Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entr

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

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Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

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First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes:

- Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel
and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history

First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes:

- Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel
and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history
purposes, the original location of the files was

src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_suser.c
src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/suser.h

- Add a man-page for secmodel_suser(9) and update the one for
secmodel_bsd44(9).

- Add a "secmodel" module class and use it. Userland program and
documentation updated.

- Manage secmodel count (nsecmodels) through the module framework.
This eliminates the need for secmodel_{,de}register() calls in
secmodel code.

- Prepare for secmodel modularization by adding relevant module bits.
The secmodels don't allow auto unload. The bsd44 secmodel depends
on the suser and securelevel secmodels. The overlay secmodel depends
on the bsd44 secmodel. As the module class is only cosmetic, and to
prevent ambiguity, the bsd44 and overlay secmodels are prefixed with
"secmodel_".

- Adapt the overlay secmodel to recent changes (mainly vnode scope).

- Stop using link-sets for the sysctl node(s) creation.

- Keep sysctl variables under nodes of their relevant secmodels. In
other words, don't create duplicates for the suser/securelevel
secmodels under the bsd44 secmodel, as the latter is merely used
for "grouping".

- For the suser and securelevel secmodels, "advertise presence" in
relevant sysctl nodes (sysctl.security.models.{suser,securelevel}).

- Get rid of the LKM preprocessor stuff.

- As secmodels are now modules, there's no need for an explicit call
to secmodel_start(); it's handled by the module framework. That
said, the module framework was adjusted to properly load secmodels
early during system startup.

- Adapt rump to changes: Instead of using empty stubs for securelevel,
simply use the suser secmodel. Also replace secmodel_start() with a
call to secmodel_suser_start().

- 5.99.20.

Testing was done on i386 ("release" build). Spearated module_init()
changes were tested on sparc and sparc64 as well by martin@ (thanks!).

Mailing list reference:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/09/25/msg006135.html

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Implement the vnode scope and adapt tmpfs to use it.

Mailing list reference:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/07/04/msg005404.html

Make securelevel a "secmodel" of its own.

While it's true that it's part of the traditional 4.4BSD security model,
there may come a time where a different "primary" security model used for
fine-grai

Make securelevel a "secmodel" of its own.

While it's true that it's part of the traditional 4.4BSD security model,
there may come a time where a different "primary" security model used for
fine-grained privileges (ie., splitting root's responsibilities to various
privileges that can be assigned) may want to still have a securelevel
setting.

Idea from Daniel Carosone:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0001.html

The location of the removed files, for reference, was:

src/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_securelevel.c
src/secmodel/bsd44/securelevel.h

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