1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.22 2017/08/12 21:47:59 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #include <stdio.h> 152 153 #include "ssl_locl.h" 154 155 #include <openssl/bn.h> 156 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h> 158 #include <openssl/evp.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 161 #include <openssl/gost.h> 162 #endif 163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/objects.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 168 #include "bytestring.h" 169 170 int 171 ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 172 { 173 unsigned long alg_k; 174 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 175 int ret = -1; 176 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 177 178 ERR_clear_error(); 179 errno = 0; 180 181 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) 182 cb = s->internal->info_callback; 183 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) 184 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; 185 186 /* init things to blank */ 187 s->internal->in_handshake++; 188 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 189 SSL_clear(s); 190 191 if (s->cert == NULL) { 192 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 193 ret = -1; 194 goto end; 195 } 196 197 for (;;) { 198 state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 199 200 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { 201 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 202 s->internal->renegotiate = 1; 203 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 204 205 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 206 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 207 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 208 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 209 210 s->server = 1; 211 if (cb != NULL) 212 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 213 214 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 215 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 216 ret = -1; 217 goto end; 218 } 219 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 220 221 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { 222 ret = -1; 223 goto end; 224 } 225 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 226 ret = -1; 227 goto end; 228 } 229 230 s->internal->init_num = 0; 231 232 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 233 /* 234 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO 235 * so that the output is sent in a way that 236 * TCP likes :-) 237 */ 238 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 239 ret = -1; 240 goto end; 241 } 242 243 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 244 ret = -1; 245 goto end; 246 } 247 248 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } else if (!S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) { 251 /* 252 * Server attempting to renegotiate with 253 * client that doesn't support secure 254 * renegotiation. 255 */ 256 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, 258 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 259 ret = -1; 260 goto end; 261 } else { 262 /* 263 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 264 * we will just send a HelloRequest 265 */ 266 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 267 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 268 } 269 break; 270 271 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 273 274 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 275 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 276 if (ret <= 0) 277 goto end; 278 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 279 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 280 s->internal->init_num = 0; 281 282 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 283 ret = -1; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 break; 287 288 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 289 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 290 break; 291 292 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 295 296 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 297 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 298 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 299 if (ret <= 0) 300 goto end; 301 } 302 303 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 304 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 305 s->internal->init_num = 0; 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 310 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 311 if (ret <= 0) 312 goto end; 313 if (s->internal->hit) { 314 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 315 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 316 else 317 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 318 } 319 else 320 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 321 s->internal->init_num = 0; 322 break; 323 324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ 327 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 328 SSL_aNULL)) { 329 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 330 if (ret <= 0) 331 goto end; 332 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) 333 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 334 else 335 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 336 } else { 337 skip = 1; 338 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 339 } 340 s->internal->init_num = 0; 341 break; 342 343 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 344 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 345 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 346 347 /* 348 * Only send if using a DH key exchange. 349 * 350 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange 351 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other 352 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's 353 * public key for key exchange. 354 */ 355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { 356 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 357 if (ret <= 0) 358 goto end; 359 } else 360 skip = 1; 361 362 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 363 s->internal->init_num = 0; 364 break; 365 366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 368 /* 369 * Determine whether or not we need to request a 370 * certificate. 371 * 372 * Do not request a certificate if: 373 * 374 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). 375 * 376 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are 377 * renegotiating. 378 * 379 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites 380 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 381 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application 382 * insists on verification (against the specs, but 383 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). 384 */ 385 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 386 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 387 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 388 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 389 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & 390 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { 391 /* No cert request */ 392 skip = 1; 393 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0; 394 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 395 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 396 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 397 ret = -1; 398 goto end; 399 } 400 } 401 } else { 402 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1; 403 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 404 if (ret <= 0) 405 goto end; 406 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 407 s->internal->init_num = 0; 408 } 409 break; 410 411 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 412 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 413 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 414 if (ret <= 0) 415 goto end; 416 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 417 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 418 s->internal->init_num = 0; 419 break; 420 421 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 422 423 /* 424 * This code originally checked to see if 425 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 426 * and then flushed. This caused problems 427 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 428 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 429 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 430 * still exist. So instead we just flush 431 * unconditionally. 432 */ 433 434 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 435 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 436 ret = -1; 437 goto end; 438 } 439 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 440 441 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 442 break; 443 444 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 445 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 446 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 447 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 448 if (ret <= 0) 449 goto end; 450 } 451 s->internal->init_num = 0; 452 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 453 break; 454 455 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 456 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 457 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 458 if (ret <= 0) 459 goto end; 460 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 461 if (ret == 2) { 462 /* 463 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when 464 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 465 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 466 * message is not sent. 467 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 468 * the client uses its key from the certificate 469 * for key exchange. 470 */ 471 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 472 s->internal->init_num = 0; 473 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { 474 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 475 s->internal->init_num = 0; 476 if (!s->session->peer) 477 break; 478 /* 479 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer 480 * at this point and digest cached records. 481 */ 482 if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 483 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 484 ret = -1; 485 goto end; 486 } 487 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 488 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 489 ret = -1; 490 goto end; 491 } 492 } else { 493 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 494 s->internal->init_num = 0; 495 496 /* 497 * We need to get hashes here so if there is 498 * a client cert, it can be verified. 499 */ 500 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 501 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 502 ret = -1; 503 goto end; 504 } 505 } 506 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_value(s, 507 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 508 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md), 509 NULL)) { 510 ret = -1; 511 goto end; 512 } 513 } 514 break; 515 516 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 517 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 518 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 519 520 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 521 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 522 if (ret <= 0) 523 goto end; 524 525 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 526 s->internal->init_num = 0; 527 break; 528 529 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 530 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 531 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 532 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 533 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 534 if (ret <= 0) 535 goto end; 536 if (s->internal->hit) 537 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 538 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 539 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 540 else 541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 542 s->internal->init_num = 0; 543 break; 544 545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 547 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 548 if (ret <= 0) 549 goto end; 550 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 551 s->internal->init_num = 0; 552 break; 553 554 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 555 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 556 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 557 if (ret <= 0) 558 goto end; 559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 560 s->internal->init_num = 0; 561 break; 562 563 564 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 565 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 566 567 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; 568 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { 569 ret = -1; 570 goto end; 571 } 572 573 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 574 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 575 576 if (ret <= 0) 577 goto end; 578 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 579 s->internal->init_num = 0; 580 581 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state( 582 s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 583 ret = -1; 584 goto end; 585 } 586 587 break; 588 589 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 590 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 591 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 592 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 593 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 594 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); 595 if (ret <= 0) 596 goto end; 597 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 598 if (s->internal->hit) 599 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 600 else 601 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 602 s->internal->init_num = 0; 603 break; 604 605 case SSL_ST_OK: 606 /* clean a few things up */ 607 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 608 609 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); 610 s->internal->init_buf = NULL; 611 612 /* remove buffering on output */ 613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 614 615 s->internal->init_num = 0; 616 617 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 618 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) { 619 s->internal->renegotiate = 0; 620 s->internal->new_session = 0; 621 622 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 623 624 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++; 625 /* s->server=1; */ 626 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 627 628 if (cb != NULL) 629 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 630 } 631 632 ret = 1; 633 goto end; 634 /* break; */ 635 636 default: 637 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 638 ret = -1; 639 goto end; 640 /* break; */ 641 } 642 643 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 644 if (s->internal->debug) { 645 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 646 goto end; 647 } 648 649 650 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { 651 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 652 S3I(s)->hs.state = state; 653 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 654 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; 655 } 656 } 657 skip = 0; 658 } 659 end: 660 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 661 662 s->internal->in_handshake--; 663 if (cb != NULL) 664 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 665 return (ret); 666 } 667 668 int 669 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 670 { 671 CBB cbb, hello; 672 673 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 674 675 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 676 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &hello, 677 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)) 678 goto err; 679 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 680 goto err; 681 682 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 683 } 684 685 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 686 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 687 688 err: 689 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 690 691 return (-1); 692 } 693 694 int 695 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 696 { 697 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; 698 CBS compression_methods; 699 uint16_t client_version; 700 uint8_t comp_method; 701 int comp_null; 702 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 703 long n; 704 unsigned long id; 705 unsigned char *p, *d; 706 SSL_CIPHER *c; 707 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 708 unsigned long alg_k; 709 const SSL_METHOD *method; 710 uint16_t shared_version; 711 unsigned char *end; 712 713 /* 714 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 715 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 716 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 717 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 718 * TLSv1. 719 */ 720 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 721 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 722 } 723 724 s->internal->first_packet = 1; 725 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 726 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 727 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 728 if (!ok) 729 return ((int)n); 730 s->internal->first_packet = 0; 731 732 if (n < 0) 733 goto err; 734 735 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 736 end = d + n; 737 738 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 739 740 /* 741 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. 742 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 743 */ 744 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) 745 goto truncated; 746 747 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) { 748 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 749 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 750 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) { 751 /* 752 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote 753 * version number. 754 */ 755 s->version = s->client_version; 756 } 757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 758 goto f_err; 759 } 760 s->client_version = client_version; 761 s->version = shared_version; 762 763 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) 764 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version); 765 if (method == NULL) { 766 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 767 goto err; 768 } 769 s->method = method; 770 771 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) 772 goto truncated; 773 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) 774 goto truncated; 775 776 /* 777 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't 778 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 779 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 780 */ 781 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 782 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) 783 goto truncated; 784 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 785 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) 786 return (1); 787 } 788 } 789 790 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, 791 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) 792 goto err; 793 794 s->internal->hit = 0; 795 796 /* 797 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 798 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 799 * ignore resumption requests with flag 800 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag 801 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications 802 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older 803 * library versions). 804 * 805 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() 806 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session 807 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 808 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 809 * ignored. 810 */ 811 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options & 812 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 813 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 814 goto err; 815 } else { 816 /* XXX - pass CBS through instead... */ 817 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, 818 (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&session_id), 819 CBS_len(&session_id), end); 820 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ 821 s->internal->hit = 1; 822 } else if (i == -1) 823 goto err; 824 else { 825 /* i == 0 */ 826 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 827 goto err; 828 } 829 } 830 831 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 832 /* 833 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify 834 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause 835 * an overflow. 836 */ 837 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) { 838 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 839 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 840 goto f_err; 841 } 842 843 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 844 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 845 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { 846 size_t cookie_len; 847 848 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ 849 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 850 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) 851 goto err; 852 853 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 854 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, 855 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { 856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 857 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 858 goto f_err; 859 } 860 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 861 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ 862 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 863 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) { 864 /* default verification */ 865 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 866 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 867 goto f_err; 868 } 869 cookie_valid = 1; 870 } 871 } 872 873 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) 874 goto truncated; 875 876 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ 877 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { 878 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 879 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 880 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 881 goto f_err; 882 } 883 884 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 885 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, 886 CBS_data(&cipher_suites), CBS_len(&cipher_suites))) == NULL) 887 goto err; 888 } 889 890 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 891 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 892 j = 0; 893 id = s->session->cipher->id; 894 895 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 896 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 897 if (c->id == id) { 898 j = 1; 899 break; 900 } 901 } 902 if (j == 0) { 903 /* 904 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher 905 * list if we are asked to reuse it 906 */ 907 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 908 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 909 goto f_err; 910 } 911 } 912 913 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) 914 goto truncated; 915 916 comp_null = 0; 917 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { 918 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) 919 goto truncated; 920 if (comp_method == 0) 921 comp_null = 1; 922 } 923 if (comp_null == 0) { 924 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 925 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 926 goto f_err; 927 } 928 929 p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&cbs); 930 931 /* TLS extensions*/ 932 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { 933 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 934 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 935 goto f_err; 936 } 937 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 938 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 939 goto err; 940 } 941 942 /* 943 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 944 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 945 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 946 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. 947 */ 948 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 949 950 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { 951 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 952 953 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 954 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 955 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, 956 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 957 s->internal->hit = 1; 958 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 959 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 960 961 ciphers = NULL; 962 963 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 964 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : 965 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 966 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 967 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 968 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 969 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 970 goto f_err; 971 } 972 973 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 974 975 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 976 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id); 977 978 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 979 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id = 980 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 981 } 982 } 983 984 /* 985 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 986 * pick a cipher 987 */ 988 989 if (!s->internal->hit) { 990 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 991 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 992 if (ciphers == NULL) { 993 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 994 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 995 goto f_err; 996 } 997 ciphers = NULL; 998 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 999 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1000 1001 if (c == NULL) { 1002 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1003 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1004 goto f_err; 1005 } 1006 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c; 1007 } else { 1008 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1009 } 1010 1011 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_init(s)) 1012 goto err; 1013 1014 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1015 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || 1016 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1017 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1018 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1019 goto f_err; 1020 } 1021 } 1022 1023 /* 1024 * We now have the following setup. 1025 * client_random 1026 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1027 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1028 * compression - basically ignored right now 1029 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1030 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1031 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag 1032 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1033 */ 1034 1035 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1036 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1037 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1038 goto err; 1039 } 1040 1041 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1042 1043 if (0) { 1044 truncated: 1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1046 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1047 f_err: 1048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1049 } 1050 err: 1051 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1052 1053 return (ret); 1054 } 1055 1056 int 1057 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1058 { 1059 unsigned char *bufend; 1060 unsigned char *p, *d; 1061 CBB cbb, session_id; 1062 size_t outlen; 1063 int sl; 1064 1065 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1066 1067 bufend = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1068 1069 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1070 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO); 1071 1072 if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, p, bufend - p)) 1073 goto err; 1074 1075 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, s->version)) 1076 goto err; 1077 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random, 1078 sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) 1079 goto err; 1080 1081 /* 1082 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1083 * back in the server hello: 1084 * 1085 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1086 * we send back the old session ID. 1087 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1088 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1089 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1090 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1091 * session ID. 1092 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1093 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1094 * 1095 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1096 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1097 * to send back. 1098 */ 1099 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1100 && !s->internal->hit) 1101 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1102 1103 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1104 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1105 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1106 goto err; 1107 } 1108 1109 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id)) 1110 goto err; 1111 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) 1112 goto err; 1113 1114 /* Cipher suite. */ 1115 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, 1116 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher))) 1117 goto err; 1118 1119 /* Compression method. */ 1120 if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0)) 1121 goto err; 1122 1123 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen)) 1124 goto err; 1125 1126 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p + outlen, 1127 bufend)) == NULL) { 1128 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1129 goto err; 1130 } 1131 1132 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d); 1133 } 1134 1135 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1136 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1137 1138 err: 1139 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1140 1141 return (-1); 1142 } 1143 1144 int 1145 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1146 { 1147 CBB cbb, done; 1148 1149 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1150 1151 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1152 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &done, 1153 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)) 1154 goto err; 1155 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 1156 goto err; 1157 1158 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1159 } 1160 1161 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1162 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1163 1164 err: 1165 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1166 1167 return (-1); 1168 } 1169 1170 int 1171 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1172 { 1173 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1174 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1175 unsigned char *data; 1176 int al; 1177 1178 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1179 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) { 1180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1181 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1182 goto f_err; 1183 } 1184 } else 1185 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp; 1186 1187 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) 1188 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1189 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)); 1190 1191 if (dhp == NULL) { 1192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1193 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1194 goto f_err; 1195 } 1196 1197 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1198 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1199 goto err; 1200 } 1201 1202 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1203 dh = dhp; 1204 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1205 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1206 goto err; 1207 } 1208 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh; 1209 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1210 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1211 goto err; 1212 } 1213 1214 /* 1215 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key. 1216 */ 1217 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p)) 1218 goto err; 1219 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p))) 1220 goto err; 1221 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data); 1222 1223 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g)) 1224 goto err; 1225 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g))) 1226 goto err; 1227 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data); 1228 1229 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys)) 1230 goto err; 1231 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key))) 1232 goto err; 1233 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data); 1234 1235 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1236 goto err; 1237 1238 return (1); 1239 1240 f_err: 1241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1242 err: 1243 return (-1); 1244 } 1245 1246 static int 1247 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1248 { 1249 const EC_GROUP *group; 1250 const EC_POINT *pubkey; 1251 unsigned char *data; 1252 int encoded_len = 0; 1253 int curve_id = 0; 1254 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1255 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1256 CBB ecpoint; 1257 int al; 1258 1259 /* 1260 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1261 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1262 */ 1263 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1264 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1265 goto err; 1266 } 1267 1268 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1269 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1270 goto err; 1271 } 1272 1273 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { 1274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1275 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1276 goto f_err; 1277 } 1278 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1279 1280 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1281 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1282 goto err; 1283 } 1284 if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL || 1285 (pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)) == NULL || 1286 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) { 1287 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1288 goto err; 1289 } 1290 1291 /* 1292 * Encode the public key. 1293 */ 1294 encoded_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, 1295 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); 1296 if (encoded_len == 0) { 1297 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1298 goto err; 1299 } 1300 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1301 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1302 goto err; 1303 } 1304 1305 /* 1306 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1307 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has: 1308 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1309 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1310 * the actual encoded point itself. 1311 */ 1312 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1313 goto err; 1314 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1315 goto err; 1316 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1317 goto err; 1318 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encoded_len)) 1319 goto err; 1320 if (EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1321 data, encoded_len, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1322 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1323 goto err; 1324 } 1325 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1326 goto err; 1327 1328 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1329 1330 return (1); 1331 1332 f_err: 1333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1334 err: 1335 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1336 1337 return (-1); 1338 } 1339 1340 static int 1341 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1342 { 1343 uint8_t *public_key = NULL; 1344 int curve_id; 1345 CBB ecpoint; 1346 int ret = -1; 1347 1348 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */ 1349 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) { 1350 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1351 goto err; 1352 } 1353 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1354 goto err; 1355 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1356 goto err; 1357 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519); 1358 1359 /* Serialize public key. */ 1360 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1361 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1362 goto err; 1363 } 1364 1365 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1366 goto err; 1367 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1368 goto err; 1369 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1370 goto err; 1371 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) 1372 goto err; 1373 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1374 goto err; 1375 1376 ret = 1; 1377 1378 err: 1379 free(public_key); 1380 1381 return (ret); 1382 } 1383 1384 static int 1385 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1386 { 1387 int nid; 1388 1389 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); 1390 1391 if (nid == NID_X25519) 1392 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb); 1393 1394 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb); 1395 } 1396 1397 int 1398 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1399 { 1400 CBB cbb; 1401 unsigned char *params = NULL; 1402 size_t params_len; 1403 unsigned char *q; 1404 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1405 unsigned int u; 1406 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1408 unsigned char *p, *d; 1409 int al, i, j, n, kn; 1410 unsigned long type; 1411 BUF_MEM *buf; 1412 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1413 1414 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1415 1416 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1417 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1418 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1419 1420 buf = s->internal->init_buf; 1421 1422 if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0)) 1423 goto err; 1424 1425 if (type & SSL_kDHE) { 1426 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1427 goto err; 1428 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { 1429 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1430 goto err; 1431 } else { 1432 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1433 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1434 goto f_err; 1435 } 1436 1437 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) 1438 goto err; 1439 1440 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { 1441 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey( 1442 s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { 1443 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1444 goto f_err; 1445 } 1446 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1447 } else { 1448 pkey = NULL; 1449 kn = 0; 1450 } 1451 1452 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 1453 params_len + kn)) { 1454 SSLerror(s, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1455 goto err; 1456 } 1457 1458 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1459 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE); 1460 1461 memcpy(p, params, params_len); 1462 1463 free(params); 1464 params = NULL; 1465 1466 n = params_len; 1467 p += params_len; 1468 1469 /* not anonymous */ 1470 if (pkey != NULL) { 1471 /* 1472 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1473 * and p points to the space at the end. 1474 */ 1475 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1476 q = md_buf; 1477 j = 0; 1478 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5_sha1(), 1479 NULL)) 1480 goto err; 1481 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, 1482 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1483 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, 1484 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1485 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1486 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1487 (unsigned int *)&i); 1488 q += i; 1489 j += i; 1490 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1491 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1492 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); 1493 goto err; 1494 } 1495 s2n(u, p); 1496 n += u + 2; 1497 } else if (md) { 1498 /* Send signature algorithm. */ 1499 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1500 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1501 /* Should never happen */ 1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1503 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1504 goto f_err; 1505 } 1506 p += 2; 1507 } 1508 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1509 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1510 s->s3->client_random, 1511 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1513 s->s3->server_random, 1514 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1515 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1516 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], 1517 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 1518 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1519 goto err; 1520 } 1521 s2n(i, p); 1522 n += i + 2; 1523 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1524 n += 2; 1525 } else { 1526 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1527 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1528 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1529 goto f_err; 1530 } 1531 } 1532 1533 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); 1534 } 1535 1536 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1537 1538 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1539 1540 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1541 1542 f_err: 1543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1544 err: 1545 free(params); 1546 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1547 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1548 1549 return (-1); 1550 } 1551 1552 int 1553 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1554 { 1555 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn; 1556 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 1557 X509_NAME *name; 1558 int i; 1559 1560 /* 1561 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4. 1562 */ 1563 1564 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1565 1566 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 1567 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &cert_request, 1568 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) 1569 goto err; 1570 1571 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) 1572 goto err; 1573 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types)) 1574 goto err; 1575 1576 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1577 unsigned char *sigalgs_data; 1578 size_t sigalgs_len; 1579 1580 tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, &sigalgs_data, &sigalgs_len); 1581 1582 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) 1583 goto err; 1584 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len)) 1585 goto err; 1586 } 1587 1588 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth)) 1589 goto err; 1590 1591 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1592 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 1593 unsigned char *name_data; 1594 size_t name_len; 1595 1596 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 1597 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 1598 1599 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn)) 1600 goto err; 1601 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len)) 1602 goto err; 1603 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len) 1604 goto err; 1605 } 1606 1607 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 1608 goto err; 1609 1610 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1611 } 1612 1613 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1614 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1615 1616 err: 1617 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1618 1619 return (-1); 1620 } 1621 1622 static int 1623 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1624 { 1625 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1626 unsigned char *d; 1627 RSA *rsa = NULL; 1628 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1629 int i, al; 1630 1631 d = p; 1632 1633 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); 1634 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1635 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1636 1637 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1638 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1639 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 1640 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1641 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1642 goto f_err; 1643 } 1644 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 1645 1646 if (2 > n) 1647 goto truncated; 1648 n2s(p, i); 1649 if (n != i + 2) { 1650 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1651 goto err; 1652 } else 1653 n = i; 1654 1655 i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1656 1657 ERR_clear_error(); 1658 1659 al = -1; 1660 1661 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 1662 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1663 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1664 } 1665 1666 if (p - d + 2 > n) /* needed in the SSL3 case */ 1667 goto truncated; 1668 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && 1669 (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 1670 /* 1671 * The premaster secret must contain the same version 1672 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback 1673 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such 1674 * protection for DH ciphersuites). 1675 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated 1676 * protocol version instead if the server does not 1677 * support the requested protocol version. 1678 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 1679 * clients. 1680 */ 1681 if (!((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1682 (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) && 1683 (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) { 1684 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1685 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1686 1687 /* 1688 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of 1689 * Bleichenbacher's attack 1690 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits 1691 * the version number check as a "bad version 1692 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the 1693 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1694 * made up by the adversary is properly 1695 * formatted except that the version number is 1696 * wrong. 1697 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this 1698 * just like any other decryption error. 1699 */ 1700 } 1701 } 1702 1703 if (al != -1) { 1704 /* 1705 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead 1706 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack 1707 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 1708 * section 7.4.7.1). 1709 */ 1710 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1711 p = fakekey; 1712 } 1713 1714 s->session->master_key_length = 1715 tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1716 s->session->master_key, p, i); 1717 1718 explicit_bzero(p, i); 1719 1720 return (1); 1721 truncated: 1722 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1723 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1724 f_err: 1725 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1726 err: 1727 return (-1); 1728 } 1729 1730 static int 1731 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1732 { 1733 BIGNUM *bn = NULL; 1734 int key_size, al; 1735 CBS cbs, dh_Yc; 1736 DH *dh; 1737 1738 if (n < 0) 1739 goto err; 1740 1741 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1742 1743 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc)) 1744 goto truncated; 1745 1746 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 1747 goto truncated; 1748 1749 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) { 1750 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1751 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1752 goto f_err; 1753 } 1754 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh; 1755 1756 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) { 1757 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1758 goto err; 1759 } 1760 1761 key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh); 1762 if (key_size <= 0) { 1763 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1764 BN_clear_free(bn); 1765 goto err; 1766 } 1767 1768 s->session->master_key_length = 1769 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1770 s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size); 1771 1772 explicit_bzero(p, key_size); 1773 1774 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh); 1775 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL; 1776 1777 BN_clear_free(bn); 1778 1779 return (1); 1780 1781 truncated: 1782 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1783 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1784 f_err: 1785 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1786 err: 1787 return (-1); 1788 } 1789 1790 static int 1791 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1792 { 1793 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1794 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1795 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1796 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1797 int i, al; 1798 1799 int ret = 1; 1800 int key_size; 1801 const EC_KEY *tkey; 1802 const EC_GROUP *group; 1803 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 1804 1805 /* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */ 1806 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 1807 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1808 goto err; 1809 } 1810 1811 /* 1812 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when 1813 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message. 1814 */ 1815 tkey = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1816 1817 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 1818 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 1819 1820 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 1821 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 1822 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1823 goto err; 1824 } 1825 1826 /* Let's get client's public key */ 1827 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 1828 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1829 goto err; 1830 } 1831 1832 if (n == 0L) { 1833 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 1834 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey( 1835 s->session->peer)) == NULL) || 1836 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 1837 /* 1838 * XXX: For now, we do not support client 1839 * authentication using ECDH certificates 1840 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 1841 * never executed. When that support is 1842 * added, we ought to ensure the key 1843 * received in the certificate is 1844 * authorized for key agreement. 1845 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 1846 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 1847 * group. 1848 */ 1849 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1850 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 1851 goto f_err; 1852 } 1853 1854 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 1855 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) 1856 == 0) { 1857 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1858 goto err; 1859 } 1860 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 1861 } else { 1862 /* 1863 * Get client's public key from encoded point 1864 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 1865 */ 1866 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1867 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1868 goto err; 1869 } 1870 1871 /* Get encoded point length */ 1872 i = *p; 1873 1874 p += 1; 1875 if (n != 1 + i) { 1876 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1877 goto err; 1878 } 1879 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 1880 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1881 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1882 goto err; 1883 } 1884 /* 1885 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 1886 * currently, so set it to the start. 1887 */ 1888 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data; 1889 } 1890 1891 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 1892 key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh); 1893 if (key_size <= 0) { 1894 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1895 goto err; 1896 } 1897 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 1898 NULL); 1899 if (i <= 0) { 1900 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1901 goto err; 1902 } 1903 1904 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 1905 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 1906 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 1907 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1908 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh); 1909 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 1910 1911 /* Compute the master secret */ 1912 s->session->master_key_length = 1913 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1914 s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 1915 1916 explicit_bzero(p, i); 1917 return (ret); 1918 1919 f_err: 1920 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1921 err: 1922 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 1923 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 1924 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 1925 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1926 return (-1); 1927 } 1928 1929 static int 1930 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1931 { 1932 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL; 1933 CBS cbs, ecpoint; 1934 int ret = -1; 1935 1936 if (n < 0) 1937 goto err; 1938 1939 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1940 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint)) 1941 goto err; 1942 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) 1943 goto err; 1944 1945 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1946 goto err; 1947 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint))) 1948 goto err; 1949 1950 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1951 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL; 1952 1953 s->session->master_key_length = 1954 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1955 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1956 1957 ret = 1; 1958 1959 err: 1960 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1961 1962 return (ret); 1963 } 1964 1965 static int 1966 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1967 { 1968 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) 1969 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n); 1970 1971 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n); 1972 } 1973 1974 static int 1975 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1976 { 1977 1978 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 1979 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 1980 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 1981 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 1982 unsigned long alg_a; 1983 int Ttag, Tclass; 1984 long Tlen; 1985 int al; 1986 int ret = 0; 1987 1988 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 1989 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1990 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 1991 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 1992 1993 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 1994 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 1995 /* 1996 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, 1997 * maybe use it for key exchange. 1998 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because 1999 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for 2000 * authorization only. 2001 */ 2002 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2003 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2004 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, 2005 client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2006 ERR_clear_error(); 2007 } 2008 if (2 > n) 2009 goto truncated; 2010 /* Decrypt session key */ 2011 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, 2012 &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 2013 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2014 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2015 goto gerr; 2016 } 2017 start = p; 2018 inlen = Tlen; 2019 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, 2020 start, inlen) <=0) { 2021 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2022 goto gerr; 2023 } 2024 /* Generate master secret */ 2025 s->session->master_key_length = 2026 tls1_generate_master_secret( 2027 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); 2028 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2029 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, 2030 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2031 ret = 2; 2032 else 2033 ret = 1; 2034 gerr: 2035 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2036 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2037 if (ret) 2038 return (ret); 2039 else 2040 goto err; 2041 2042 truncated: 2043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2044 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2046 err: 2047 return (-1); 2048 } 2049 2050 int 2051 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2052 { 2053 unsigned long alg_k; 2054 unsigned char *p; 2055 int al, ok; 2056 long n; 2057 2058 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ 2059 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2060 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2061 if (!ok) 2062 return ((int)n); 2063 2064 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2065 2066 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2067 2068 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2069 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1) 2070 goto err; 2071 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2072 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2073 goto err; 2074 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 2075 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2076 goto err; 2077 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2078 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1) 2079 goto err; 2080 } else { 2081 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2082 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2083 goto f_err; 2084 } 2085 2086 return (1); 2087 2088 f_err: 2089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2090 err: 2091 return (-1); 2092 } 2093 2094 int 2095 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2096 { 2097 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2098 unsigned char *p; 2099 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2100 long n; 2101 int type = 0, i, j; 2102 X509 *peer; 2103 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2104 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2105 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2106 2107 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2108 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2109 if (!ok) 2110 return ((int)n); 2111 2112 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2113 peer = s->session->peer; 2114 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2115 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2116 } else { 2117 peer = NULL; 2118 pkey = NULL; 2119 } 2120 2121 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2122 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2123 if (peer != NULL) { 2124 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2125 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2126 goto f_err; 2127 } 2128 ret = 1; 2129 goto end; 2130 } 2131 2132 if (peer == NULL) { 2133 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2134 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2135 goto f_err; 2136 } 2137 2138 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2139 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2140 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2141 goto f_err; 2142 } 2143 2144 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2145 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2146 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2147 goto f_err; 2148 } 2149 2150 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2151 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2152 /* 2153 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites. 2154 * 2155 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare 2156 * signature without length field. 2157 */ 2158 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2159 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) { 2160 i = 64; 2161 } else { 2162 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2163 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2164 /* Should never happen */ 2165 if (sigalg == -1) { 2166 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2167 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2168 goto f_err; 2169 } 2170 if (2 > n) 2171 goto truncated; 2172 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 2173 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 2174 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2176 goto f_err; 2177 } 2178 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 2179 if (md == NULL) { 2180 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2182 goto f_err; 2183 } 2184 p += 2; 2185 n -= 2; 2186 } 2187 if (2 > n) 2188 goto truncated; 2189 n2s(p, i); 2190 n -= 2; 2191 if (i > n) 2192 goto truncated; 2193 } 2194 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2195 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 2196 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2198 goto f_err; 2199 } 2200 2201 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2202 long hdatalen = 0; 2203 void *hdata; 2204 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2205 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2206 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2207 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2208 goto f_err; 2209 } 2210 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2211 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 2212 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2214 goto f_err; 2215 } 2216 2217 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 2218 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2219 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2220 goto f_err; 2221 } 2222 } else 2223 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 2224 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2225 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2226 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2227 if (i < 0) { 2228 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2229 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2230 goto f_err; 2231 } 2232 if (i == 0) { 2233 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2234 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2235 goto f_err; 2236 } 2237 } else 2238 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 2239 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2240 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2241 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 2242 if (j <= 0) { 2243 /* bad signature */ 2244 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2245 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2246 goto f_err; 2247 } 2248 } else 2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 2250 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2251 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 2252 long hdatalen = 0; 2253 void *hdata; 2254 unsigned char signature[128]; 2255 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature); 2256 int nid; 2257 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2258 2259 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2260 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2261 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2262 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2263 goto f_err; 2264 } 2265 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || 2266 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { 2267 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2268 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2269 goto f_err; 2270 } 2271 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 2272 if (!pctx) { 2273 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2274 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2275 goto f_err; 2276 } 2277 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2278 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || 2279 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) || 2280 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || 2281 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || 2282 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, 2283 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, 2284 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, 2285 NULL) <= 0)) { 2286 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2287 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2288 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2289 goto f_err; 2290 } 2291 2292 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) { 2293 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2294 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2295 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2296 goto f_err; 2297 } 2298 2299 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2300 } else 2301 #endif 2302 { 2303 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2304 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2305 goto f_err; 2306 } 2307 2308 2309 ret = 1; 2310 if (0) { 2311 truncated: 2312 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2313 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2314 f_err: 2315 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2316 } 2317 end: 2318 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 2319 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 2320 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 2321 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 2322 } 2323 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 2324 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2325 return (ret); 2326 } 2327 2328 int 2329 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2330 { 2331 CBS cbs, client_certs; 2332 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 2333 X509 *x = NULL; 2334 long n; 2335 const unsigned char *q; 2336 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 2337 2338 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2339 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); 2340 2341 if (!ok) 2342 return ((int)n); 2343 2344 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 2345 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2346 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2347 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2348 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2349 goto f_err; 2350 } 2351 /* 2352 * If tls asked for a client cert, 2353 * the client must return a 0 list. 2354 */ 2355 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 2356 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 2357 ); 2358 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2359 goto f_err; 2360 } 2361 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2362 return (1); 2363 } 2364 2365 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 2366 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2367 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2368 goto f_err; 2369 } 2370 2371 if (n < 0) 2372 goto truncated; 2373 2374 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2375 2376 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 2377 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2378 goto err; 2379 } 2380 2381 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) || 2382 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2383 goto truncated; 2384 2385 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) { 2386 CBS cert; 2387 2388 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) { 2389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2390 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2391 goto f_err; 2392 } 2393 2394 q = CBS_data(&cert); 2395 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); 2396 if (x == NULL) { 2397 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2398 goto err; 2399 } 2400 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { 2401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2402 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2403 goto f_err; 2404 } 2405 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 2406 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2407 goto err; 2408 } 2409 x = NULL; 2410 } 2411 2412 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 2413 /* 2414 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned. 2415 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate. 2416 */ 2417 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2418 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2419 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2420 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2421 goto f_err; 2422 } 2423 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 2424 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 2425 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2426 goto f_err; 2427 } 2428 } else { 2429 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 2430 if (i <= 0) { 2431 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2432 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2433 goto f_err; 2434 } 2435 } 2436 2437 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2438 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 2439 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2440 2441 /* 2442 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2443 * when we arrive here 2444 */ 2445 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2446 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2447 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2448 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2449 goto err; 2450 } 2451 } 2452 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2453 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 2454 2455 /* 2456 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2457 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 2458 */ 2459 2460 sk = NULL; 2461 2462 ret = 1; 2463 if (0) { 2464 truncated: 2465 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2466 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2467 f_err: 2468 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2469 } 2470 err: 2471 X509_free(x); 2472 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 2473 2474 return (ret); 2475 } 2476 2477 int 2478 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2479 { 2480 CBB cbb, server_cert; 2481 X509 *x; 2482 2483 /* 2484 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. 2485 */ 2486 2487 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2488 2489 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 2490 if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) { 2491 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2492 return (0); 2493 } 2494 2495 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert, 2496 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) 2497 goto err; 2498 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x)) 2499 goto err; 2500 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 2501 goto err; 2502 2503 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2504 } 2505 2506 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2507 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2508 2509 err: 2510 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2511 2512 return (0); 2513 } 2514 2515 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 2516 int 2517 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2518 { 2519 unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart; 2520 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 2521 const unsigned char *const_p; 2522 int len, slen_full, slen; 2523 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2524 unsigned int hlen; 2525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2526 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2527 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2528 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2529 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2530 2531 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 2532 /* get session encoding length */ 2533 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2534 /* 2535 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2536 * too long 2537 */ 2538 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 2539 goto err; 2540 senc = malloc(slen_full); 2541 if (!senc) 2542 goto err; 2543 p = senc; 2544 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2545 2546 /* 2547 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to 2548 * clean up 2549 */ 2550 const_p = senc; 2551 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 2552 if (sess == NULL) 2553 goto err; 2554 2555 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 2556 sess->session_id_length = 0; 2557 2558 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 2559 if (slen > slen_full) { 2560 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 2561 goto err; 2562 } 2563 p = senc; 2564 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 2565 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 2566 2567 /* 2568 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2569 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2570 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2571 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2572 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2573 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2574 */ 2575 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 2576 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2577 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2578 goto err; 2579 2580 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET); 2581 2582 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2583 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2584 2585 /* 2586 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2587 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2588 * from parent ctx. 2589 */ 2590 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2591 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, 2592 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { 2593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2594 goto err; 2595 } 2596 } else { 2597 arc4random_buf(iv, 16); 2598 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2599 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2600 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 2601 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2602 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2603 } 2604 2605 /* 2606 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 2607 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session 2608 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new 2609 * sessions will live as long as their sessions. 2610 */ 2611 l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 2612 2613 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2614 p += 2; 2615 /* Output key name */ 2616 macstart = p; 2617 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2618 p += 16; 2619 /* output IV */ 2620 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2621 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2622 /* Encrypt session data */ 2623 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2624 p += len; 2625 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len); 2626 p += len; 2627 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2628 2629 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2630 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2631 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2632 p += hlen; 2633 2634 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2635 /* Total length */ 2636 len = p - d; 2637 2638 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */ 2639 p = d + 4; 2640 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */ 2641 2642 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len); 2643 2644 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2645 2646 freezero(senc, slen_full); 2647 } 2648 2649 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2650 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2651 2652 err: 2653 freezero(senc, slen_full); 2654 2655 return (-1); 2656 } 2657 2658 int 2659 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2660 { 2661 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp; 2662 2663 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2664 2665 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 2666 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &certstatus, 2667 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS)) 2668 goto err; 2669 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type)) 2670 goto err; 2671 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp)) 2672 goto err; 2673 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, 2674 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2675 goto err; 2676 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 2677 goto err; 2678 2679 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2680 } 2681 2682 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2683 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2684 2685 err: 2686 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2687 2688 return (-1); 2689 } 2690