xref: /onnv-gate/usr/src/uts/common/gssapi/mechs/krb5/mech/k5unseal.c (revision 13132:9615cdbf7b70)

/*
 * Copyright (c) 1999, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
 */
/*
 * Copyright 2001 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
 *
 * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
 * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
 * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
 * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
 * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
 * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
 * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
 * representations about the suitability of this software for any
 * purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
 *
 * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
 * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
 * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
 * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
 * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

/*
 * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
 *
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
 * a specific license from the United States Government.  It is the
 * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
 * obtain such a license before exporting.
 *
 * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
 * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
 * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
 * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
 * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
 * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
 * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
 * permission.  FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
 * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
 * or implied warranty.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 */

#include "gssapiP_krb5.h"
#include "k5-int.h"

/* message_buffer is an input if SIGN, output if SEAL, and ignored if DEL_CTX
   conf_state is only valid if SEAL. */

static OM_uint32
kg_unseal_v1(context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
	     conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
    krb5_context context;
    OM_uint32 *minor_status;
    krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int bodysize;
    gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
    int *conf_state;
    int *qop_state;
    int toktype;
{
    krb5_error_code code;
    int conflen = 0;
    int signalg;
    int sealalg;
    gss_buffer_desc token;
    krb5_checksum cksum;
    krb5_checksum md5cksum;
    krb5_data plaind;
    char *data_ptr;
    krb5_timestamp now;
    unsigned char *plain;
    unsigned int cksum_len = 0;
    size_t plainlen;
    int direction;
    krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
    OM_uint32 retval;
    size_t sumlen, blocksize;
    int tmsglen;
    krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;

    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() start\n");

    /* Solaris Kerberos:  make sure this is initialized */
    *minor_status = 0;

    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
	message_buffer->length = 0;
	message_buffer->value = NULL;
    }

    /* get the sign and seal algorithms */

    signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1]<<8);
    sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3]<<8);

    /* Sanity checks */

    if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff)) {
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN\n");
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

    if ((toktype != KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) &&
	(sealalg != 0xffff)) {
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error2 GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN\n");
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

    /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
       key type, so a simple comparison is ok */

    if ((toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) &&
	!((sealalg == 0xffff) ||
	  (sealalg == ctx->sealalg))) {
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error3 GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN\n");
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

    /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
       but few enough that we can try them all. */

    if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
	(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
	(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
	 signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
	(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
	signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error4 GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN\n");
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

    KRB5_LOG(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() signalg = %d\n", signalg);

    switch (signalg) {
    case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
    case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
	cksum_len = 8;
	if (toktype != KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
	  sign_usage = 15;
	    break;
    case SGN_ALG_3:
	cksum_len = 16;
	break;
    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
	cksum_len = 20;
	break;
    default:
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error signalg=%d\n", signalg);
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

#ifdef _KERNEL
	/*
	 * Because the ARCFOUR code bypasses the standard
	 * crypto interfaces, we must make sure the kernel
	 * crypto framework mechanism types are properly
	 * initialized here.
	 */
	context->kef_cipher_mt = get_cipher_mech_type(context,
					ctx->seq);
	context->kef_hash_mt = get_hash_mech_type(context,
					ctx->seq);
	if ((code = init_key_kef(context->kef_cipher_mt,
				ctx->seq))) {
		*minor_status = code;
		return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}
	if ((code = init_key_kef(context->kef_cipher_mt,
			ctx->enc))) {
		*minor_status = code;
		return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}
#endif /* _KERNEL */

    /* get the token parameters */

    if ((code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr+14, ptr+6, &direction,
			       &seqnum))) {
	*minor_status = code;
	return(GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
    }

    /* decode the message, if SEAL */

    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
	tmsglen = bodysize-(14+cksum_len);
	KRB5_LOG1(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() tmsglen = %d cksum_len = %d",
		tmsglen, cksum_len);
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG\n");

	if (sealalg != 0xffff) {
	    if ((plain = (unsigned char *) xmalloc(tmsglen)) == NULL) {
		*minor_status = ENOMEM;
		KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error ENOMEM\n");
		return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	    }
	    if (ctx->enc->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
	      unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
	      krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
	      int i;
	      bigend_seqnum[0] = (seqnum>>24) & 0xff;
	      bigend_seqnum[1] = (seqnum>>16) & 0xff;
	      bigend_seqnum[2] = (seqnum>>8) & 0xff;
	      bigend_seqnum[3] = seqnum & 0xff;
	      code = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
	      if (code)
		{
		  xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
		  *minor_status = code;
		  return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
		}

	      for (i = 0; i <= 15; i++)
		((char *) enc_key->contents)[i] ^=0xf0;

#ifndef _KERNEL
		/*
		 * The enc_key contents were modified, delete the
		 * key object so it doesn't get used later.
		 */
		if (enc_key->hKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
			(void)C_DestroyObject(krb_ctx_hSession(context),
				enc_key->hKey);
			enc_key->hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
		}
#endif
		KRB5_LOG(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() enc_key->enctype = %d",
			enc_key->enctype);

		code = kg_arcfour_docrypt (context,
				enc_key, 0,
				&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
				ptr+14+cksum_len, tmsglen,
				plain);
		krb5_free_keyblock (context, enc_key);
            } else {
		code = kg_decrypt(context, ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
			ptr+14+cksum_len, plain, tmsglen);
	    }
            if (code) {
                xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
		*minor_status = code;
		return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	    }
	} else {
	    plain = ptr+14+cksum_len;
	}

	plainlen = tmsglen;

	if ((sealalg == 0xffff) && ctx->big_endian) {
	    token.length = tmsglen;
	} else {
	    conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc);
	    /*
	     * Solaris Kerberos: we want to perform a sanity check on the
	     * pad length, so we know it can not be more than the blocksize.
	     */
	    code = krb5_c_block_size(context, ctx->enc->enctype, &blocksize);
	    if (code != 0) {
		if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		    xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
		*minor_status = code;
		return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	    }
	    if (plain[tmsglen-1] > blocksize) {
		if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		    xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
		*minor_status = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
		return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	    }
	    token.length = tmsglen - conflen - plain[tmsglen-1];
	}

	if (token.length) {
	    if ((token.value = (void *) xmalloc(token.length)) == NULL) {
		if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		    xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
		*minor_status = ENOMEM;
		KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error2 ENOMEM\n");
		return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	    }
	    (void) memcpy(token.value, plain+conflen, token.length);
	} else {
	    token.value = NULL;
	}
    } else if (toktype == KG_TOK_SIGN_MSG) {
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() toktype == KG_TOK_SIGN_MSG\n");
	token = *message_buffer;
	plain = token.value;
	plainlen = token.length;
    } else {
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() toktype == NULL\n");
	token.length = 0;
	token.value = NULL;
	plain = token.value;
	plainlen = token.length;
    }

    /* compute the checksum of the message */

    /* initialize the the cksum */
    switch (signalg) {
    case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
    case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
    case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
    case SGN_ALG_3:
	md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
	break;
    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
      md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
      break;
    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
	md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
	break;
    default:
	KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error2 signalg=%d\n", signalg);
#ifndef	_KERNEL
	abort ();
#else
	*minor_status = 0;
	return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
    }

    code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
    if (code)
    {
	KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, krb5_c_checksum_length() error "
		"code=%d\n", code);
	return(code);
    }
    md5cksum.length = (size_t)sumlen;

    switch (signalg) {
    case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
    case SGN_ALG_3:
	/* compute the checksum of the message */

	/* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */

	if (! (data_ptr = (void *)
	       xmalloc(8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen)))) {
	    if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = ENOMEM;
	    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error3 ENOMEM\n");
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}

	(void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);

	if (ctx->big_endian)
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, token.value, token.length);
	else
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);

	plaind.length = 8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen);
	plaind.data = data_ptr;
	code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
				    ctx->seq, sign_usage,
				    &plaind, &md5cksum);
	xfree_wrap(data_ptr, 8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen));

	if (code) {
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = code;
	    KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, krb5_c_make_checksum() "
		    "error code = %d\n", code);
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}

	if ((code = kg_encrypt(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
			       (g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used, gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
				ctx->seq->contents : NULL),
			       md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.contents, 16))) {
	    xfree_wrap(md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = code;
	    KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, kg_encrypt() error"
		    "code = %d\n", code);
	    return GSS_S_FAILURE;
	}

	if (signalg == 0)
	    cksum.length = 8;
	else
	    cksum.length = 16;
	cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;

	code = memcmp(cksum.contents, ptr+14, cksum.length);
	break;

    case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
	if (!ctx->seed_init &&
	    (code = kg_make_seed(context, ctx->subkey, ctx->seed))) {
	    xfree_wrap(md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
	    if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = code;
	    return GSS_S_FAILURE;
	}

	if (! (data_ptr = (void *)
	       xmalloc(sizeof(ctx->seed) + 8 +
		       (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen)))) {
	    xfree_wrap(md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
	    if (sealalg == 0)
		xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = ENOMEM;
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}
	(void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);
	(void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, ctx->seed, sizeof(ctx->seed));
	if (ctx->big_endian)
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8+sizeof(ctx->seed),
			  token.value, token.length);
	else
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8+sizeof(ctx->seed),
			  plain, plainlen);
	plaind.length = 8 + sizeof(ctx->seed) +
	    (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen);
	plaind.data = data_ptr;
	xfree_wrap(md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
	code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
				    ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SIGN,
				    &plaind, &md5cksum);
	xfree_wrap(data_ptr, 8 + sizeof(ctx->seed) +
            (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen));

	if (code) {
	    if (sealalg == 0)
		xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = code;
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}

	code = memcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr+14, 8);
	/* Falls through to defective-token??  */

    default:
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error SGN_ALG_MD2_5 "
		"GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN\n");
	return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);

    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
	/* compute the checksum of the message */

	/* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */

	if (! (data_ptr = (void *)
	       xmalloc(8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen)))) {
	    if (sealalg != 0xffff)
		xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = ENOMEM;
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}

	(void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);

	if (ctx->big_endian) {
	    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() ctx->big_endian = 1\n");
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, token.value, token.length);
	}
	else {
	    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() ctx->big_endian = 0\n");
	    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
	}

	plaind.length = 8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen);
	plaind.data = data_ptr;

	code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
				    ctx->seq, sign_usage,
				    &plaind, &md5cksum);

	xfree_wrap(data_ptr, 8 + (ctx->big_endian ? token.length : plainlen));

	if (code) {
	    if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
		xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
		/* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
		 * output parameter.
		 */
		token.value = NULL;
		token.length = 0;
	    }
	    *minor_status = code;
	    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error "
		    "SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD GSS_S_FAILURE\n");
	    return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
	}

	/* compare the computed checksum against the transmitted checksum */
	code = memcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr+14, cksum_len);
	KRB5_LOG(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() memcmp %d bytes", cksum_len);
	break;
    }

    xfree_wrap(md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
    if (sealalg != 0xffff)
	xfree_wrap(plain, tmsglen);

    if (code) {
	if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
	    xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
	    /* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
	     * output parameter.
	     */
	    token.value = NULL;
	    token.length = 0;
	}
	*minor_status = 0;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error GSS_S_BAD_SIG\n");
	return(GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
    }

    if (conf_state)
	*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xffff);

    if (qop_state)
	*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;

    if ((code = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) {
	*minor_status = code;

	KRB5_LOG(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, krb5_timeofday()"
		"error code = %d\n", code);

	return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
    }

    if (now > ctx->endtime) {
	*minor_status = 0;

	KRB5_LOG1(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error "
		"now %d > ctx->endtime %d\n", now, ctx->endtime);

	return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
    }

    /* do sequencing checks */
    if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
	(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
	if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG) {
	    xfree_wrap(token.value, token.length);
	    /* Solaris Kerberos: just to be safe since token.value is an
	     * output parameter.
	     */
	    token.value = NULL;
	    token.length = 0;
	}
	*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_BAD_DIRECTION;

	KRB5_LOG1(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal_v1() end, error GSS_S_BAD_SIG "
		"G_BAD_DIRECTION ctx->initiate = %d "
		"direction = %d\n", ctx->initiate, direction);

	return(GSS_S_BAD_SIG);
    }

    retval = g_order_check(&(ctx->seqstate), (gssint_uint64)seqnum);

    /* It got through unscathed, adjust the output message buffer. */
    if (retval == 0 && toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
	*message_buffer = token;

    *minor_status = 0;
    KRB5_LOG(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal_v1() end, retval = %d\n", retval);
    return(retval);
}

/* message_buffer is an input if SIGN, output if SEAL, and ignored if DEL_CTX
   conf_state is only valid if SEAL. */

OM_uint32
kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
	  message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
    OM_uint32 *minor_status;
    gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
    gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
    gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
    int *conf_state;
    int *qop_state;
    int toktype;
{
    krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
    unsigned char *ptr;
    int bodysize;
    int err;
    int toktype2;

    KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal() start \n");

    /* validate the context handle */
    if (! kg_validate_ctx_id(context_handle)) {
	*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_VALIDATE_FAILED;

	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal() end, kg_validate_ctx_id() error "
		"G_VALIDATE_FAILED \n");

	return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
    }

    ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;

    if (! ctx->established) {
	*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
	KRB5_LOG0(KRB5_ERR, "kg_unseal() end, error ! ctx->established \n");
	return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
    }

    /* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */

    /* verify the header */
    ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
    if (ctx->proto)
	switch (toktype) {
	case KG_TOK_SIGN_MSG:
	    toktype2 = 0x0404;
	    break;
	case KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG:
	    toktype2 = 0x0504;
	    break;
	case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
	    toktype2 = 0x0405;
	    break;
	default:
	    toktype2 = toktype;
	    break;
	}
    else
	toktype2 = toktype;
    err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
				(uint32_t *)&bodysize, &ptr, toktype2,
				input_token_buffer->length,
				!ctx->proto);
    if (err) {
	*minor_status = err;
	return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
    }

    if (ctx->proto == 0) {
	err = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
			    message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
			    toktype);

    } else {
	err = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
                                           ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
                                           conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
    }

    *minor_status = err;

#ifndef _KERNEL
    if (err != 0)
	save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
#endif

    KRB5_LOG(KRB5_INFO, "kg_unseal() end, err = %d", err);

    return(err);
}