1 /* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.109 2017/05/06 22:24:58 beck Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138 #include <limits.h> 139 #include <stdio.h> 140 141 #include "ssl_locl.h" 142 143 #include <openssl/evp.h> 144 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 145 #include <openssl/md5.h> 146 147 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 148 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 149 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 150 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len); 151 152 void 153 tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 154 { 155 freezero(S3I(s)->hs.key_block, S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len); 156 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = NULL; 157 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = 0; 158 } 159 160 int 161 tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) 162 { 163 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 164 165 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 166 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer == NULL) 167 return (0); 168 169 (void)BIO_set_close(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); 170 171 return (1); 172 } 173 174 int 175 tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) 176 { 177 if (len < 0) 178 return 0; 179 180 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_update(s, buf, len)) 181 return 0; 182 183 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && 184 !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 185 BIO_write(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len); 186 return 1; 187 } 188 189 return 1; 190 } 191 192 int 193 tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s) 194 { 195 long hdatalen; 196 void *hdata; 197 198 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 199 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 200 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); 201 goto err; 202 } 203 204 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 205 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 206 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 207 } 208 209 return 1; 210 211 err: 212 return 0; 213 } 214 215 void 216 tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 217 { 218 int i; 219 220 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 221 if (++seq[i] != 0) 222 break; 223 } 224 } 225 226 /* 227 * TLS P_hash() data expansion function - see RFC 5246, section 5. 228 */ 229 static int 230 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 231 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 232 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 233 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 234 { 235 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 236 size_t A1_len, hmac_len; 237 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 238 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 239 int ret = 0; 240 int chunk; 241 size_t i; 242 243 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 244 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 245 246 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 247 248 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 249 if (!mac_key) 250 goto err; 251 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 252 goto err; 253 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 254 goto err; 255 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 256 goto err; 257 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 258 goto err; 259 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 260 goto err; 261 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 262 goto err; 263 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 264 goto err; 265 266 for (;;) { 267 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 268 goto err; 269 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 270 goto err; 271 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 272 goto err; 273 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 274 goto err; 275 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 276 goto err; 277 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 278 goto err; 279 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 280 goto err; 281 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, hmac, &hmac_len)) 282 goto err; 283 284 if (hmac_len > out_len) 285 hmac_len = out_len; 286 287 for (i = 0; i < hmac_len; i++) 288 out[i] ^= hmac[i]; 289 290 out += hmac_len; 291 out_len -= hmac_len; 292 293 if (out_len == 0) 294 break; 295 296 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 297 goto err; 298 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 299 goto err; 300 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 301 goto err; 302 } 303 ret = 1; 304 305 err: 306 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 307 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 308 309 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 310 explicit_bzero(hmac, sizeof(hmac)); 311 312 return ret; 313 } 314 315 int 316 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, 317 const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, 318 const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, 319 const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) 320 { 321 const EVP_MD *md; 322 size_t half_len; 323 324 memset(out, 0, out_len); 325 326 if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) 327 return (0); 328 329 if (md->type == NID_md5_sha1) { 330 /* 331 * Partition secret between MD5 and SHA1, then XOR result. 332 * If the secret length is odd, a one byte overlap is used. 333 */ 334 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 335 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_md5(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 336 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 337 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 338 return (0); 339 340 secret += secret_len - half_len; 341 if (!tls1_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), secret, half_len, seed1, seed1_len, 342 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 343 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 344 return (0); 345 346 return (1); 347 } 348 349 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len, 350 seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, 351 seed5, seed5_len, out, out_len)) 352 return (0); 353 354 return (1); 355 } 356 357 static int 358 tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) 359 { 360 if (num < 0) 361 return (0); 362 363 return tls1_PRF(s, 364 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 365 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 366 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 367 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 368 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, km, num); 369 } 370 371 /* 372 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 373 * and 0 on failure. 374 */ 375 static int 376 tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 377 { 378 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 379 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 380 return (1); 381 } 382 383 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 384 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 385 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 386 return (0); 387 } 388 389 return (1); 390 } 391 392 static int 393 tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 394 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 395 { 396 const EVP_AEAD *aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 397 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 398 399 if (is_read) { 400 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_read_ctx)) 401 return 0; 402 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 403 } else { 404 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->internal->aead_write_ctx)) 405 return 0; 406 aead_ctx = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 407 } 408 409 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 410 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 411 return (0); 412 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 413 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 414 return (0); 415 } 416 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 417 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 418 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 419 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 420 (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 421 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 422 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 423 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 424 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 425 426 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 427 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 428 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 429 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 430 return (0); 431 } 432 } else { 433 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 434 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 435 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 436 return (0); 437 } 438 } 439 440 return (1); 441 } 442 443 /* 444 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 445 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 446 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 447 * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates 448 * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction. 449 */ 450 static int 451 tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, 452 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 453 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 454 unsigned int iv_len) 455 { 456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 457 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 458 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 459 const EVP_MD *mac; 460 int mac_type; 461 462 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 463 mac = S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash; 464 mac_type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 465 466 if (is_read) { 467 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 468 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 469 else 470 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 471 472 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); 473 s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; 474 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash); 475 s->read_hash = NULL; 476 477 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 478 goto err; 479 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 480 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 481 goto err; 482 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 483 } else { 484 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 485 s->internal->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 486 else 487 s->internal->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 488 489 /* 490 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 491 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 492 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 493 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 494 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 495 */ 496 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 497 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 498 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 499 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->internal->write_hash); 500 s->internal->write_hash = NULL; 501 } 502 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 503 goto err; 504 s->internal->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 505 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 506 goto err; 507 s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx; 508 } 509 510 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 511 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL, 512 !is_read); 513 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, 514 iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv); 515 } else 516 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 517 518 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 519 EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 520 mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 521 if (mac_key == NULL) 522 goto err; 523 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 524 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 525 } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) { 526 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 528 mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret); 529 } 530 531 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 532 int nid; 533 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 534 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 535 else 536 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 537 538 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 539 if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 540 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 541 } 542 543 return (1); 544 545 err: 546 SSLerrorx(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 547 return (0); 548 } 549 550 int 551 tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 552 { 553 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 554 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 555 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 556 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 557 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 558 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 559 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 560 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 561 char is_read, use_client_keys; 562 563 564 cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc; 565 aead = S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead; 566 567 /* 568 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 569 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 570 * just written one. 571 */ 572 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 573 574 /* 575 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 576 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 577 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 578 */ 579 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 580 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 581 582 583 /* 584 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 585 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 586 */ 587 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 588 seq = is_read ? S3I(s)->read_sequence : S3I(s)->write_sequence; 589 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 590 } 591 592 if (aead != NULL) { 593 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 594 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher); 595 } else { 596 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 597 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 598 599 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 600 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 601 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 602 } 603 604 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 605 606 key_block = S3I(s)->hs.key_block; 607 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 608 key_block += mac_secret_size; 609 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 610 key_block += mac_secret_size; 611 client_write_key = key_block; 612 key_block += key_len; 613 server_write_key = key_block; 614 key_block += key_len; 615 client_write_iv = key_block; 616 key_block += iv_len; 617 server_write_iv = key_block; 618 key_block += iv_len; 619 620 if (use_client_keys) { 621 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 622 key = client_write_key; 623 iv = client_write_iv; 624 } else { 625 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 626 key = server_write_key; 627 iv = server_write_iv; 628 } 629 630 if (key_block - S3I(s)->hs.key_block != S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len) { 631 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 632 goto err2; 633 } 634 635 if (is_read) { 636 memcpy(S3I(s)->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 637 S3I(s)->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 638 } else { 639 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 640 S3I(s)->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 641 } 642 643 if (aead != NULL) { 644 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 645 iv, iv_len); 646 } 647 648 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, 649 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 650 651 err2: 652 return (0); 653 } 654 655 int 656 tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 657 { 658 unsigned char *key_block; 659 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 660 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 661 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 662 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 663 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 664 int ret = 0; 665 666 if (S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len != 0) 667 return (1); 668 669 if (s->session->cipher && 670 (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) { 671 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 672 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 673 return (0); 674 } 675 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 676 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 677 } else { 678 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 679 &mac_secret_size)) { 680 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 681 return (0); 682 } 683 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 684 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 685 686 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 687 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 688 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 689 } 690 691 S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead; 692 S3I(s)->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 693 S3I(s)->tmp.new_hash = mac; 694 S3I(s)->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 695 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 696 697 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 698 699 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 700 2)) == NULL) { 701 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 702 goto err; 703 } 704 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 705 706 S3I(s)->hs.key_block_len = key_block_len; 707 S3I(s)->hs.key_block = key_block; 708 709 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, key_block_len)) 710 goto err; 711 712 if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 713 s->method->internal->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 714 /* 715 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 716 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 717 */ 718 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 1; 719 720 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 721 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 722 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 723 724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 725 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 726 S3I(s)->need_empty_fragments = 0; 727 #endif 728 } 729 } 730 731 ret = 1; 732 733 err: 734 return (ret); 735 } 736 737 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 738 * 739 * Returns: 740 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 741 * short etc). 742 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 743 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 744 * an internal error occured. 745 */ 746 int 747 tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 748 { 749 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 750 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 751 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 752 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 753 unsigned char *seq; 754 unsigned long l; 755 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 756 757 if (send) { 758 aead = s->internal->aead_write_ctx; 759 rec = &S3I(s)->wrec; 760 seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence; 761 } else { 762 aead = s->internal->aead_read_ctx; 763 rec = &S3I(s)->rrec; 764 seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence; 765 } 766 767 if (aead) { 768 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 769 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 770 unsigned int nonce_used; 771 772 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 773 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 774 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 775 } else { 776 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 777 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 778 } 779 780 ad[8] = rec->type; 781 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 782 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 783 784 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 785 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 786 return -1; 787 788 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 789 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 790 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 791 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 792 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 793 } else { 794 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 795 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 796 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 797 } 798 799 if (send) { 800 size_t len = rec->length; 801 size_t eivlen = 0; 802 in = rec->input; 803 out = rec->data; 804 805 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 806 /* 807 * The sequence number is left zero 808 * padded, then xored with the fixed 809 * nonce. 810 */ 811 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 812 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 813 aead->variable_nonce_len); 814 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 815 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 816 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 817 } else { 818 /* 819 * When sending we use the sequence number as 820 * the variable part of the nonce. 821 */ 822 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 823 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 824 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 825 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 826 aead->variable_nonce_len); 827 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 828 } 829 830 /* 831 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 832 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 833 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 834 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 835 * plaintext. 836 */ 837 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 838 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 839 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 840 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 841 } 842 843 ad[11] = len >> 8; 844 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 845 846 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 847 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 848 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 849 return -1; 850 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 851 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 852 } else { 853 /* receive */ 854 size_t len = rec->length; 855 856 if (rec->data != rec->input) 857 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 858 out = in = rec->input; 859 860 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 861 return 0; 862 863 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 864 /* 865 * The sequence number is left zero 866 * padded, then xored with the fixed 867 * nonce. 868 */ 869 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 870 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 871 aead->variable_nonce_len); 872 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 873 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 874 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 875 } else { 876 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 877 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 878 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 879 880 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 881 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 882 aead->variable_nonce_len); 883 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 884 } 885 886 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 887 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 888 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 889 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 890 } 891 892 if (len < aead->tag_len) 893 return 0; 894 len -= aead->tag_len; 895 896 ad[11] = len >> 8; 897 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 898 899 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 900 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 901 sizeof(ad))) 902 return -1; 903 904 rec->data = rec->input = out; 905 } 906 907 rec->length = out_len; 908 909 return 1; 910 } 911 912 if (send) { 913 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->write_hash)) { 914 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->write_hash); 915 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 916 } 917 ds = s->internal->enc_write_ctx; 918 if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 919 enc = NULL; 920 else { 921 int ivlen = 0; 922 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->internal->enc_write_ctx); 923 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 924 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 925 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 926 if (ivlen > 1) { 927 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 928 #ifdef DEBUG 929 /* we can't write into the input stream: 930 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 931 */ 932 fprintf(stderr, 933 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 934 __FILE__, __LINE__); 935 #endif 936 } else 937 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 938 } 939 } 940 } else { 941 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 942 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 943 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 944 } 945 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 946 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 947 enc = NULL; 948 else 949 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 950 } 951 952 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 953 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 954 rec->input = rec->data; 955 ret = 1; 956 } else { 957 l = rec->length; 958 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 959 960 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 961 unsigned char buf[13]; 962 963 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 964 dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq, 965 send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch); 966 } else { 967 memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 968 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 969 } 970 971 buf[8] = rec->type; 972 buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 973 buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 974 buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 975 buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 976 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); 977 if (send) { 978 l += pad; 979 rec->length += pad; 980 } 981 } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 982 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 983 984 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 985 986 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 987 j = i - 1; 988 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 989 rec->input[k] = j; 990 l += i; 991 rec->length += i; 992 } 993 994 if (!send) { 995 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 996 return 0; 997 } 998 999 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 1000 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 1001 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 1002 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 1003 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 1004 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1005 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1006 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1007 } 1008 1009 ret = 1; 1010 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 1011 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1012 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 1013 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 1014 if (pad && !send) 1015 rec->length -= pad; 1016 } 1017 return ret; 1018 } 1019 1020 int 1021 tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int str_len, unsigned char *out) 1022 { 1023 unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1024 size_t hash_len; 1025 1026 if (str_len < 0) 1027 return 0; 1028 1029 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_value(s, buf, sizeof(buf), &hash_len)) 1030 return 0; 1031 1032 if (!tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1033 str, str_len, buf, hash_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1034 out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) 1035 return 0; 1036 1037 return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; 1038 } 1039 1040 int 1041 tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 1042 { 1043 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 1044 unsigned char *seq; 1045 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 1046 size_t md_size, orig_len; 1047 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 1048 unsigned char header[13]; 1049 int stream_mac = (send ? 1050 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 1051 (ssl->internal->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1052 int t; 1053 1054 if (send) { 1055 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->wrec); 1056 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->write_sequence[0]); 1057 hash = ssl->internal->write_hash; 1058 } else { 1059 rec = &(ssl->s3->internal->rrec); 1060 seq = &(ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence[0]); 1061 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1062 } 1063 1064 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1065 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1066 md_size = t; 1067 1068 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1069 if (stream_mac) { 1070 mac_ctx = hash; 1071 } else { 1072 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1073 return -1; 1074 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1075 } 1076 1077 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1078 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1079 send ? D1I(ssl)->w_epoch : D1I(ssl)->r_epoch); 1080 else 1081 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1082 1083 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1084 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1085 rec->type &= 0xff; 1086 1087 header[8] = rec->type; 1088 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1089 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1090 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1091 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1092 1093 if (!send && 1094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1095 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1096 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1097 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1098 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1099 * timing-oracle. */ 1100 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1101 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1102 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1103 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret, 1104 ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret_size)) 1105 return -1; 1106 } else { 1107 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1108 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1109 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1110 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1111 } 1112 1113 if (!stream_mac) 1114 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1115 1116 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1117 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1118 1119 return (md_size); 1120 } 1121 1122 int 1123 tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1124 int len) 1125 { 1126 if (len < 0) 1127 return 0; 1128 1129 if (!tls1_PRF(s, p, len, 1130 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1131 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1132 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1133 s->session->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) 1134 return 0; 1135 1136 return (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1137 } 1138 1139 int 1140 tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1141 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1142 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1143 { 1144 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1145 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1146 int rv; 1147 1148 /* construct PRF arguments 1149 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1150 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1151 * does not create a prohibited label. 1152 */ 1153 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1154 if (use_context) { 1155 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1156 } 1157 1158 val = malloc(vallen); 1159 if (val == NULL) 1160 goto err2; 1161 currentvalpos = 0; 1162 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1163 currentvalpos += llen; 1164 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1165 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1166 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1167 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1168 1169 if (use_context) { 1170 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1171 currentvalpos++; 1172 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1173 currentvalpos++; 1174 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1175 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1176 } 1177 } 1178 1179 /* disallow prohibited labels 1180 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1181 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1182 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1183 */ 1184 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1185 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1186 goto err1; 1187 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1188 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1189 goto err1; 1190 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1191 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1192 goto err1; 1193 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1194 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1195 goto err1; 1196 1197 rv = tls1_PRF(s, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1198 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, out, olen); 1199 1200 goto ret; 1201 err1: 1202 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1203 rv = 0; 1204 goto ret; 1205 err2: 1206 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1207 rv = 0; 1208 ret: 1209 free(val); 1210 1211 return (rv); 1212 } 1213 1214 int 1215 tls1_alert_code(int code) 1216 { 1217 switch (code) { 1218 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1219 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1220 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1221 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1222 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1223 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1224 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1225 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1226 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1227 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1228 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1229 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1230 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1231 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1232 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1233 return (-1); 1234 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1235 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1236 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1237 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1238 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1239 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1240 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1241 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1242 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1243 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1244 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1245 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1246 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1247 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1248 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1249 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1250 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1251 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1252 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1253 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1254 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1255 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1256 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1257 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1258 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1259 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1260 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1261 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1262 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1263 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1264 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1265 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1266 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1267 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1268 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1269 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1270 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1271 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1272 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1273 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1274 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1275 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1276 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1277 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1278 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1279 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1280 default: 1281 return (-1); 1282 } 1283 } 1284