1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.8 2017/03/01 14:01:24 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #include <stdio.h> 152 153 #include "ssl_locl.h" 154 155 #include <openssl/bn.h> 156 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h> 158 #include <openssl/evp.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 161 #include <openssl/gost.h> 162 #endif 163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/objects.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 168 #include "bytestring.h" 169 170 int 171 ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 172 { 173 unsigned long alg_k; 174 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 175 int ret = -1; 176 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 177 178 ERR_clear_error(); 179 errno = 0; 180 181 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) 182 cb = s->internal->info_callback; 183 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) 184 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; 185 186 /* init things to blank */ 187 s->internal->in_handshake++; 188 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 189 SSL_clear(s); 190 191 if (s->cert == NULL) { 192 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 193 ret = -1; 194 goto end; 195 } 196 197 for (;;) { 198 state = s->internal->state; 199 200 switch (s->internal->state) { 201 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 202 s->internal->renegotiate = 1; 203 /* s->internal->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 204 205 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 206 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 207 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 208 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 209 210 s->server = 1; 211 if (cb != NULL) 212 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 213 214 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 215 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 216 ret = -1; 217 goto end; 218 } 219 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 220 221 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { 222 ret = -1; 223 goto end; 224 } 225 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 226 ret = -1; 227 goto end; 228 } 229 230 s->internal->init_num = 0; 231 232 if (s->internal->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 233 /* 234 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO 235 * so that the output is sent in a way that 236 * TCP likes :-) 237 */ 238 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 239 ret = -1; 240 goto end; 241 } 242 243 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 244 ret = -1; 245 goto end; 246 } 247 248 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } else if (!S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) { 251 /* 252 * Server attempting to renegotiate with 253 * client that doesn't support secure 254 * renegotiation. 255 */ 256 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, 258 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 259 ret = -1; 260 goto end; 261 } else { 262 /* 263 * s->internal->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 264 * we will just send a HelloRequest 265 */ 266 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 267 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 268 } 269 break; 270 271 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 273 274 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 275 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 276 if (ret <= 0) 277 goto end; 278 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 279 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 280 s->internal->init_num = 0; 281 282 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 283 ret = -1; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 break; 287 288 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 289 s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK; 290 break; 291 292 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 295 296 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 297 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 298 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 299 if (ret <= 0) 300 goto end; 301 } 302 303 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 304 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 305 s->internal->init_num = 0; 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 310 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 311 if (ret <= 0) 312 goto end; 313 if (s->internal->hit) { 314 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 315 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 316 else 317 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 318 } 319 else 320 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 321 s->internal->init_num = 0; 322 break; 323 324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ 327 if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 328 SSL_aNULL)) { 329 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 330 if (ret <= 0) 331 goto end; 332 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) 333 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 334 else 335 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 336 } else { 337 skip = 1; 338 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 339 } 340 s->internal->init_num = 0; 341 break; 342 343 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 344 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 345 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 346 347 /* 348 * Only send if using a DH key exchange. 349 * 350 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange 351 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other 352 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's 353 * public key for key exchange. 354 */ 355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { 356 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 357 if (ret <= 0) 358 goto end; 359 } else 360 skip = 1; 361 362 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 363 s->internal->init_num = 0; 364 break; 365 366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 368 /* 369 * Determine whether or not we need to request a 370 * certificate. 371 * 372 * Do not request a certificate if: 373 * 374 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). 375 * 376 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are 377 * renegotiating. 378 * 379 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites 380 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 381 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application 382 * insists on verification (against the specs, but 383 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). 384 */ 385 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 386 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 387 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 388 ((S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 389 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & 390 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { 391 /* No cert request */ 392 skip = 1; 393 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0; 394 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 395 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 396 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 397 ret = -1; 398 goto end; 399 } 400 } 401 } else { 402 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1; 403 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 404 if (ret <= 0) 405 goto end; 406 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 407 s->internal->init_num = 0; 408 } 409 break; 410 411 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 412 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 413 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 414 if (ret <= 0) 415 goto end; 416 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 417 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 418 s->internal->init_num = 0; 419 break; 420 421 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 422 423 /* 424 * This code originally checked to see if 425 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 426 * and then flushed. This caused problems 427 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 428 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 429 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 430 * still exist. So instead we just flush 431 * unconditionally. 432 */ 433 434 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 435 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 436 ret = -1; 437 goto end; 438 } 439 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 440 441 s->internal->state = S3I(s)->tmp.next_state; 442 break; 443 444 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 445 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 446 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 447 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 448 if (ret <= 0) 449 goto end; 450 } 451 s->internal->init_num = 0; 452 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 453 break; 454 455 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 456 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 457 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 458 if (ret <= 0) 459 goto end; 460 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 461 if (ret == 2) { 462 /* 463 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when 464 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 465 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 466 * message is not sent. 467 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 468 * the client uses its key from the certificate 469 * for key exchange. 470 */ 471 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) 472 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 473 else 474 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 475 s->internal->init_num = 0; 476 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { 477 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 478 s->internal->init_num = 0; 479 if (!s->session->peer) 480 break; 481 /* 482 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer 483 * at this point and digest cached records. 484 */ 485 if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 486 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 487 ret = -1; 488 goto end; 489 } 490 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 491 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 492 ret = -1; 493 goto end; 494 } 495 } else { 496 int offset = 0; 497 int dgst_num; 498 499 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 500 s->internal->init_num = 0; 501 502 /* 503 * We need to get hashes here so if there is 504 * a client cert, it can be verified 505 * FIXME - digest processing for 506 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. 507 * But it is next step 508 */ 509 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 510 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 511 ret = -1; 512 goto end; 513 } 514 } 515 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; 516 dgst_num++) 517 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 518 int dgst_size; 519 520 tls1_cert_verify_mac(s, 521 EVP_MD_CTX_type( 522 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]), 523 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 524 dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size( 525 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 526 if (dgst_size < 0) { 527 ret = -1; 528 goto end; 529 } 530 offset += dgst_size; 531 } 532 } 533 break; 534 535 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 536 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 537 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 538 539 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 540 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 541 if (ret <= 0) 542 goto end; 543 544 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) 545 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 546 else 547 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 548 s->internal->init_num = 0; 549 break; 550 551 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 552 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 553 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 554 if (ret <= 0) 555 goto end; 556 s->internal->init_num = 0; 557 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 558 break; 559 560 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 561 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 562 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 563 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 564 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 565 if (ret <= 0) 566 goto end; 567 if (s->internal->hit) 568 s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK; 569 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 570 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 571 else 572 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 573 s->internal->init_num = 0; 574 break; 575 576 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 577 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 578 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 579 if (ret <= 0) 580 goto end; 581 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 582 s->internal->init_num = 0; 583 break; 584 585 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 586 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 587 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 588 if (ret <= 0) 589 goto end; 590 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 591 s->internal->init_num = 0; 592 break; 593 594 595 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 596 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 597 598 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher; 599 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { 600 ret = -1; 601 goto end; 602 } 603 604 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 605 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 606 607 if (ret <= 0) 608 goto end; 609 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 610 s->internal->init_num = 0; 611 612 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state( 613 s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 614 ret = -1; 615 goto end; 616 } 617 618 break; 619 620 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 621 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 622 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 623 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 624 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 625 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); 626 if (ret <= 0) 627 goto end; 628 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 629 if (s->internal->hit) { 630 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) { 631 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 632 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = 633 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 634 } else 635 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = 636 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 637 } else 638 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 639 s->internal->init_num = 0; 640 break; 641 642 case SSL_ST_OK: 643 /* clean a few things up */ 644 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 645 646 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); 647 s->internal->init_buf = NULL; 648 649 /* remove buffering on output */ 650 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 651 652 s->internal->init_num = 0; 653 654 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 655 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) { 656 s->internal->renegotiate = 0; 657 s->internal->new_session = 0; 658 659 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 660 661 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++; 662 /* s->server=1; */ 663 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 664 665 if (cb != NULL) 666 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 667 } 668 669 ret = 1; 670 goto end; 671 /* break; */ 672 673 default: 674 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 675 ret = -1; 676 goto end; 677 /* break; */ 678 } 679 680 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 681 if (s->internal->debug) { 682 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 683 goto end; 684 } 685 686 687 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->internal->state != state)) { 688 new_state = s->internal->state; 689 s->internal->state = state; 690 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 691 s->internal->state = new_state; 692 } 693 } 694 skip = 0; 695 } 696 end: 697 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 698 699 s->internal->in_handshake--; 700 if (cb != NULL) 701 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 702 return (ret); 703 } 704 705 int 706 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 707 { 708 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 709 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST); 710 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0); 711 712 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 713 } 714 715 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 716 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 717 } 718 719 int 720 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 721 { 722 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; 723 CBS compression_methods; 724 uint16_t client_version; 725 uint8_t comp_method; 726 int comp_null; 727 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; 728 long n; 729 unsigned long id; 730 unsigned char *p, *d; 731 SSL_CIPHER *c; 732 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 733 unsigned long alg_k; 734 const SSL_METHOD *method; 735 uint16_t shared_version; 736 unsigned char *end; 737 738 /* 739 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 740 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 741 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 742 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 743 * TLSv1. 744 */ 745 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 746 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 747 } 748 749 s->internal->first_packet = 1; 750 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 751 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 752 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 753 if (!ok) 754 return ((int)n); 755 s->internal->first_packet = 0; 756 757 if (n < 0) 758 goto err; 759 760 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 761 end = d + n; 762 763 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 764 765 /* 766 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. 767 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 768 */ 769 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) 770 goto truncated; 771 772 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) { 773 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 774 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 775 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) { 776 /* 777 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote 778 * version number. 779 */ 780 s->version = s->client_version; 781 } 782 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 783 goto f_err; 784 } 785 s->client_version = client_version; 786 s->version = shared_version; 787 788 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) 789 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version); 790 if (method == NULL) { 791 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 792 goto err; 793 } 794 s->method = method; 795 796 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) 797 goto truncated; 798 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) 799 goto truncated; 800 801 /* 802 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't 803 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 804 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 805 */ 806 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 807 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) 808 goto truncated; 809 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 810 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) 811 return (1); 812 } 813 } 814 815 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, 816 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) 817 goto err; 818 819 s->internal->hit = 0; 820 821 /* 822 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 823 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 824 * ignore resumption requests with flag 825 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag 826 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications 827 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older 828 * library versions). 829 * 830 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() 831 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session 832 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 833 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 834 * ignored. 835 */ 836 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options & 837 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 838 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 839 goto err; 840 } else { 841 /* XXX - pass CBS through instead... */ 842 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, 843 (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&session_id), 844 CBS_len(&session_id), end); 845 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ 846 s->internal->hit = 1; 847 } else if (i == -1) 848 goto err; 849 else { 850 /* i == 0 */ 851 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 852 goto err; 853 } 854 } 855 856 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 857 /* 858 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify 859 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause 860 * an overflow. 861 */ 862 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) { 863 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 864 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 865 goto f_err; 866 } 867 868 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 869 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 870 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { 871 size_t cookie_len; 872 873 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ 874 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 875 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) 876 goto err; 877 878 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 879 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, 880 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { 881 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 882 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 883 goto f_err; 884 } 885 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 886 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ 887 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 888 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) { 889 /* default verification */ 890 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 891 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 892 goto f_err; 893 } 894 ret = 2; 895 } 896 } 897 898 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) 899 goto truncated; 900 901 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ 902 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { 903 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 904 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 905 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 906 goto f_err; 907 } 908 909 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 910 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, 911 CBS_data(&cipher_suites), CBS_len(&cipher_suites))) == NULL) 912 goto err; 913 } 914 915 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 916 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 917 j = 0; 918 id = s->session->cipher->id; 919 920 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 921 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 922 if (c->id == id) { 923 j = 1; 924 break; 925 } 926 } 927 if (j == 0) { 928 /* 929 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher 930 * list if we are asked to reuse it 931 */ 932 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 933 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 934 goto f_err; 935 } 936 } 937 938 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) 939 goto truncated; 940 941 comp_null = 0; 942 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { 943 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) 944 goto truncated; 945 if (comp_method == 0) 946 comp_null = 1; 947 } 948 if (comp_null == 0) { 949 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 950 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 951 goto f_err; 952 } 953 954 p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&cbs); 955 956 /* TLS extensions*/ 957 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { 958 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 959 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 960 goto f_err; 961 } 962 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 963 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 964 goto err; 965 } 966 967 /* 968 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 969 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 970 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 971 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. 972 */ 973 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 974 975 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { 976 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 977 978 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 979 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 980 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, 981 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 982 s->internal->hit = 1; 983 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 984 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 985 986 ciphers = NULL; 987 988 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 989 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : 990 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 991 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 992 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 993 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 994 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 995 goto f_err; 996 } 997 998 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 999 1000 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1001 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id); 1002 1003 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1004 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id = 1005 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1006 } 1007 } 1008 1009 /* 1010 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1011 * pick a cipher 1012 */ 1013 1014 if (!s->internal->hit) { 1015 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1016 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1017 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1018 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1019 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1020 goto f_err; 1021 } 1022 ciphers = NULL; 1023 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1024 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1025 1026 if (c == NULL) { 1027 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1028 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1029 goto f_err; 1030 } 1031 S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1032 } else { 1033 S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1034 } 1035 1036 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1037 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || 1038 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1039 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1040 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1041 goto f_err; 1042 } 1043 } 1044 1045 /* 1046 * We now have the following setup. 1047 * client_random 1048 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1049 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1050 * compression - basically ignored right now 1051 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1052 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1053 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag 1054 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1055 */ 1056 1057 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1058 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1059 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1060 goto err; 1061 } 1062 1063 if (ret < 0) 1064 ret = 1; 1065 if (0) { 1066 truncated: 1067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1068 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1069 f_err: 1070 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1071 } 1072 err: 1073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1074 1075 return (ret); 1076 } 1077 1078 int 1079 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1080 { 1081 unsigned char *bufend; 1082 unsigned char *p, *d; 1083 CBB cbb, session_id; 1084 size_t outlen; 1085 int sl; 1086 1087 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1088 1089 bufend = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 1090 1091 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1092 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO); 1093 1094 if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, p, bufend - p)) 1095 goto err; 1096 1097 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, s->version)) 1098 goto err; 1099 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random, 1100 sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) 1101 goto err; 1102 1103 /* 1104 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1105 * back in the server hello: 1106 * 1107 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1108 * we send back the old session ID. 1109 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1110 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1111 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1112 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1113 * session ID. 1114 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1115 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1116 * 1117 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1118 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1119 * to send back. 1120 */ 1121 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1122 && !s->internal->hit) 1123 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1124 1125 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1126 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1127 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1128 goto err; 1129 } 1130 1131 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id)) 1132 goto err; 1133 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) 1134 goto err; 1135 1136 /* Cipher suite. */ 1137 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, 1138 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher))) 1139 goto err; 1140 1141 /* Compression method. */ 1142 if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0)) 1143 goto err; 1144 1145 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen)) 1146 goto err; 1147 1148 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p + outlen, 1149 bufend)) == NULL) { 1150 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1151 goto err; 1152 } 1153 1154 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d); 1155 } 1156 1157 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1158 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1159 1160 err: 1161 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1162 1163 return (-1); 1164 } 1165 1166 int 1167 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1168 { 1169 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1170 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE); 1171 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0); 1172 1173 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1174 } 1175 1176 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1177 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1178 } 1179 1180 int 1181 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1182 { 1183 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1184 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1185 unsigned char *data; 1186 int al; 1187 1188 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1189 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) { 1190 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1191 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1192 goto f_err; 1193 } 1194 } else 1195 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp; 1196 1197 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) 1198 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1199 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher)); 1200 1201 if (dhp == NULL) { 1202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1203 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1204 goto f_err; 1205 } 1206 1207 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1208 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1209 goto err; 1210 } 1211 1212 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1213 dh = dhp; 1214 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1215 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1216 goto err; 1217 } 1218 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh; 1219 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1220 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1221 goto err; 1222 } 1223 1224 /* 1225 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key. 1226 */ 1227 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p)) 1228 goto err; 1229 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p))) 1230 goto err; 1231 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data); 1232 1233 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g)) 1234 goto err; 1235 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g))) 1236 goto err; 1237 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data); 1238 1239 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys)) 1240 goto err; 1241 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key))) 1242 goto err; 1243 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data); 1244 1245 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1246 goto err; 1247 1248 return (1); 1249 1250 f_err: 1251 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1252 err: 1253 return (-1); 1254 } 1255 1256 static int 1257 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1258 { 1259 CBB ecpoint; 1260 unsigned char *data; 1261 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1262 const EC_GROUP *group; 1263 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1264 int encodedlen = 0; 1265 int curve_id = 0; 1266 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1267 int al; 1268 1269 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 1270 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1271 if (nid != NID_undef) 1272 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); 1273 } else if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) { 1274 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1275 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher)); 1276 } 1277 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1278 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1279 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1280 goto f_err; 1281 } 1282 1283 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1284 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1285 goto err; 1286 } 1287 1288 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1289 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1290 ecdh = ecdhp; 1291 } else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1292 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1293 goto err; 1294 } 1295 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1296 1297 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1298 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1299 (s->internal->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1300 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1301 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1302 goto err; 1303 } 1304 } 1305 1306 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1307 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1308 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1309 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1310 goto err; 1311 } 1312 1313 /* 1314 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1315 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1316 */ 1317 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id( 1318 EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { 1319 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1320 goto err; 1321 } 1322 1323 /* 1324 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1325 * allocate memory accordingly. 1326 */ 1327 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1328 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); 1329 1330 encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen); 1331 1332 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1333 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1334 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1335 goto err; 1336 } 1337 1338 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1339 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1340 1341 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1342 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1343 goto err; 1344 } 1345 1346 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1347 bn_ctx = NULL; 1348 1349 /* 1350 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1351 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has: 1352 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1353 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1354 * the actual encoded point itself. 1355 */ 1356 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1357 goto err; 1358 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1359 goto err; 1360 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1361 goto err; 1362 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encodedlen)) 1363 goto err; 1364 1365 memcpy(data, encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1366 1367 free(encodedPoint); 1368 encodedPoint = NULL; 1369 1370 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1371 goto err; 1372 1373 return (1); 1374 1375 f_err: 1376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1377 err: 1378 free(encodedPoint); 1379 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1380 1381 return (-1); 1382 } 1383 1384 static int 1385 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1386 { 1387 uint8_t *public_key = NULL; 1388 int curve_id; 1389 CBB ecpoint; 1390 int ret = -1; 1391 1392 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */ 1393 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) { 1394 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1395 goto err; 1396 } 1397 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1398 goto err; 1399 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1400 goto err; 1401 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519); 1402 1403 /* Serialize public key. */ 1404 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1405 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1406 goto err; 1407 } 1408 1409 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1410 goto err; 1411 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1412 goto err; 1413 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1414 goto err; 1415 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) 1416 goto err; 1417 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1418 goto err; 1419 1420 ret = 1; 1421 1422 err: 1423 free(public_key); 1424 1425 return (ret); 1426 } 1427 1428 static int 1429 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1430 { 1431 int nid; 1432 1433 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); 1434 1435 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0 && nid == NID_X25519) 1436 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb); 1437 1438 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb); 1439 } 1440 1441 int 1442 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1443 { 1444 CBB cbb; 1445 unsigned char *params = NULL; 1446 size_t params_len; 1447 unsigned char *q; 1448 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1449 unsigned int u; 1450 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1451 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1452 unsigned char *p, *d; 1453 int al, i, j, n, kn; 1454 unsigned long type; 1455 BUF_MEM *buf; 1456 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1457 1458 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1459 1460 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1461 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1462 type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1463 1464 buf = s->internal->init_buf; 1465 1466 if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0)) 1467 goto err; 1468 1469 if (type & SSL_kDHE) { 1470 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1471 goto err; 1472 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { 1473 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1474 goto err; 1475 } else { 1476 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1477 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1478 goto f_err; 1479 } 1480 1481 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) 1482 goto err; 1483 1484 if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { 1485 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey( 1486 s, S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { 1487 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1488 goto f_err; 1489 } 1490 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1491 } else { 1492 pkey = NULL; 1493 kn = 0; 1494 } 1495 1496 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 1497 params_len + kn)) { 1498 SSLerror(s, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1499 goto err; 1500 } 1501 1502 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1503 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE); 1504 1505 memcpy(p, params, params_len); 1506 1507 free(params); 1508 params = NULL; 1509 1510 n = params_len; 1511 p += params_len; 1512 1513 /* not anonymous */ 1514 if (pkey != NULL) { 1515 /* 1516 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1517 * and p points to the space at the end. 1518 */ 1519 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1520 q = md_buf; 1521 j = 0; 1522 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5_sha1(), 1523 NULL)) 1524 goto err; 1525 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, 1526 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1527 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, 1528 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1529 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1530 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1531 (unsigned int *)&i); 1532 q += i; 1533 j += i; 1534 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1535 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1536 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); 1537 goto err; 1538 } 1539 s2n(u, p); 1540 n += u + 2; 1541 } else if (md) { 1542 /* Send signature algorithm. */ 1543 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1544 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1545 /* Should never happen */ 1546 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1547 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1548 goto f_err; 1549 } 1550 p += 2; 1551 } 1552 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1553 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1554 s->s3->client_random, 1555 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1556 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1557 s->s3->server_random, 1558 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1559 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1560 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], 1561 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 1562 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1563 goto err; 1564 } 1565 s2n(i, p); 1566 n += i + 2; 1567 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1568 n += 2; 1569 } else { 1570 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1571 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1572 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1573 goto f_err; 1574 } 1575 } 1576 1577 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); 1578 } 1579 1580 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1581 1582 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1583 1584 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1585 1586 f_err: 1587 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1588 err: 1589 free(params); 1590 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1591 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1592 1593 return (-1); 1594 } 1595 1596 int 1597 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1598 { 1599 unsigned char *p, *d; 1600 int i, j, nl, off, n; 1601 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 1602 X509_NAME *name; 1603 BUF_MEM *buf; 1604 1605 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 1606 buf = s->internal->init_buf; 1607 1608 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1609 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); 1610 1611 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1612 p++; 1613 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 1614 d[0] = n; 1615 p += n; 1616 n++; 1617 1618 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1619 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 1620 s2n(nl, p); 1621 p += nl + 2; 1622 n += nl + 2; 1623 } 1624 1625 off = n; 1626 p += 2; 1627 n += 2; 1628 1629 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1630 nl = 0; 1631 if (sk != NULL) { 1632 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 1633 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 1634 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 1635 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 1636 ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + n + j 1637 + 2)) { 1638 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1639 goto err; 1640 } 1641 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1642 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + n; 1643 s2n(j, p); 1644 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 1645 n += 2 + j; 1646 nl += 2 + j; 1647 } 1648 } 1649 /* else no CA names */ 1650 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1651 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + off; 1652 s2n(nl, p); 1653 1654 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); 1655 1656 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1657 } 1658 1659 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1660 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1661 err: 1662 return (-1); 1663 } 1664 1665 static int 1666 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1667 { 1668 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1669 unsigned char *d; 1670 RSA *rsa = NULL; 1671 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1672 int i, al; 1673 1674 d = p; 1675 1676 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); 1677 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1678 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1679 1680 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1681 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1682 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 1683 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1684 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1685 goto f_err; 1686 } 1687 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 1688 1689 if (2 > n) 1690 goto truncated; 1691 n2s(p, i); 1692 if (n != i + 2) { 1693 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1694 goto err; 1695 } else 1696 n = i; 1697 1698 i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1699 1700 ERR_clear_error(); 1701 1702 al = -1; 1703 1704 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 1705 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1706 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1707 } 1708 1709 if (p - d + 2 > n) /* needed in the SSL3 case */ 1710 goto truncated; 1711 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && 1712 (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 1713 /* 1714 * The premaster secret must contain the same version 1715 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback 1716 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such 1717 * protection for DH ciphersuites). 1718 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated 1719 * protocol version instead if the server does not 1720 * support the requested protocol version. 1721 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 1722 * clients. 1723 */ 1724 if (!((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1725 (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) && 1726 (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) { 1727 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1728 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1729 1730 /* 1731 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of 1732 * Bleichenbacher's attack 1733 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits 1734 * the version number check as a "bad version 1735 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the 1736 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1737 * made up by the adversary is properly 1738 * formatted except that the version number is 1739 * wrong. 1740 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this 1741 * just like any other decryption error. 1742 */ 1743 } 1744 } 1745 1746 if (al != -1) { 1747 /* 1748 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead 1749 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack 1750 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 1751 * section 7.4.7.1). 1752 */ 1753 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1754 p = fakekey; 1755 } 1756 1757 s->session->master_key_length = 1758 tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1759 s->session->master_key, p, i); 1760 1761 explicit_bzero(p, i); 1762 1763 return (1); 1764 truncated: 1765 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1766 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1767 f_err: 1768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1769 err: 1770 return (-1); 1771 } 1772 1773 static int 1774 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1775 { 1776 BIGNUM *bn = NULL; 1777 int key_size, al; 1778 CBS cbs, dh_Yc; 1779 DH *dh; 1780 1781 if (n < 0) 1782 goto err; 1783 1784 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1785 1786 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc)) 1787 goto truncated; 1788 1789 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 1790 goto truncated; 1791 1792 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) { 1793 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1794 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1795 goto f_err; 1796 } 1797 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh; 1798 1799 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) { 1800 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1801 goto err; 1802 } 1803 1804 key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh); 1805 if (key_size <= 0) { 1806 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1807 BN_clear_free(bn); 1808 goto err; 1809 } 1810 1811 s->session->master_key_length = 1812 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1813 s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size); 1814 1815 explicit_bzero(p, key_size); 1816 1817 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh); 1818 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL; 1819 1820 BN_clear_free(bn); 1821 1822 return (1); 1823 1824 truncated: 1825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1826 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1827 f_err: 1828 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1829 err: 1830 return (-1); 1831 } 1832 1833 static int 1834 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1835 { 1836 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1837 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1838 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1839 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1840 int i, al; 1841 1842 int ret = 1; 1843 int key_size; 1844 const EC_KEY *tkey; 1845 const EC_GROUP *group; 1846 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 1847 1848 /* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */ 1849 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 1850 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1851 goto err; 1852 } 1853 1854 /* 1855 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when 1856 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message. 1857 */ 1858 tkey = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1859 1860 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 1861 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 1862 1863 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 1864 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 1865 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1866 goto err; 1867 } 1868 1869 /* Let's get client's public key */ 1870 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 1871 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1872 goto err; 1873 } 1874 1875 if (n == 0L) { 1876 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 1877 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey( 1878 s->session->peer)) == NULL) || 1879 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 1880 /* 1881 * XXX: For now, we do not support client 1882 * authentication using ECDH certificates 1883 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 1884 * never executed. When that support is 1885 * added, we ought to ensure the key 1886 * received in the certificate is 1887 * authorized for key agreement. 1888 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 1889 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 1890 * group. 1891 */ 1892 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1893 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 1894 goto f_err; 1895 } 1896 1897 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 1898 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) 1899 == 0) { 1900 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1901 goto err; 1902 } 1903 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 1904 } else { 1905 /* 1906 * Get client's public key from encoded point 1907 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 1908 */ 1909 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1910 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1911 goto err; 1912 } 1913 1914 /* Get encoded point length */ 1915 i = *p; 1916 1917 p += 1; 1918 if (n != 1 + i) { 1919 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1920 goto err; 1921 } 1922 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 1923 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1924 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1925 goto err; 1926 } 1927 /* 1928 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 1929 * currently, so set it to the start. 1930 */ 1931 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data; 1932 } 1933 1934 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 1935 key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh); 1936 if (key_size <= 0) { 1937 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1938 goto err; 1939 } 1940 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 1941 NULL); 1942 if (i <= 0) { 1943 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1944 goto err; 1945 } 1946 1947 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 1948 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 1949 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 1950 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1951 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh); 1952 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 1953 1954 /* Compute the master secret */ 1955 s->session->master_key_length = 1956 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1957 s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 1958 1959 explicit_bzero(p, i); 1960 return (ret); 1961 1962 f_err: 1963 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1964 err: 1965 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 1966 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 1967 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 1968 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1969 return (-1); 1970 } 1971 1972 static int 1973 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1974 { 1975 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL; 1976 CBS cbs, ecpoint; 1977 int ret = -1; 1978 1979 if (n < 0) 1980 goto err; 1981 1982 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1983 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint)) 1984 goto err; 1985 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) 1986 goto err; 1987 1988 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1989 goto err; 1990 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint))) 1991 goto err; 1992 1993 explicit_bzero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1994 free(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519); 1995 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL; 1996 1997 s->session->master_key_length = 1998 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1999 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 2000 2001 ret = 1; 2002 2003 err: 2004 if (shared_key != NULL) 2005 explicit_bzero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 2006 free(shared_key); 2007 2008 return (ret); 2009 } 2010 2011 static int 2012 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 2013 { 2014 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) 2015 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n); 2016 2017 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n); 2018 } 2019 2020 static int 2021 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 2022 { 2023 2024 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2025 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2026 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2027 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2028 unsigned long alg_a; 2029 int Ttag, Tclass; 2030 long Tlen; 2031 int al; 2032 int ret = 0; 2033 2034 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2035 alg_a = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2036 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2037 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2038 2039 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2040 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2041 /* 2042 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, 2043 * maybe use it for key exchange. 2044 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because 2045 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for 2046 * authorization only. 2047 */ 2048 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2049 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2050 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, 2051 client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2052 ERR_clear_error(); 2053 } 2054 if (2 > n) 2055 goto truncated; 2056 /* Decrypt session key */ 2057 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, 2058 &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 2059 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2060 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2061 goto gerr; 2062 } 2063 start = p; 2064 inlen = Tlen; 2065 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, 2066 start, inlen) <=0) { 2067 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2068 goto gerr; 2069 } 2070 /* Generate master secret */ 2071 s->session->master_key_length = 2072 tls1_generate_master_secret( 2073 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); 2074 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2075 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, 2076 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2077 ret = 2; 2078 else 2079 ret = 1; 2080 gerr: 2081 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2082 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2083 if (ret) 2084 return (ret); 2085 else 2086 goto err; 2087 2088 truncated: 2089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2090 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2092 err: 2093 return (-1); 2094 } 2095 2096 int 2097 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2098 { 2099 unsigned long alg_k; 2100 unsigned char *p; 2101 int al, ok; 2102 long n; 2103 2104 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ 2105 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2106 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2107 if (!ok) 2108 return ((int)n); 2109 2110 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2111 2112 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2113 2114 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2115 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1) 2116 goto err; 2117 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2118 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2119 goto err; 2120 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 2121 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2122 goto err; 2123 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2124 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1) 2125 goto err; 2126 } else { 2127 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2128 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2129 goto f_err; 2130 } 2131 2132 return (1); 2133 2134 f_err: 2135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2136 err: 2137 return (-1); 2138 } 2139 2140 int 2141 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2142 { 2143 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2144 unsigned char *p; 2145 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2146 long n; 2147 int type = 0, i, j; 2148 X509 *peer; 2149 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2150 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2151 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2152 2153 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2154 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2155 if (!ok) 2156 return ((int)n); 2157 2158 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2159 peer = s->session->peer; 2160 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2161 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2162 } else { 2163 peer = NULL; 2164 pkey = NULL; 2165 } 2166 2167 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2168 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2169 if (peer != NULL) { 2170 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2171 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2172 goto f_err; 2173 } 2174 ret = 1; 2175 goto end; 2176 } 2177 2178 if (peer == NULL) { 2179 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2180 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2181 goto f_err; 2182 } 2183 2184 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2185 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2186 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2187 goto f_err; 2188 } 2189 2190 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2191 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2192 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2193 goto f_err; 2194 } 2195 2196 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2197 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2198 /* 2199 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites. 2200 * 2201 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare 2202 * signature without length field. 2203 */ 2204 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2205 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) { 2206 i = 64; 2207 } else { 2208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2209 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2210 /* Should never happen */ 2211 if (sigalg == -1) { 2212 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2214 goto f_err; 2215 } 2216 if (2 > n) 2217 goto truncated; 2218 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 2219 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 2220 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2222 goto f_err; 2223 } 2224 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 2225 if (md == NULL) { 2226 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2228 goto f_err; 2229 } 2230 p += 2; 2231 n -= 2; 2232 } 2233 if (2 > n) 2234 goto truncated; 2235 n2s(p, i); 2236 n -= 2; 2237 if (i > n) 2238 goto truncated; 2239 } 2240 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2241 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 2242 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2244 goto f_err; 2245 } 2246 2247 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2248 long hdatalen = 0; 2249 void *hdata; 2250 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2251 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2252 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2253 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2254 goto f_err; 2255 } 2256 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2257 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 2258 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2260 goto f_err; 2261 } 2262 2263 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 2264 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2265 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2266 goto f_err; 2267 } 2268 } else 2269 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 2270 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2271 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2272 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2273 if (i < 0) { 2274 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2275 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2276 goto f_err; 2277 } 2278 if (i == 0) { 2279 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2280 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2281 goto f_err; 2282 } 2283 } else 2284 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 2285 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2286 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2287 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 2288 if (j <= 0) { 2289 /* bad signature */ 2290 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2291 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2292 goto f_err; 2293 } 2294 } else 2295 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 2296 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2297 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2298 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 2299 if (j <= 0) { 2300 /* bad signature */ 2301 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2302 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2303 goto f_err; 2304 } 2305 } else 2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 2307 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2308 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 2309 long hdatalen = 0; 2310 void *hdata; 2311 unsigned char signature[128]; 2312 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature); 2313 int nid; 2314 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2315 2316 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2317 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2318 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2319 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2320 goto f_err; 2321 } 2322 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || 2323 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { 2324 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2325 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2326 goto f_err; 2327 } 2328 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 2329 if (!pctx) { 2330 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2331 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2332 goto f_err; 2333 } 2334 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2335 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || 2336 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) || 2337 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || 2338 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || 2339 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, 2340 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, 2341 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, 2342 NULL) <= 0)) { 2343 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2344 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2345 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2346 goto f_err; 2347 } 2348 2349 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) { 2350 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2351 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2352 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2353 goto f_err; 2354 } 2355 2356 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2357 } else 2358 #endif 2359 { 2360 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2361 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2362 goto f_err; 2363 } 2364 2365 2366 ret = 1; 2367 if (0) { 2368 truncated: 2369 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2370 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2371 f_err: 2372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2373 } 2374 end: 2375 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 2376 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 2377 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 2378 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 2379 } 2380 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 2381 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2382 return (ret); 2383 } 2384 2385 int 2386 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2387 { 2388 CBS cbs, client_certs; 2389 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 2390 X509 *x = NULL; 2391 long n; 2392 const unsigned char *q; 2393 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 2394 2395 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2396 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); 2397 2398 if (!ok) 2399 return ((int)n); 2400 2401 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 2402 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2403 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2404 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2405 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2406 goto f_err; 2407 } 2408 /* 2409 * If tls asked for a client cert, 2410 * the client must return a 0 list. 2411 */ 2412 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 2413 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 2414 ); 2415 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2416 goto f_err; 2417 } 2418 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2419 return (1); 2420 } 2421 2422 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 2423 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2424 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2425 goto f_err; 2426 } 2427 2428 if (n < 0) 2429 goto truncated; 2430 2431 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2432 2433 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 2434 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2435 goto err; 2436 } 2437 2438 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) || 2439 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2440 goto truncated; 2441 2442 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) { 2443 CBS cert; 2444 2445 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) { 2446 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2447 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2448 goto f_err; 2449 } 2450 2451 q = CBS_data(&cert); 2452 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); 2453 if (x == NULL) { 2454 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2455 goto err; 2456 } 2457 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { 2458 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2459 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2460 goto f_err; 2461 } 2462 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 2463 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2464 goto err; 2465 } 2466 x = NULL; 2467 } 2468 2469 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 2470 /* 2471 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned. 2472 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate. 2473 */ 2474 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2475 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2476 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2477 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2478 goto f_err; 2479 } 2480 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 2481 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 2482 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2483 goto f_err; 2484 } 2485 } else { 2486 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 2487 if (i <= 0) { 2488 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2489 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2490 goto f_err; 2491 } 2492 } 2493 2494 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2495 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 2496 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2497 2498 /* 2499 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2500 * when we arrive here 2501 */ 2502 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2503 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2504 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2505 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2506 goto err; 2507 } 2508 } 2509 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2510 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 2511 2512 /* 2513 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2514 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 2515 */ 2516 2517 sk = NULL; 2518 2519 ret = 1; 2520 if (0) { 2521 truncated: 2522 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2523 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2524 f_err: 2525 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2526 } 2527 err: 2528 X509_free(x); 2529 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 2530 2531 return (ret); 2532 } 2533 2534 int 2535 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2536 { 2537 CBB cbb, server_cert; 2538 X509 *x; 2539 2540 /* 2541 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. 2542 */ 2543 2544 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2545 2546 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 2547 if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) { 2548 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2549 return (0); 2550 } 2551 2552 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert, 2553 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) 2554 goto err; 2555 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x)) 2556 goto err; 2557 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 2558 goto err; 2559 2560 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2561 } 2562 2563 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2564 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2565 2566 err: 2567 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2568 2569 return (0); 2570 } 2571 2572 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 2573 int 2574 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2575 { 2576 unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart; 2577 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 2578 const unsigned char *const_p; 2579 int len, slen_full, slen; 2580 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2581 unsigned int hlen; 2582 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2583 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2584 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2585 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2586 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2587 2588 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 2589 /* get session encoding length */ 2590 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2591 /* 2592 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2593 * too long 2594 */ 2595 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 2596 goto err; 2597 senc = malloc(slen_full); 2598 if (!senc) 2599 goto err; 2600 p = senc; 2601 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2602 2603 /* 2604 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to 2605 * clean up 2606 */ 2607 const_p = senc; 2608 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 2609 if (sess == NULL) 2610 goto err; 2611 2612 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 2613 sess->session_id_length = 0; 2614 2615 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 2616 if (slen > slen_full) { 2617 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 2618 goto err; 2619 } 2620 p = senc; 2621 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 2622 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 2623 2624 /* 2625 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2626 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2627 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2628 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2629 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2630 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2631 */ 2632 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 2633 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2634 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2635 goto err; 2636 2637 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET); 2638 2639 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2640 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2641 2642 /* 2643 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2644 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2645 * from parent ctx. 2646 */ 2647 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2648 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, 2649 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { 2650 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2651 goto err; 2652 } 2653 } else { 2654 arc4random_buf(iv, 16); 2655 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2656 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2657 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 2658 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2659 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2660 } 2661 2662 /* 2663 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 2664 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session 2665 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new 2666 * sessions will live as long as their sessions. 2667 */ 2668 l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 2669 2670 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2671 p += 2; 2672 /* Output key name */ 2673 macstart = p; 2674 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2675 p += 16; 2676 /* output IV */ 2677 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2678 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2679 /* Encrypt session data */ 2680 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2681 p += len; 2682 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len); 2683 p += len; 2684 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2685 2686 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2687 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2688 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2689 p += hlen; 2690 2691 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2692 /* Total length */ 2693 len = p - d; 2694 2695 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */ 2696 p = d + 4; 2697 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */ 2698 2699 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len); 2700 2701 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2702 2703 explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full); 2704 free(senc); 2705 } 2706 2707 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2708 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2709 2710 err: 2711 if (senc != NULL) 2712 explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full); 2713 free(senc); 2714 2715 return (-1); 2716 } 2717 2718 int 2719 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2720 { 2721 unsigned char *p; 2722 2723 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 2724 /* 2725 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2726 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 2727 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 2728 * + (ocsp response) 2729 */ 2730 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 4 + 2731 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2732 return (-1); 2733 2734 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS); 2735 2736 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 2737 l2n3(s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 2738 memcpy(p, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 2739 2740 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4); 2741 2742 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2743 } 2744 2745 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2746 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2747 } 2748 2749 /* 2750 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 2751 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 2752 */ 2753 int 2754 ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 2755 { 2756 CBS cbs, proto, padding; 2757 int ok; 2758 long n; 2759 size_t len; 2760 2761 /* 2762 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 2763 * extension in their ClientHello 2764 */ 2765 if (!S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) { 2766 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 2767 return (-1); 2768 } 2769 2770 /* 514 maxlen is enough for the payload format below */ 2771 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 2772 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 2773 if (!ok) 2774 return ((int)n); 2775 2776 /* 2777 * s->internal->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 2778 * in this handshake, but S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 2779 * by ssl3_get_finished). 2780 */ 2781 if (!S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2782 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 2783 return (-1); 2784 } 2785 2786 if (n < 2) 2787 return (0); 2788 /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 2789 2790 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num); 2791 2792 /* 2793 * The payload looks like: 2794 * uint8 proto_len; 2795 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 2796 * uint8 padding_len; 2797 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 2798 */ 2799 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &proto) || 2800 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &padding) || 2801 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2802 return 0; 2803 2804 /* 2805 * XXX We should not NULL it, but this matches old behavior of not 2806 * freeing before malloc. 2807 */ 2808 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; 2809 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; 2810 2811 if (!CBS_stow(&proto, &s->internal->next_proto_negotiated, &len)) { 2812 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2813 return (0); 2814 } 2815 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = (uint8_t)len; 2816 2817 return (1); 2818 } 2819