1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.29 2011/02/16 18:39:33 drochner Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.29 2011/02/16 18:39:33 drochner Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/systm.h> 51 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 52 #include <sys/socket.h> 53 #include <sys/syslog.h> 54 #include <sys/kernel.h> 55 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 56 #include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 57 58 #include <net/if.h> 59 60 #include <netinet/in.h> 61 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 64 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 65 66 #include <net/route.h> 67 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 70 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 71 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 72 73 #ifdef INET6 74 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 75 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 76 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 77 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 78 # endif 79 #endif 80 81 #include <netipsec/key.h> 82 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 83 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 84 85 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 86 87 /* 88 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 89 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 90 */ 91 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 92 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 93 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 94 /* 95 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 96 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 97 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 98 */ 99 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 100 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 101 102 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 103 104 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 105 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 106 107 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 108 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 109 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 110 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 111 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 113 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 114 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 115 116 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 117 118 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 119 120 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 121 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 122 123 /* 124 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 125 */ 126 struct auth_hash * 127 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 128 { 129 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 130 return NULL; 131 switch (alg) { 132 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 133 return &auth_hash_null; 134 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 135 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 136 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 137 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 138 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 139 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 140 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 141 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 142 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 143 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 144 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 145 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 146 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 147 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 148 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 149 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 150 } 151 return NULL; 152 } 153 154 size_t 155 ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav) 156 { 157 size_t size; 158 159 if (sav != NULL) { 160 int authsize; 161 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 162 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 163 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 164 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 165 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 166 } else { 167 /* default guess */ 168 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 169 } 170 return size; 171 } 172 173 /* 174 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 175 */ 176 int 177 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria) 178 { 179 struct auth_hash *thash; 180 int keylen; 181 182 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 183 if (thash == NULL) { 184 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 185 sav->alg_auth)); 186 return EINVAL; 187 } 188 /* 189 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 190 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 191 * later during protocol processing. 192 */ 193 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 194 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 195 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 196 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 197 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 198 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 199 return EINVAL; 200 } 201 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 202 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 203 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 204 return EINVAL; 205 } 206 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 207 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 208 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 209 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 210 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 211 return EINVAL; 212 } 213 214 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 215 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 216 217 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 218 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 219 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 220 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 221 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 222 223 return 0; 224 } 225 226 /* 227 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 228 */ 229 static int 230 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp) 231 { 232 struct cryptoini cria; 233 int error; 234 235 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 236 if (!error) { 237 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 238 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 239 &cria, crypto_support); 240 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 241 } 242 return error; 243 } 244 245 /* 246 * Paranoia. 247 * 248 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 249 */ 250 int 251 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 252 { 253 int err; 254 255 if (sav->key_auth) 256 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 257 258 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 259 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 260 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 261 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 262 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 263 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 264 return err; 265 } 266 267 /* 268 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 269 */ 270 static int 271 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 272 { 273 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 274 unsigned char *ptr; 275 int off, count; 276 277 #ifdef INET 278 struct ip *ip; 279 #endif /* INET */ 280 281 #ifdef INET6 282 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 283 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 284 int alloc, len, ad; 285 #endif /* INET6 */ 286 287 switch (proto) { 288 #ifdef INET 289 case AF_INET: 290 /* 291 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 292 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 293 * contiguous memory. 294 */ 295 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 296 if (m == NULL) { 297 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 298 return ENOBUFS; 299 } 300 301 /* Fix the IP header */ 302 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 303 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 304 ip->ip_tos = 0; 305 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 306 ip->ip_sum = 0; 307 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 308 309 /* 310 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 311 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 312 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 313 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 314 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 315 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 316 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 317 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 318 */ 319 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 320 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 321 #else 322 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 323 #endif 324 if (!out) { 325 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 326 327 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 328 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 329 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 330 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 331 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 332 DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, " 333 "in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n", 334 skip, 335 inlen, TOHOST(inlen), 336 ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len))); 337 338 339 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 340 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 341 else 342 ip->ip_off = 0; 343 } else { 344 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 345 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 346 else 347 ip->ip_off = 0; 348 } 349 350 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 351 352 /* IPv4 option processing */ 353 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 354 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 355 off + 1 < skip) 356 ; 357 else { 358 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 359 "option length for option %d\n", 360 ptr[off])); 361 362 m_freem(m); 363 return EINVAL; 364 } 365 366 switch (ptr[off]) { 367 case IPOPT_EOL: 368 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 369 break; 370 371 case IPOPT_NOP: 372 off++; 373 break; 374 375 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 376 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 377 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 378 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 379 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 380 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 381 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 382 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 383 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 384 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 385 386 m_freem(m); 387 return EINVAL; 388 } 389 390 off += ptr[off + 1]; 391 break; 392 393 case IPOPT_LSRR: 394 case IPOPT_SSRR: 395 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 396 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 397 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 398 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 399 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 400 401 m_freem(m); 402 return EINVAL; 403 } 404 405 /* 406 * On output, if we have either of the 407 * source routing options, we should 408 * swap the destination address of the 409 * IP header with the last address 410 * specified in the option, as that is 411 * what the destination's IP header 412 * will look like. 413 */ 414 if (out) 415 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 416 sizeof(struct in_addr), 417 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 418 419 /* Fall through */ 420 default: 421 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 422 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 423 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 424 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 425 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 426 m_freem(m); 427 return EINVAL; 428 } 429 430 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 431 count = ptr[off + 1]; 432 memcpy(ptr, ipseczeroes, count); 433 off += count; 434 break; 435 } 436 437 /* Sanity check. */ 438 if (off > skip) { 439 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 440 "IPv4 options header\n")); 441 442 m_freem(m); 443 return EINVAL; 444 } 445 } 446 447 break; 448 #endif /* INET */ 449 450 #ifdef INET6 451 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 452 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 453 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 454 455 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 456 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 457 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 458 m_freem(m); 459 return EMSGSIZE; 460 } 461 462 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 463 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 464 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 465 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 466 467 /* Scoped address handling. */ 468 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 469 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 470 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 471 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 472 473 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 474 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 475 476 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 477 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 478 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 479 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 480 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 481 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 482 if (ptr == NULL) { 483 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 484 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 485 "headers\n")); 486 m_freem(m); 487 return ENOBUFS; 488 } 489 490 /* 491 * Copy all the protocol headers after 492 * the IPv6 header. 493 */ 494 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 495 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 496 alloc = 1; 497 } else { 498 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 499 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 500 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 501 alloc = 0; 502 } 503 } else 504 break; 505 506 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 507 508 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 509 switch (off) { 510 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 511 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 512 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 513 514 /* 515 * Process the mutable/immutable 516 * options -- borrows heavily from the 517 * KAME code. 518 */ 519 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 520 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 521 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 522 count++; 523 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 524 } 525 526 /* Sanity check. */ 527 if (count > len + 528 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 529 m_freem(m); 530 531 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 532 if (alloc) 533 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 534 return EINVAL; 535 } 536 537 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 538 539 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 540 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 541 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 542 ptr[count + 1]); 543 544 count += ad; 545 546 /* Sanity check. */ 547 if (count > 548 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 549 m_freem(m); 550 551 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 552 if (alloc) 553 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 554 return EINVAL; 555 } 556 } 557 558 /* Advance. */ 559 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 560 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 561 break; 562 563 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 564 /* 565 * Always include routing headers in 566 * computation. 567 */ 568 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 569 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 570 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 571 break; 572 573 default: 574 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 575 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 576 if (alloc) 577 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 578 m_freem(m); 579 return EINVAL; 580 } 581 582 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 583 if (alloc) { 584 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 585 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 586 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 587 } 588 589 break; 590 #endif /* INET6 */ 591 } 592 593 return 0; 594 } 595 596 /* 597 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 598 * passes authentication. 599 */ 600 static int 601 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 602 { 603 struct auth_hash *ahx; 604 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 605 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 606 struct m_tag *mtag; 607 struct newah *ah; 608 int hl, rplen, authsize; 609 610 struct cryptodesc *crda; 611 struct cryptop *crp; 612 613 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 614 615 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 616 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 617 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 618 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 619 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 620 621 /* Figure out header size. */ 622 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 623 624 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 625 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 626 if (ah == NULL) { 627 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 628 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 629 m_freem(m); 630 return ENOBUFS; 631 } 632 633 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 634 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 635 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 636 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 637 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 638 m_freem(m); 639 return ENOBUFS; 640 } 641 642 /* Verify AH header length. */ 643 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 644 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 645 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 646 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 647 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 648 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 649 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 650 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 651 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 652 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 653 m_freem(m); 654 return EACCES; 655 } 656 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 657 DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n" 658 "len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n", 659 skip, protoff, 660 hl, authsize, rplen, 661 (long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)))); 662 663 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 664 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 665 if (crp == NULL) { 666 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 667 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 668 m_freem(m); 669 return ENOBUFS; 670 } 671 672 crda = crp->crp_desc; 673 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 674 675 crda->crd_skip = 0; 676 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 677 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 678 679 /* Authentication operation. */ 680 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 681 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 682 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 683 684 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 685 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 686 mtag != NULL; 687 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 688 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 689 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 690 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 691 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 692 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 693 break; 694 } 695 696 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 697 if (mtag == NULL) { 698 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 699 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 700 } else { 701 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 702 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 703 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 704 } 705 if (tc == NULL) { 706 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 707 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 708 crypto_freereq(crp); 709 m_freem(m); 710 return ENOBUFS; 711 } 712 713 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 714 if (mtag == NULL) { 715 int error; 716 717 /* 718 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 719 * and the AH header. 720 */ 721 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 722 723 { 724 u_int8_t *pppp = ((char *)(tc+1))+skip+rplen; 725 DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \ 726 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 727 authsize, 728 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 729 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 730 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11])); 731 } 732 733 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 734 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 735 736 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 737 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 738 skip, ahx->type, 0); 739 if (error != 0) { 740 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 741 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 742 free(tc, M_XDATA); 743 crypto_freereq(crp); 744 return error; 745 } 746 } 747 748 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 749 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 750 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 751 crp->crp_buf = m; 752 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 753 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 754 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 755 756 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 757 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 758 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 759 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 760 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 761 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 762 tc->tc_skip = skip; 763 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 764 765 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 766 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 767 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 768 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 769 770 if (mtag == NULL) 771 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 772 else 773 return ah_input_cb(crp); 774 } 775 776 #ifdef INET6 777 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 778 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 779 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 780 } else { \ 781 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 782 } \ 783 } while (0) 784 #else 785 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 786 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 787 #endif 788 789 /* 790 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 791 */ 792 static int 793 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 794 { 795 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 796 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 797 struct mbuf *m; 798 struct cryptodesc *crd; 799 struct auth_hash *ahx; 800 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 801 struct m_tag *mtag; 802 struct secasvar *sav; 803 struct secasindex *saidx; 804 u_int8_t nxt; 805 char *ptr; 806 int s, authsize; 807 u_int16_t dport = 0; 808 u_int16_t sport = 0; 809 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 810 struct m_tag * tag = NULL; 811 #endif 812 813 crd = crp->crp_desc; 814 815 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 816 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 817 skip = tc->tc_skip; 818 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 819 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 820 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 821 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 822 823 824 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 825 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 826 if ((tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL))) { 827 sport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[0]; 828 dport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1]; 829 } 830 #endif 831 832 s = splsoftnet(); 833 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 834 835 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 836 if (sav == NULL) { 837 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 838 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 839 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 840 goto bad; 841 } 842 843 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 844 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 845 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 846 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 847 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 848 849 ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform; 850 851 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 852 if (crp->crp_etype) { 853 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 854 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 855 856 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 857 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 858 splx(s); 859 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 860 } 861 862 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 863 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 864 error = crp->crp_etype; 865 goto bad; 866 } else { 867 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 868 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 869 crp = NULL; 870 } 871 872 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 873 if (m == NULL) { 874 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 875 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 876 error = EINVAL; 877 goto bad; 878 } 879 880 /* Figure out header size. */ 881 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 882 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 883 884 if (ipsec_debug) 885 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 886 887 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 888 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 889 890 /* 891 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 892 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 893 */ 894 if (mtag == NULL) { 895 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 896 897 /* Verify authenticator. */ 898 if (memcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 899 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 900 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 901 "over %d bytes " \ 902 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 903 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 904 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 905 authsize, 906 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 907 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 908 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 909 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 910 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 911 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 912 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 913 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 914 )); 915 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 916 error = EACCES; 917 goto bad; 918 } 919 920 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 921 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 922 923 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 924 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 925 } else { 926 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 927 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 928 } 929 930 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 931 932 /* 933 * Header is now authenticated. 934 */ 935 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 936 937 /* 938 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 939 */ 940 if (sav->replay) { 941 u_int32_t seq; 942 943 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 944 sizeof (seq), &seq); 945 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 946 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 947 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 948 goto bad; 949 } 950 } 951 952 /* 953 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 954 */ 955 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 956 if (error) { 957 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 958 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 959 960 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 961 goto bad; 962 } 963 964 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 965 966 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 967 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 968 splx(s); 969 return error; 970 bad: 971 if (sav) 972 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 973 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 974 splx(s); 975 if (m != NULL) 976 m_freem(m); 977 if (tc != NULL) 978 free(tc, M_XDATA); 979 if (crp != NULL) 980 crypto_freereq(crp); 981 return error; 982 } 983 984 /* 985 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 986 */ 987 static int 988 ah_output( 989 struct mbuf *m, 990 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 991 struct mbuf **mp, 992 int skip, 993 int protoff 994 ) 995 { 996 struct secasvar *sav; 997 struct auth_hash *ahx; 998 struct cryptodesc *crda; 999 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1000 struct mbuf *mi; 1001 struct cryptop *crp; 1002 u_int16_t iplen; 1003 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1004 u_int8_t prot; 1005 struct newah *ah; 1006 1007 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1008 1009 sav = isr->sav; 1010 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1011 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1012 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1013 1014 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1015 1016 /* Figure out header size. */ 1017 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1018 1019 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1020 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1021 #ifdef INET 1022 case AF_INET: 1023 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1024 break; 1025 #endif /* INET */ 1026 #ifdef INET6 1027 case AF_INET6: 1028 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1029 break; 1030 #endif /* INET6 */ 1031 default: 1032 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1033 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1034 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1035 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1036 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1037 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1038 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1039 goto bad; 1040 } 1041 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1042 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1043 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1044 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1045 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1046 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1047 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1048 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1049 error = EMSGSIZE; 1050 goto bad; 1051 } 1052 1053 /* Update the counters. */ 1054 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1055 1056 m = m_clone(m); 1057 if (m == NULL) { 1058 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1059 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1060 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1061 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1062 error = ENOBUFS; 1063 goto bad; 1064 } 1065 1066 /* Inject AH header. */ 1067 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1068 if (mi == NULL) { 1069 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1070 "%s/%08lx\n", 1071 rplen + authsize, 1072 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1073 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1074 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1075 error = ENOBUFS; 1076 goto bad; 1077 } 1078 1079 /* 1080 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1081 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1082 */ 1083 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1084 1085 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1086 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1087 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1088 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1089 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1090 1091 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1092 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1093 1094 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1095 if (sav->replay) { 1096 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1097 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1098 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1099 "%s/%08lx\n", 1100 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1101 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1102 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1103 error = EINVAL; 1104 goto bad; 1105 } 1106 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1107 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1108 if (!ipsec_replay) 1109 #endif 1110 sav->replay->count++; 1111 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1112 } 1113 1114 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1115 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1116 if (crp == NULL) { 1117 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1118 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1119 error = ENOBUFS; 1120 goto bad; 1121 } 1122 1123 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1124 1125 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1126 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1127 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1128 1129 /* Authentication operation. */ 1130 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1131 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1132 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1133 1134 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1135 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1136 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1137 if (tc == NULL) { 1138 crypto_freereq(crp); 1139 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1140 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1141 error = ENOBUFS; 1142 goto bad; 1143 } 1144 1145 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1146 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1147 1148 /* 1149 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1150 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1151 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1152 */ 1153 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1154 #ifdef INET 1155 case AF_INET: 1156 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1157 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1158 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1159 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1160 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1161 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1162 break; 1163 #endif /* INET */ 1164 1165 #ifdef INET6 1166 case AF_INET6: 1167 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1168 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1169 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1170 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1171 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1172 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1173 break; 1174 #endif /* INET6 */ 1175 } 1176 1177 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1178 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1179 1180 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1181 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1182 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1183 1184 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1185 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1186 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1187 if (error != 0) { 1188 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1189 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1190 crypto_freereq(crp); 1191 goto bad; 1192 } 1193 1194 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1195 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1196 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1197 crp->crp_buf = m; 1198 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1199 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1200 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1201 1202 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1203 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1204 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1205 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1206 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1207 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1208 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1209 1210 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1211 bad: 1212 if (m) 1213 m_freem(m); 1214 return (error); 1215 } 1216 1217 /* 1218 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1219 */ 1220 static int 1221 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1222 { 1223 int skip, protoff, error; 1224 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1225 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1226 struct secasvar *sav; 1227 struct mbuf *m; 1228 void *ptr; 1229 int s, err; 1230 1231 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1232 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1233 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1234 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1235 ptr = (tc + 1); 1236 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1237 1238 s = splsoftnet(); 1239 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1240 1241 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1242 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1243 if (sav == NULL) { 1244 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1245 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1246 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1247 goto bad; 1248 } 1249 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1250 1251 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1252 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1253 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1254 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1255 1256 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1257 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1258 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1259 splx(s); 1260 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1261 } 1262 1263 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1264 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1265 error = crp->crp_etype; 1266 goto bad; 1267 } 1268 1269 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1270 if (m == NULL) { 1271 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1272 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1273 error = EINVAL; 1274 goto bad; 1275 } 1276 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1277 1278 /* 1279 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1280 * in place. 1281 */ 1282 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1283 1284 /* No longer needed. */ 1285 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1286 crypto_freereq(crp); 1287 1288 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1289 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1290 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1291 int alen; 1292 1293 /* 1294 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1295 * the other side. 1296 */ 1297 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1298 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1299 } 1300 #endif 1301 1302 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1303 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1304 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1305 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1306 splx(s); 1307 return err; 1308 bad: 1309 if (sav) 1310 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1311 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1312 splx(s); 1313 if (m) 1314 m_freem(m); 1315 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1316 crypto_freereq(crp); 1317 return error; 1318 } 1319 1320 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1321 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1322 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1323 NULL, 1324 }; 1325 1326 INITFN void 1327 ah_attach(void) 1328 { 1329 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1330 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1331 } 1332 1333 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1334 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1335 #endif 1336