1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.96 2017/02/07 02:08:38 beck Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <stdio.h> 139 140 #include "ssl_locl.h" 141 142 #include <openssl/evp.h> 143 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 144 #include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146 void 147 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 148 { 149 if (S3I(s)->tmp.key_block != NULL) { 150 explicit_bzero(S3I(s)->tmp.key_block, 151 S3I(s)->tmp.key_block_length); 152 free(S3I(s)->tmp.key_block); 153 S3I(s)->tmp.key_block = NULL; 154 } 155 S3I(s)->tmp.key_block_length = 0; 156 } 157 158 int 159 tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) 160 { 161 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 162 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 163 164 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 165 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer == NULL) 166 return (0); 167 168 (void)BIO_set_close(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); 169 170 return (1); 171 } 172 173 void 174 tls1_free_digest_list(SSL *s) 175 { 176 int i; 177 178 if (s == NULL) 179 return; 180 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst == NULL) 181 return; 182 183 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 184 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i]) 185 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i]); 186 } 187 free(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst); 188 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst = NULL; 189 } 190 191 int 192 tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) 193 { 194 int i; 195 196 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && 197 !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 198 BIO_write(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len); 199 return 1; 200 } 201 202 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 203 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) 204 continue; 205 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len)) { 206 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 207 return 0; 208 } 209 } 210 211 return 1; 212 } 213 214 int 215 tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s) 216 { 217 const EVP_MD *md; 218 long hdatalen, mask; 219 void *hdata; 220 int i; 221 222 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 223 224 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst = calloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *)); 225 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst == NULL) { 226 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 227 goto err; 228 } 229 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 230 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 231 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); 232 goto err; 233 } 234 235 /* Loop through bits of the algorithm2 field and create MD contexts. */ 236 for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) { 237 if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0 || md == NULL) 238 continue; 239 240 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 241 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) { 242 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 243 goto err; 244 } 245 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i], md, NULL)) { 246 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 247 goto err; 248 } 249 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, 250 hdatalen)) { 251 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 252 goto err; 253 } 254 } 255 256 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 257 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 258 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 259 } 260 261 return 1; 262 263 err: 264 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 265 return 0; 266 } 267 268 void 269 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 270 { 271 int i; 272 273 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 274 if (++seq[i] != 0) 275 break; 276 } 277 } 278 279 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 280 static int 281 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len, 282 const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 283 const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 284 const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) 285 { 286 int chunk; 287 size_t j; 288 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 289 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 290 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 291 size_t A1_len; 292 int ret = 0; 293 294 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 295 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 296 297 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 298 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 299 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 300 if (!mac_key) 301 goto err; 302 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 303 goto err; 304 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 305 goto err; 306 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 307 goto err; 308 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 309 goto err; 310 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 311 goto err; 312 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 313 goto err; 314 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 315 goto err; 316 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 317 goto err; 318 319 for (;;) { 320 /* Reinit mac contexts */ 321 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 322 goto err; 323 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 324 goto err; 325 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 326 goto err; 327 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) 328 goto err; 329 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 330 goto err; 331 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 332 goto err; 333 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 334 goto err; 335 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 336 goto err; 337 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 338 goto err; 339 340 if (olen > chunk) { 341 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) 342 goto err; 343 out += j; 344 olen -= j; 345 /* calc the next A1 value */ 346 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) 347 goto err; 348 } else { 349 /* last one */ 350 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 351 goto err; 352 memcpy(out, A1, olen); 353 break; 354 } 355 } 356 ret = 1; 357 358 err: 359 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 360 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 361 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 362 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 363 return ret; 364 } 365 366 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 367 static int 368 tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, 369 int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, 370 int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, 371 int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) 372 { 373 int len, i, idx, count; 374 const unsigned char *S1; 375 long m; 376 const EVP_MD *md; 377 int ret = 0; 378 379 /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 380 count = 0; 381 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 382 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) 383 count++; 384 } 385 if (count == 0) { 386 SSLerrorx(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 387 goto err; 388 } 389 len = slen / count; 390 if (count == 1) 391 slen = 0; 392 S1 = sec; 393 memset(out1, 0, olen); 394 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 395 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 396 if (!md) { 397 SSLerrorx(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 398 goto err; 399 } 400 if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1), seed1, 401 seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, 402 seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen)) 403 goto err; 404 S1 += len; 405 for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { 406 out1[i] ^= out2[i]; 407 } 408 } 409 } 410 ret = 1; 411 412 err: 413 return ret; 414 } 415 416 static int 417 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num) 418 { 419 int ret; 420 421 ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 422 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 423 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 424 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 425 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 426 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 427 km, tmp, num); 428 return ret; 429 } 430 431 /* 432 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 433 * and 0 on failure. 434 */ 435 static int 436 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 437 { 438 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 439 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 440 return (1); 441 } 442 443 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 444 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 445 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 446 return (0); 447 } 448 449 return (1); 450 } 451 452 static int 453 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 454 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 455 { 456 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 457 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 458 459 if (is_read) { 460 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 461 return 0; 462 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 463 } else { 464 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 465 return 0; 466 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 467 } 468 469 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 470 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 471 return (0); 472 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 473 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 474 return (0); 475 } 476 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 477 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 478 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 479 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 480 (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 481 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 482 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 483 S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 484 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 485 486 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 487 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 488 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 489 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 490 return (0); 491 } 492 } else { 493 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 494 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 495 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 496 return (0); 497 } 498 } 499 500 return (1); 501 } 502 503 /* 504 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 505 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 506 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 507 * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates 508 * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction. 509 */ 510 static int 511 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, 512 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 513 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 514 unsigned int iv_len) 515 { 516 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 517 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 518 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 519 const EVP_MD *mac; 520 int mac_type; 521 522 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 523 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 524 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 525 526 if (is_read) { 527 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 528 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 529 else 530 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 531 532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); 533 s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; 534 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash); 535 s->read_hash = NULL; 536 537 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 538 goto err; 539 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 540 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 541 goto err; 542 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 543 } else { 544 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 545 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 546 else 547 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 548 549 /* 550 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 551 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 552 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 553 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 554 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 555 */ 556 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 557 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 558 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 559 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->internal->write_hash); 560 s->internal->write_hash = NULL; 561 } 562 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 563 goto err; 564 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 565 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 566 goto err; 567 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 568 } 569 570 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 571 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL, 572 !is_read); 573 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, 574 iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv); 575 } else 576 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 577 578 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 579 EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 580 mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 581 if (mac_key == NULL) 582 goto err; 583 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 584 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 585 } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) { 586 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 588 mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret); 589 } 590 591 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 592 int nid; 593 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 594 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 595 else 596 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 597 598 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 599 if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 600 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 601 } 602 603 return (1); 604 605 err: 606 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 607 return (0); 608 } 609 610 int 611 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 612 { 613 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 614 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 615 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 616 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 617 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 618 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 619 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 620 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 621 char is_read, use_client_keys; 622 623 624 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 625 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 626 627 /* 628 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 629 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 630 * just written one. 631 */ 632 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 633 634 /* 635 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 636 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 637 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 638 */ 639 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 640 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 641 642 643 /* 644 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 645 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 646 */ 647 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 648 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 649 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 650 } 651 652 if (aead != NULL) { 653 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 654 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher); 655 } else { 656 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 657 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 658 659 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 660 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 661 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 662 } 663 664 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 665 666 key_block = S3I(s)->tmp.key_block; 667 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 668 key_block += mac_secret_size; 669 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 670 key_block += mac_secret_size; 671 client_write_key = key_block; 672 key_block += key_len; 673 server_write_key = key_block; 674 key_block += key_len; 675 client_write_iv = key_block; 676 key_block += iv_len; 677 server_write_iv = key_block; 678 key_block += iv_len; 679 680 if (use_client_keys) { 681 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 682 key = client_write_key; 683 iv = client_write_iv; 684 } else { 685 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 686 key = server_write_key; 687 iv = server_write_iv; 688 } 689 690 if (key_block - S3I(s)->tmp.key_block != S3I(s)->tmp.key_block_length) { 691 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 692 goto err2; 693 } 694 695 if (is_read) { 696 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 697 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 698 } else { 699 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 700 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 701 } 702 703 if (aead != NULL) { 704 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 705 iv, iv_len); 706 } 707 708 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, 709 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 710 711 err2: 712 return (0); 713 } 714 715 int 716 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 717 { 718 unsigned char *key_block, *tmp_block = NULL; 719 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 720 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 721 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 722 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 723 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 724 int ret = 0; 725 726 if (S3I(s)->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 727 return (1); 728 729 if (s->session->cipher && 730 (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) { 731 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 732 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 733 return (0); 734 } 735 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 736 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 737 } else { 738 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 739 &mac_secret_size)) { 740 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 741 return (0); 742 } 743 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 744 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 745 746 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 747 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 748 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 749 } 750 751 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 752 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 753 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 754 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 755 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 756 757 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 758 759 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 760 2)) == NULL) { 761 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 762 goto err; 763 } 764 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 765 766 S3I(s)->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len; 767 S3I(s)->tmp.key_block = key_block; 768 769 if ((tmp_block = malloc(key_block_len)) == NULL) { 770 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 771 goto err; 772 } 773 774 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, tmp_block, key_block_len)) 775 goto err; 776 777 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 778 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 779 /* 780 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 781 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 782 */ 783 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 784 785 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 786 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 787 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 788 789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 790 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 791 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 792 #endif 793 } 794 } 795 796 ret = 1; 797 798 err: 799 if (tmp_block) { 800 explicit_bzero(tmp_block, key_block_len); 801 free(tmp_block); 802 } 803 return (ret); 804 } 805 806 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 807 * 808 * Returns: 809 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 810 * short etc). 811 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 812 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 813 * an internal error occured. 814 */ 815 int 816 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 817 { 818 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 819 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 820 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 821 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 822 unsigned char *seq; 823 unsigned long l; 824 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 825 826 if (send) { 827 aead = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 828 rec = &S3I(s)->wrec; 829 seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence; 830 } else { 831 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 832 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 833 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 834 } 835 836 if (aead) { 837 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 838 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 839 unsigned int nonce_used; 840 841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 842 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 843 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 844 } else { 845 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 846 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 847 } 848 849 ad[8] = rec->type; 850 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 851 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 852 853 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 854 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 855 return -1; 856 857 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 858 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 859 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 860 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 861 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 862 } else { 863 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 864 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 865 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 866 } 867 868 if (send) { 869 size_t len = rec->length; 870 size_t eivlen = 0; 871 in = rec->input; 872 out = rec->data; 873 874 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 875 /* 876 * The sequence number is left zero 877 * padded, then xored with the fixed 878 * nonce. 879 */ 880 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 881 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 882 aead->variable_nonce_len); 883 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 884 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 885 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 886 } else { 887 /* 888 * When sending we use the sequence number as 889 * the variable part of the nonce. 890 */ 891 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 892 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 893 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 894 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 895 aead->variable_nonce_len); 896 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 897 } 898 899 /* 900 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 901 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 902 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 903 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 904 * plaintext. 905 */ 906 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 907 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 908 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 909 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 910 } 911 912 ad[11] = len >> 8; 913 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 914 915 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 916 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 917 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 918 return -1; 919 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 920 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 921 } else { 922 /* receive */ 923 size_t len = rec->length; 924 925 if (rec->data != rec->input) 926 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 927 out = in = rec->input; 928 929 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 930 return 0; 931 932 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 933 /* 934 * The sequence number is left zero 935 * padded, then xored with the fixed 936 * nonce. 937 */ 938 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 939 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 940 aead->variable_nonce_len); 941 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 942 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 943 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 944 } else { 945 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 946 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 947 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 948 949 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 950 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 951 aead->variable_nonce_len); 952 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 953 } 954 955 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 956 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 957 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 958 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 959 } 960 961 if (len < aead->tag_len) 962 return 0; 963 len -= aead->tag_len; 964 965 ad[11] = len >> 8; 966 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 967 968 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 969 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 970 sizeof(ad))) 971 return -1; 972 973 rec->data = rec->input = out; 974 } 975 976 rec->length = out_len; 977 978 return 1; 979 } 980 981 if (send) { 982 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 983 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 984 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 985 } 986 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 987 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 988 enc = NULL; 989 else { 990 int ivlen = 0; 991 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 992 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 993 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 994 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 995 if (ivlen > 1) { 996 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 997 #ifdef DEBUG 998 /* we can't write into the input stream: 999 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 1000 */ 1001 fprintf(stderr, 1002 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 1003 __FILE__, __LINE__); 1004 #endif 1005 } else 1006 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 1007 } 1008 } 1009 } else { 1010 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 1011 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1012 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 1013 } 1014 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 1015 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 1016 enc = NULL; 1017 else 1018 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 1019 } 1020 1021 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 1022 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 1023 rec->input = rec->data; 1024 ret = 1; 1025 } else { 1026 l = rec->length; 1027 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 1028 1029 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 1030 unsigned char buf[13]; 1031 1032 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1033 dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq, 1034 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 1035 } else { 1036 memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1037 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1038 } 1039 1040 buf[8] = rec->type; 1041 buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 1042 buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 1043 buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 1044 buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 1045 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); 1046 if (send) { 1047 l += pad; 1048 rec->length += pad; 1049 } 1050 } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 1051 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 1052 1053 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 1054 1055 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 1056 j = i - 1; 1057 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 1058 rec->input[k] = j; 1059 l += i; 1060 rec->length += i; 1061 } 1062 1063 if (!send) { 1064 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 1065 return 0; 1066 } 1067 1068 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 1069 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 1070 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 1071 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 1072 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 1073 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1074 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1075 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1076 } 1077 1078 ret = 1; 1079 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 1080 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1081 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 1082 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 1083 if (pad && !send) 1084 rec->length -= pad; 1085 } 1086 return ret; 1087 } 1088 1089 int 1090 tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 1091 { 1092 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; 1093 unsigned int ret; 1094 int i; 1095 1096 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) 1097 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1098 return 0; 1099 1100 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 1101 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i] && 1102 EVP_MD_CTX_type(S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { 1103 d = S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[i]; 1104 break; 1105 } 1106 } 1107 if (d == NULL) { 1108 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 1109 return 0; 1110 } 1111 1112 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1113 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) 1114 return 0; 1115 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); 1116 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1117 1118 return ((int)ret); 1119 } 1120 1121 int 1122 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 1123 { 1124 unsigned int i; 1125 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 1126 unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1127 unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; 1128 int idx; 1129 long mask; 1130 int err = 0; 1131 const EVP_MD *md; 1132 1133 q = buf; 1134 1135 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) 1136 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1137 return 0; 1138 1139 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1140 1141 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { 1142 if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & mask) { 1143 int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 1144 EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[idx]; 1145 if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || 1146 hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { 1147 /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ 1148 err = 1; 1149 } else { 1150 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || 1151 !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || 1152 (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) 1153 err = 1; 1154 q += hashsize; 1155 } 1156 } 1157 } 1158 1159 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), 1160 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1161 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1162 out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) 1163 err = 1; 1164 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1165 1166 if (err) 1167 return 0; 1168 else 1169 return sizeof buf2; 1170 } 1171 1172 int 1173 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 1174 { 1175 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 1176 unsigned char *seq; 1177 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 1178 size_t md_size, orig_len; 1179 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 1180 unsigned char header[13]; 1181 int stream_mac = (send ? 1182 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 1183 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1184 int t; 1185 1186 if (send) { 1187 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->wrec); 1188 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->write_sequence[0]); 1189 hash = ssl->internal->write_hash; 1190 } else { 1191 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 1192 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 1193 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1194 } 1195 1196 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1197 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1198 md_size = t; 1199 1200 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1201 if (stream_mac) { 1202 mac_ctx = hash; 1203 } else { 1204 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1205 return -1; 1206 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1207 } 1208 1209 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1210 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1211 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 1212 else 1213 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1214 1215 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1216 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1217 rec->type &= 0xff; 1218 1219 header[8] = rec->type; 1220 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1221 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1222 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1223 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1224 1225 if (!send && 1226 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1227 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1228 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1229 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1230 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1231 * timing-oracle. */ 1232 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1233 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1234 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1235 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 1236 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 1237 return -1; 1238 } else { 1239 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1240 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1241 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1242 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1243 } 1244 1245 if (!stream_mac) 1246 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1247 1248 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1249 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1250 1251 return (md_size); 1252 } 1253 1254 int 1255 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1256 int len) 1257 { 1258 unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1259 1260 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1261 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1262 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1263 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1264 p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); 1265 1266 return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1267 } 1268 1269 int 1270 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1271 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1272 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1273 { 1274 unsigned char *buff; 1275 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1276 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1277 int rv; 1278 1279 buff = malloc(olen); 1280 if (buff == NULL) 1281 goto err2; 1282 1283 /* construct PRF arguments 1284 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1285 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1286 * does not create a prohibited label. 1287 */ 1288 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1289 if (use_context) { 1290 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1291 } 1292 1293 val = malloc(vallen); 1294 if (val == NULL) 1295 goto err2; 1296 currentvalpos = 0; 1297 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1298 currentvalpos += llen; 1299 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1300 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1301 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1302 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1303 1304 if (use_context) { 1305 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1306 currentvalpos++; 1307 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1308 currentvalpos++; 1309 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1310 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1311 } 1312 } 1313 1314 /* disallow prohibited labels 1315 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1316 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1317 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1318 */ 1319 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1320 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1321 goto err1; 1322 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1323 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1324 goto err1; 1325 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1326 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1327 goto err1; 1328 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1329 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1330 goto err1; 1331 1332 rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1333 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1334 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1335 out, buff, olen); 1336 1337 goto ret; 1338 err1: 1339 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1340 rv = 0; 1341 goto ret; 1342 err2: 1343 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1344 rv = 0; 1345 ret: 1346 free(buff); 1347 free(val); 1348 1349 return (rv); 1350 } 1351 1352 int 1353 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1354 { 1355 switch (code) { 1356 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1357 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1358 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1359 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1360 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1361 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1362 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1363 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1364 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1365 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1366 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1367 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1368 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1369 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1370 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1371 return (-1); 1372 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1373 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1374 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1375 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1376 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1377 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1378 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1379 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1380 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1381 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1382 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1383 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1384 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1385 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1386 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1387 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1388 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1389 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1390 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1391 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1392 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1393 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1394 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1395 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1396 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1397 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1398 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1399 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1400 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1401 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1402 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1403 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1404 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1405 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1406 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1407 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1408 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1409 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1410 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1411 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1412 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1413 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1414 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1415 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1416 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1417 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1418 default: 1419 return (-1); 1420 } 1421 } 1422