xref: /openbsd-src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c (revision ccf343118d8491e93817fadb7621312f3204b0dc)
1 /*	$OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.5 2014/07/11 00:38:17 matthew Exp $	*/
2 /*
3  * Copyright (c) 2014 Google Inc.
4  *
5  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
6  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
7  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
8  *
9  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
10  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
11  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
12  * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
13  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
14  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
15  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
16  */
17 
18 #include <assert.h>
19 #include <errno.h>
20 #include <signal.h>
21 #include <string.h>
22 #include <unistd.h>
23 
24 #define ASSERT_EQ(a, b) assert((a) == (b))
25 #define ASSERT_NE(a, b) assert((a) != (b))
26 #define ASSERT_GE(a, b) assert((a) >= (b))
27 
28 /* 128 bits of random data. */
29 static const char secret[16] = {
30 	0xa0, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xba, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x0c,
31 	0xb0, 0xd6, 0xd4, 0xe3, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x5f, 0x96,
32 };
33 
34 enum {
35 	SECRETCOUNT = 64,
36 	SECRETBYTES = SECRETCOUNT * sizeof(secret)
37 };
38 
39 static char altstack[SIGSTKSZ + SECRETBYTES];
40 
41 static void
42 setup_stack(void)
43 {
44 	const stack_t sigstk = {
45 		.ss_sp = altstack,
46 		.ss_size = sizeof(altstack),
47 	};
48 
49 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(&sigstk, NULL));
50 }
51 
52 static void
53 assert_on_stack(void)
54 {
55 	stack_t cursigstk;
56 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(NULL, &cursigstk));
57 	ASSERT_EQ(SS_ONSTACK, cursigstk.ss_flags & (SS_DISABLE|SS_ONSTACK));
58 }
59 
60 static void
61 call_on_stack(void (*fn)(int))
62 {
63 	/*
64 	 * This is a bit more complicated than strictly necessary, but
65 	 * it ensures we don't have any flaky test failures due to
66 	 * inherited signal masks/actions/etc.
67 	 *
68 	 * On systems where SA_ONSTACK is not supported, this could
69 	 * alternatively be implemented using makecontext() or
70 	 * pthread_attr_setstack().
71 	 */
72 
73 	const struct sigaction sigact = {
74 		.sa_handler = fn,
75 		.sa_flags = SA_ONSTACK,
76 	};
77 	struct sigaction oldsigact;
78 	sigset_t sigset, oldsigset;
79 
80 	/* First, block all signals. */
81 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigemptyset(&sigset));
82 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigfillset(&sigset));
83 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &oldsigset));
84 
85 	/* Next setup the signal handler for SIGUSR1. */
86 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sigact, &oldsigact));
87 
88 	/* Raise SIGUSR1 and momentarily unblock it to run the handler. */
89 	ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGUSR1));
90 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigdelset(&sigset, SIGUSR1));
91 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, sigsuspend(&sigset));
92 	ASSERT_EQ(EINTR, errno);
93 
94 	/* Restore the original signal action, stack, and mask. */
95 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &oldsigact, NULL));
96 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldsigset, NULL));
97 }
98 
99 static void
100 populate_secret(char *buf, size_t len)
101 {
102 	int i, fds[2];
103 	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(fds));
104 
105 	for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++)
106 		ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(secret), write(fds[1], secret, sizeof(secret)));
107 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[1]));
108 
109 	ASSERT_EQ(len, read(fds[0], buf, len));
110 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[0]));
111 }
112 
113 static int
114 count_secrets(const char *buf)
115 {
116 	int res = 0;
117 	size_t i;
118 	for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) {
119 		if (memcmp(buf + i * sizeof(secret), secret,
120 		    sizeof(secret)) == 0)
121 			res += 1;
122 	}
123 	return (res);
124 }
125 
126 static char *
127 test_without_bzero()
128 {
129 	char buf[SECRETBYTES];
130 	assert_on_stack();
131 	populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf));
132 	char *res = memmem(altstack, sizeof(altstack), buf, sizeof(buf));
133 	ASSERT_NE(NULL, res);
134 	return (res);
135 }
136 
137 static char *
138 test_with_bzero()
139 {
140 	char buf[SECRETBYTES];
141 	assert_on_stack();
142 	populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf));
143 	char *res = memmem(altstack, sizeof(altstack), buf, sizeof(buf));
144 	ASSERT_NE(NULL, res);
145 	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
146 	return (res);
147 }
148 
149 static void
150 do_test_without_bzero(int signo)
151 {
152 	char *buf = test_without_bzero();
153 	ASSERT_GE(count_secrets(buf), 1);
154 }
155 
156 static void
157 do_test_with_bzero(int signo)
158 {
159 	char *buf = test_without_bzero();
160 	ASSERT_GE(count_secrets(buf), 0);
161 }
162 
163 int
164 main()
165 {
166 	setup_stack();
167 
168 	/*
169 	 * Solaris and OS X clobber the signal stack after returning to the
170 	 * normal stack, so we need to inspect altstack while we're still
171 	 * running on it.  Unfortunately, this means we risk clobbering the
172 	 * buffer ourselves.
173 	 *
174 	 * To minimize this risk, test_with{,out}_bzero() are responsible for
175 	 * locating the offset of their buf variable within altstack, and
176 	 * and returning that address.  Then we can simply memcmp() repeatedly
177 	 * to count how many instances of secret we found.
178 	 */
179 
180 	/*
181 	 * First, test that if we *don't* call explicit_bzero, that we
182 	 * *are* able to find at least one instance of the secret data still
183 	 * on the stack.  This sanity checks that call_on_stack() and
184 	 * populate_secret() work as intended.
185 	 */
186 	memset(altstack, 0, sizeof(altstack));
187 	call_on_stack(do_test_without_bzero);
188 
189 	/*
190 	 * Now test with a call to explicit_bzero() and check that we
191 	 * *don't* find any instances of the secret data.
192 	 */
193 	memset(altstack, 0, sizeof(altstack));
194 	call_on_stack(do_test_with_bzero);
195 
196 	return (0);
197 }
198