1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.114 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <limits.h> 139 #include <stdio.h> 140 141 #include "ssl_locl.h" 142 143 #include <openssl/evp.h> 144 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 145 #include <openssl/md5.h> 146 147 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 148 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 149 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 150 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len); 151 152 void 153 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 154 { 155 freezero(S3I(s)->hs.key_block, S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len); 156 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = NULL; 157 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = 0; 158 } 159 160 int 161 tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) 162 { 163 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 164 165 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 166 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer == NULL) 167 return (0); 168 169 (void)BIO_set_close(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); 170 171 return (1); 172 } 173 174 int 175 tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) 176 { 177 if (len < 0) 178 return 0; 179 180 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_update(s, buf, len)) 181 return 0; 182 183 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && 184 !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 185 BIO_write(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len); 186 return 1; 187 } 188 189 return 1; 190 } 191 192 int 193 tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s) 194 { 195 long hdatalen; 196 void *hdata; 197 198 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 199 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 200 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); 201 goto err; 202 } 203 204 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 205 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 206 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 207 } 208 209 return 1; 210 211 err: 212 return 0; 213 } 214 215 void 216 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 217 { 218 int i; 219 220 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 221 if (++seq[i] != 0) 222 break; 223 } 224 } 225 226 /* 227 * TLS P_hash() data expansion function - see RFC 5246, section 5. 228 */ 229 static int 230 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 231 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 232 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 233 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 234 { 235 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 236 size_t A1_len, hmac_len; 237 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 238 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 239 int ret = 0; 240 int chunk; 241 size_t i; 242 243 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 244 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 245 246 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 247 248 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 249 if (!mac_key) 250 goto err; 251 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 252 goto err; 253 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 254 goto err; 255 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 256 goto err; 257 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 258 goto err; 259 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 260 goto err; 261 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 262 goto err; 263 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 264 goto err; 265 266 for (;;) { 267 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 268 goto err; 269 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 270 goto err; 271 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 272 goto err; 273 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 274 goto err; 275 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 276 goto err; 277 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 278 goto err; 279 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 280 goto err; 281 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) 282 goto err; 283 284 if (hmac_len > out_len) 285 hmac_len = out_len; 286 287 for (i = 0; i < hmac_len; i++) 288 out[i] ^= hmac[i]; 289 290 out += hmac_len; 291 out_len -= hmac_len; 292 293 if (out_len == 0) 294 break; 295 296 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 297 goto err; 298 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 299 goto err; 300 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 301 goto err; 302 } 303 ret = 1; 304 305 err: 306 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 307 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 308 309 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 310 explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); 311 312 return ret; 313 } 314 315 int 316 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 317 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 318 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 319 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 320 { 321 const EVP_MD *md; 322 size_t half_len; 323 324 memset(out, 0, out_len); 325 326 if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) 327 return (0); 328 329 if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { 330 /* 331 * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. 332 * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. 333 */ 334 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 335 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 336 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 337 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 338 return (0); 339 340 secret += secret_len - half_len; 341 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 342 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 343 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 344 return (0); 345 346 return (1); 347 } 348 349 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, 350 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 351 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 352 return (0); 353 354 return (1); 355 } 356 357 static int 358 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) 359 { 360 if (num < 0) 361 return (0); 362 363 return tls1_PRF(s, 364 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 365 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 366 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 367 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 368 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, km, num); 369 } 370 371 /* 372 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 373 * and 0 on failure. 374 */ 375 static int 376 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 377 { 378 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 379 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 380 return (1); 381 } 382 383 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 384 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 385 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 386 return (0); 387 } 388 389 return (1); 390 } 391 392 static int 393 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 394 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 395 { 396 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 397 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 398 399 if (is_read) { 400 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 401 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 402 return 0; 403 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 404 } else { 405 /* XXX - Need to correctly handle DTLS. */ 406 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 407 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 408 return 0; 409 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 410 } 411 412 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 413 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 414 return (0); 415 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 416 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 417 return (0); 418 } 419 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 420 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 421 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 422 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 423 (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 424 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 425 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 426 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 427 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 428 429 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 430 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 431 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 432 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 433 return (0); 434 } 435 } else { 436 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 437 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 438 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 439 return (0); 440 } 441 } 442 443 return (1); 444 } 445 446 /* 447 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 448 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 449 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 450 * message. 451 */ 452 static int 453 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, 454 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 455 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 456 unsigned int iv_len) 457 { 458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 459 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 460 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 461 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 462 const EVP_MD *mac; 463 int mac_type; 464 465 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 466 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 467 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 468 469 if (is_read) { 470 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 471 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 472 else 473 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 474 475 ssl_clear_cipher_read_state(s); 476 477 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 478 goto err; 479 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 480 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 481 goto err; 482 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 483 } else { 484 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 485 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 486 else 487 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 488 489 /* 490 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 491 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 492 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 493 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 494 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 495 */ 496 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 497 ssl_clear_cipher_write_state(s); 498 499 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 500 goto err; 501 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 502 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) 503 goto err; 504 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 505 } 506 507 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 508 509 if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, 510 mac_secret_size)) == NULL) 511 goto err; 512 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 513 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 514 515 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 516 int nid; 517 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 518 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 519 else 520 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 521 522 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 523 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 524 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 525 } 526 527 return (1); 528 529 err: 530 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 531 return (0); 532 } 533 534 int 535 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 536 { 537 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 538 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 539 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 540 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 541 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 542 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 543 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 544 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 545 char is_read, use_client_keys; 546 547 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 548 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 549 550 /* 551 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 552 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 553 * just written one. 554 */ 555 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 556 557 /* 558 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 559 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 560 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 561 */ 562 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 563 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 564 565 /* 566 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 567 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 568 */ 569 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 570 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 571 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 572 } 573 574 if (aead != NULL) { 575 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 576 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher); 577 } else { 578 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 579 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 580 } 581 582 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 583 584 key_block = S3I(s)->hs.key_block; 585 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 586 key_block += mac_secret_size; 587 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 588 key_block += mac_secret_size; 589 client_write_key = key_block; 590 key_block += key_len; 591 server_write_key = key_block; 592 key_block += key_len; 593 client_write_iv = key_block; 594 key_block += iv_len; 595 server_write_iv = key_block; 596 key_block += iv_len; 597 598 if (use_client_keys) { 599 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 600 key = client_write_key; 601 iv = client_write_iv; 602 } else { 603 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 604 key = server_write_key; 605 iv = server_write_iv; 606 } 607 608 if (key_block - S3I(s)->hs.key_block != S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len) { 609 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 610 goto err2; 611 } 612 613 if (is_read) { 614 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 615 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 616 } else { 617 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 618 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 619 } 620 621 if (aead != NULL) { 622 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 623 iv, iv_len); 624 } 625 626 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, 627 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 628 629 err2: 630 return (0); 631 } 632 633 int 634 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 635 { 636 unsigned char *key_block; 637 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 638 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 639 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 640 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 641 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 642 int ret = 0; 643 644 if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len != 0) 645 return (1); 646 647 if (s->session->cipher && 648 (s->session->cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD)) { 649 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 650 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 651 return (0); 652 } 653 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 654 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 655 } else { 656 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 657 &mac_secret_size)) { 658 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 659 return (0); 660 } 661 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 662 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 663 } 664 665 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 666 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 667 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 668 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 669 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 670 671 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 672 673 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 674 2)) == NULL) { 675 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 676 goto err; 677 } 678 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 679 680 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = key_block_len; 681 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = key_block; 682 683 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, key_block_len)) 684 goto err; 685 686 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 687 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 688 /* 689 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 690 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 691 */ 692 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 693 694 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 695 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 696 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 697 698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 699 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 700 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 701 #endif 702 } 703 } 704 705 ret = 1; 706 707 err: 708 return (ret); 709 } 710 711 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 712 * 713 * Returns: 714 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 715 * short etc). 716 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 717 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 718 * an internal error occured. 719 */ 720 int 721 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 722 { 723 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 724 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 725 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 726 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 727 unsigned char *seq; 728 unsigned long l; 729 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 730 731 if (send) { 732 aead = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 733 rec = &S3I(s)->wrec; 734 seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence; 735 } else { 736 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 737 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 738 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 739 } 740 741 if (aead) { 742 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 743 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 744 unsigned int nonce_used; 745 746 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 747 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 748 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 749 } else { 750 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 751 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 752 } 753 754 ad[8] = rec->type; 755 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 756 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 757 758 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 759 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 760 return -1; 761 762 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 763 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 764 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 765 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 766 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 767 } else { 768 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 769 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 770 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 771 } 772 773 if (send) { 774 size_t len = rec->length; 775 size_t eivlen = 0; 776 in = rec->input; 777 out = rec->data; 778 779 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 780 /* 781 * The sequence number is left zero 782 * padded, then xored with the fixed 783 * nonce. 784 */ 785 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 786 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 787 aead->variable_nonce_len); 788 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 789 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 790 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 791 } else { 792 /* 793 * When sending we use the sequence number as 794 * the variable part of the nonce. 795 */ 796 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 797 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 798 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 799 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 800 aead->variable_nonce_len); 801 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 802 } 803 804 /* 805 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 806 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 807 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 808 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 809 * plaintext. 810 */ 811 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 812 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 813 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 814 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 815 } 816 817 ad[11] = len >> 8; 818 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 819 820 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 821 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 822 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 823 return -1; 824 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 825 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 826 } else { 827 /* receive */ 828 size_t len = rec->length; 829 830 if (rec->data != rec->input) 831 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 832 out = in = rec->input; 833 834 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 835 return 0; 836 837 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 838 /* 839 * The sequence number is left zero 840 * padded, then xored with the fixed 841 * nonce. 842 */ 843 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 844 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 845 aead->variable_nonce_len); 846 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 847 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 848 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 849 } else { 850 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 851 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 852 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 853 854 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 855 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 856 aead->variable_nonce_len); 857 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 858 } 859 860 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 861 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 862 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 863 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 864 } 865 866 if (len < aead->tag_len) 867 return 0; 868 len -= aead->tag_len; 869 870 ad[11] = len >> 8; 871 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 872 873 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 874 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 875 sizeof(ad))) 876 return -1; 877 878 rec->data = rec->input = out; 879 } 880 881 rec->length = out_len; 882 883 return 1; 884 } 885 886 if (send) { 887 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 888 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 889 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 890 } 891 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 892 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 893 enc = NULL; 894 else { 895 int ivlen = 0; 896 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 897 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 898 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 899 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 900 if (ivlen > 1) { 901 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 902 #ifdef DEBUG 903 /* we can't write into the input stream: 904 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 905 */ 906 fprintf(stderr, 907 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 908 __FILE__, __LINE__); 909 #endif 910 } else 911 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 912 } 913 } 914 } else { 915 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 916 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 917 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 918 } 919 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 920 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 921 enc = NULL; 922 else 923 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 924 } 925 926 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 927 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 928 rec->input = rec->data; 929 ret = 1; 930 } else { 931 l = rec->length; 932 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 933 934 if (bs != 1 && send) { 935 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 936 937 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 938 939 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 940 j = i - 1; 941 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 942 rec->input[k] = j; 943 l += i; 944 rec->length += i; 945 } 946 947 if (!send) { 948 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 949 return 0; 950 } 951 952 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 953 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 954 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 955 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 956 957 ret = 1; 958 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 959 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 960 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 961 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 962 if (pad && !send) 963 rec->length -= pad; 964 } 965 return ret; 966 } 967 968 int 969 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int str_len, unsigned char *out) 970 { 971 unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 972 size_t hash_len; 973 974 if (str_len < 0) 975 return 0; 976 977 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_value(s, buf, sizeof(buf), &hash_len)) 978 return 0; 979 980 if (!tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 981 str, str_len, buf, hash_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 982 out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) 983 return 0; 984 985 return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; 986 } 987 988 int 989 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 990 { 991 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 992 unsigned char *seq; 993 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 994 size_t md_size, orig_len; 995 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 996 unsigned char header[13]; 997 int stream_mac = (send ? 998 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 999 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1000 int t; 1001 1002 if (send) { 1003 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->wrec); 1004 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->write_sequence[0]); 1005 hash = ssl->internal->write_hash; 1006 } else { 1007 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 1008 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 1009 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1010 } 1011 1012 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1013 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1014 md_size = t; 1015 1016 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1017 if (stream_mac) { 1018 mac_ctx = hash; 1019 } else { 1020 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1021 return -1; 1022 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1023 } 1024 1025 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1026 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1027 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 1028 else 1029 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1030 1031 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1032 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1033 rec->type &= 0xff; 1034 1035 header[8] = rec->type; 1036 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1037 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1038 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1039 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1040 1041 if (!send && 1042 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1043 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1044 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1045 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1046 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1047 * timing-oracle. */ 1048 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1049 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1050 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1051 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 1052 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 1053 return -1; 1054 } else { 1055 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1056 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1057 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1058 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1059 } 1060 1061 if (!stream_mac) 1062 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1063 1064 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1065 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1066 1067 return (md_size); 1068 } 1069 1070 int 1071 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1072 int len) 1073 { 1074 if (len < 0) 1075 return 0; 1076 1077 if (!tls1_PRF(s, p, len, 1078 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1079 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1080 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1081 s->session->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) 1082 return 0; 1083 1084 return (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1085 } 1086 1087 int 1088 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1089 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1090 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1091 { 1092 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1093 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1094 int rv; 1095 1096 /* construct PRF arguments 1097 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1098 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1099 * does not create a prohibited label. 1100 */ 1101 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1102 if (use_context) { 1103 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1104 } 1105 1106 val = malloc(vallen); 1107 if (val == NULL) 1108 goto err2; 1109 currentvalpos = 0; 1110 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1111 currentvalpos += llen; 1112 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1113 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1114 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1115 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1116 1117 if (use_context) { 1118 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1119 currentvalpos++; 1120 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1121 currentvalpos++; 1122 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1123 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1124 } 1125 } 1126 1127 /* disallow prohibited labels 1128 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1129 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1130 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1131 */ 1132 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1133 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1134 goto err1; 1135 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1136 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1137 goto err1; 1138 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1139 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1140 goto err1; 1141 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1142 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1143 goto err1; 1144 1145 rv = tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1146 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, out, olen); 1147 1148 goto ret; 1149 err1: 1150 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1151 rv = 0; 1152 goto ret; 1153 err2: 1154 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1155 rv = 0; 1156 ret: 1157 free(val); 1158 1159 return (rv); 1160 } 1161 1162 int 1163 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1164 { 1165 switch (code) { 1166 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1167 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1168 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1169 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1170 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1171 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1172 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1173 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1174 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1175 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1176 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1177 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1178 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1179 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1180 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1181 return (-1); 1182 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1183 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1184 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1185 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1186 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1187 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1188 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1189 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1190 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1191 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1192 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1193 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1194 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1195 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1196 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1197 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1198 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1199 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1200 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1201 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1202 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1203 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1204 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1205 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1206 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1207 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1208 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1209 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1210 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1211 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1212 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1213 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1214 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1215 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1216 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1217 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1218 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1219 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1220 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1221 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1222 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1223 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1224 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1225 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1226 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1227 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1228 default: 1229 return (-1); 1230 } 1231 } 1232