adopt membar_enter_preatomic/membar_exit_postatomic
or something (except they are applicable only to atomic r/m/w, not to
atomic_load/store_*, making the naming annoying) and get rid of all
the ifdefs.

show more ...

Add ACL support for FFS. From FreeBSD.

Rename min/max -> uimin/uimax for better honesty.

These functions are defined on unsigned int. The generic name
min/max should not silently truncate to 32 bits on 64-bit systems.
This is purely a n

Rename min/max -> uimin/uimax for better honesty.

These functions are defined on unsigned int. The generic name
min/max should not silently truncate to 32 bits on 64-bit systems.
This is purely a name change -- no functional change intended.

HOWEVER! Some subsystems have

#define min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
#define max(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))

even though our standard name for that is MIN/MAX. Although these
may invite multiple evaluation bugs, these do _not_ cause integer
truncation.

To avoid `fixing' these cases, I first changed the name in libkern,
and then compile-tested every file where min/max occurred in order to
confirm that it failed -- and thus confirm that nothing shadowed
min/max -- before changing it.

I have left a handful of bootloaders that are too annoying to
compile-test, and some dead code:

cobalt ews4800mips hp300 hppa ia64 luna68k vax
acorn32/if_ie.c (not included in any kernels)
macppc/if_gm.c (superseded by gem(4))

It should be easy to fix the fallout once identified -- this way of
doing things fails safe, and the goal here, after all, is to _avoid_
silent integer truncations, not introduce them.

Maybe one day we can reintroduce min/max as type-generic things that
never silently truncate. But we should avoid doing that for a while,
so that existing code has a chance to be detected by the compiler for
conversion to uimin/uimax without changing the semantics until we can
properly audit it all. (Who knows, maybe in some cases integer
truncation is actually intended!)

show more ...

remove checks for failure after memory allocation calls that cannot fail:

kmem_alloc() with KM_SLEEP
kmem_zalloc() with KM_SLEEP
percpu_alloc()
pserialize_create()
psref_class_create()

al

remove checks for failure after memory allocation calls that cannot fail:

kmem_alloc() with KM_SLEEP
kmem_zalloc() with KM_SLEEP
percpu_alloc()
pserialize_create()
psref_class_create()

all of these paths include an assertion that the allocation has not failed,
so callers should not assert that again.

show more ...

Expose struct kauth_cred for the benefit of the debugger. I can't convince gcc
to produce debug info for the structure if it does not appear in more than
one source file.

KASSERT that magic pointers NOCRED and FSCRED are not dereferenced.

C99 section 6.7.2.3 (Tags) Note 3 states that:

A type specifier of the form

enum identifier

without an enumerator list shall only appear after the type it
specifies is complete.

which mean

C99 section 6.7.2.3 (Tags) Note 3 states that:

A type specifier of the form

enum identifier

without an enumerator list shall only appear after the type it
specifies is complete.

which means that we cannot pass an "enum vtype" argument to
kauth_access_action() without fully specifying the type first.
Unfortunately there is a complicated include file loop which
makes that difficult, so convert this minimal function into a
macro (and capitalize it).

(ok elad@)

show more ...

PR/46973: Dr. Wolfgang Stukenbrock: kauth_authorize_action_internal() returns
non-macro value as it should do

Add new action KAUTH_CRED_CHROOT for kauth(9)'s credential scope.
Reviewed and approved by elad@.

KNF fix. space vs. tab

Fix a typo. s/seperate/separate/

Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the follow

Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

show more ...

Remove TNF license.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

show more ...

Tiny cosmetics...

Implement the vnode scope and adapt tmpfs to use it.

Mailing list reference:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/07/04/msg005404.html

kauth_cred_free: add an assertion.

fix sign-compare issues

Use __arraycount when appropriate

Remove clause 3 and 4 from TNF licenses