1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.31 2011/02/18 20:40:58 drochner Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.31 2011/02/18 20:40:58 drochner Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/systm.h> 51 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 52 #include <sys/socket.h> 53 #include <sys/syslog.h> 54 #include <sys/kernel.h> 55 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 56 #include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 57 58 #include <net/if.h> 59 60 #include <netinet/in.h> 61 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 64 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 65 66 #include <net/route.h> 67 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 70 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 71 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 72 73 #ifdef INET6 74 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 75 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 76 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 77 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 78 # endif 79 #endif 80 81 #include <netipsec/key.h> 82 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 83 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 84 85 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 86 87 /* 88 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 89 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 90 */ 91 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 92 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 93 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 94 /* 95 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 96 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 97 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 98 */ 99 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 100 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 101 102 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 103 104 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 105 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 106 107 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 108 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 109 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 110 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 111 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 113 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 114 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 115 116 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 117 118 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 119 120 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 121 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 122 123 /* 124 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 125 */ 126 const struct auth_hash * 127 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 128 { 129 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 130 return NULL; 131 switch (alg) { 132 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 133 return &auth_hash_null; 134 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 135 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 136 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 137 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 138 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 139 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 140 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 141 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 142 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 143 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 144 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 145 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 146 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 147 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 148 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 149 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 150 } 151 return NULL; 152 } 153 154 size_t 155 ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 156 { 157 size_t size; 158 159 if (sav != NULL) { 160 int authsize; 161 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 162 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 163 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 164 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 165 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 166 } else { 167 /* default guess */ 168 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 169 } 170 return size; 171 } 172 173 /* 174 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 175 */ 176 int 177 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 178 struct cryptoini *cria) 179 { 180 const struct auth_hash *thash; 181 int keylen; 182 183 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 184 if (thash == NULL) { 185 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 186 sav->alg_auth)); 187 return EINVAL; 188 } 189 /* 190 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 191 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 192 * later during protocol processing. 193 */ 194 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 195 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 196 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 197 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 198 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 199 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 200 return EINVAL; 201 } 202 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 203 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 204 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 205 return EINVAL; 206 } 207 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 208 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 209 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 210 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 211 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 212 return EINVAL; 213 } 214 215 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 216 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 217 218 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 219 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 220 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 221 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 222 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 223 224 return 0; 225 } 226 227 /* 228 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 229 */ 230 static int 231 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 232 { 233 struct cryptoini cria; 234 int error; 235 236 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 237 if (!error) { 238 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 239 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 240 &cria, crypto_support); 241 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 242 } 243 return error; 244 } 245 246 /* 247 * Paranoia. 248 * 249 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 250 */ 251 int 252 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 253 { 254 int err; 255 256 if (sav->key_auth) 257 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 258 259 mutex_spin_enter(&crypto_mtx); 260 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 261 mutex_spin_exit(&crypto_mtx); 262 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 263 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 264 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 265 return err; 266 } 267 268 /* 269 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 270 */ 271 static int 272 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 273 { 274 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 275 unsigned char *ptr; 276 int off, count; 277 278 #ifdef INET 279 struct ip *ip; 280 #endif /* INET */ 281 282 #ifdef INET6 283 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 284 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 285 int alloc, len, ad; 286 #endif /* INET6 */ 287 288 switch (proto) { 289 #ifdef INET 290 case AF_INET: 291 /* 292 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 293 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 294 * contiguous memory. 295 */ 296 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 297 if (m == NULL) { 298 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 299 return ENOBUFS; 300 } 301 302 /* Fix the IP header */ 303 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 304 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 305 ip->ip_tos = 0; 306 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 307 ip->ip_sum = 0; 308 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 309 310 /* 311 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 312 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 313 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 314 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 315 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 316 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 317 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 318 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 319 */ 320 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 321 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 322 #else 323 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 324 #endif 325 if (!out) { 326 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 327 328 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 329 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 330 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 331 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 332 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 333 DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, " 334 "in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n", 335 skip, 336 inlen, TOHOST(inlen), 337 ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len))); 338 339 340 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 341 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 342 else 343 ip->ip_off = 0; 344 } else { 345 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 346 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 347 else 348 ip->ip_off = 0; 349 } 350 351 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 352 353 /* IPv4 option processing */ 354 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 355 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 356 off + 1 < skip) 357 ; 358 else { 359 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 360 "option length for option %d\n", 361 ptr[off])); 362 363 m_freem(m); 364 return EINVAL; 365 } 366 367 switch (ptr[off]) { 368 case IPOPT_EOL: 369 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 370 break; 371 372 case IPOPT_NOP: 373 off++; 374 break; 375 376 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 377 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 378 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 379 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 380 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 381 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 382 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 383 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 384 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 385 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 386 387 m_freem(m); 388 return EINVAL; 389 } 390 391 off += ptr[off + 1]; 392 break; 393 394 case IPOPT_LSRR: 395 case IPOPT_SSRR: 396 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 397 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 398 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 399 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 400 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 401 402 m_freem(m); 403 return EINVAL; 404 } 405 406 /* 407 * On output, if we have either of the 408 * source routing options, we should 409 * swap the destination address of the 410 * IP header with the last address 411 * specified in the option, as that is 412 * what the destination's IP header 413 * will look like. 414 */ 415 if (out) 416 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 417 sizeof(struct in_addr), 418 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 419 420 /* Fall through */ 421 default: 422 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 423 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 424 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 425 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 426 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 427 m_freem(m); 428 return EINVAL; 429 } 430 431 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 432 count = ptr[off + 1]; 433 memcpy(ptr, ipseczeroes, count); 434 off += count; 435 break; 436 } 437 438 /* Sanity check. */ 439 if (off > skip) { 440 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 441 "IPv4 options header\n")); 442 443 m_freem(m); 444 return EINVAL; 445 } 446 } 447 448 break; 449 #endif /* INET */ 450 451 #ifdef INET6 452 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 453 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 454 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 455 456 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 457 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 458 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 459 m_freem(m); 460 return EMSGSIZE; 461 } 462 463 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 464 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 465 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 466 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 467 468 /* Scoped address handling. */ 469 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 470 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 471 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 472 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 473 474 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 475 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 476 477 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 478 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 479 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 480 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 481 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 482 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 483 if (ptr == NULL) { 484 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 485 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 486 "headers\n")); 487 m_freem(m); 488 return ENOBUFS; 489 } 490 491 /* 492 * Copy all the protocol headers after 493 * the IPv6 header. 494 */ 495 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 496 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 497 alloc = 1; 498 } else { 499 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 500 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 501 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 502 alloc = 0; 503 } 504 } else 505 break; 506 507 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 508 509 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 510 switch (off) { 511 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 512 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 513 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 514 515 /* 516 * Process the mutable/immutable 517 * options -- borrows heavily from the 518 * KAME code. 519 */ 520 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 521 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 522 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 523 count++; 524 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 525 } 526 527 /* Sanity check. */ 528 if (count > len + 529 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 530 m_freem(m); 531 532 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 533 if (alloc) 534 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 535 return EINVAL; 536 } 537 538 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 539 540 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 541 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 542 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 543 ptr[count + 1]); 544 545 count += ad; 546 547 /* Sanity check. */ 548 if (count > 549 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 550 m_freem(m); 551 552 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 553 if (alloc) 554 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 555 return EINVAL; 556 } 557 } 558 559 /* Advance. */ 560 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 561 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 562 break; 563 564 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 565 /* 566 * Always include routing headers in 567 * computation. 568 */ 569 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 570 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 571 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 572 break; 573 574 default: 575 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 576 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 577 if (alloc) 578 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 579 m_freem(m); 580 return EINVAL; 581 } 582 583 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 584 if (alloc) { 585 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 586 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 587 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 588 } 589 590 break; 591 #endif /* INET6 */ 592 } 593 594 return 0; 595 } 596 597 /* 598 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 599 * passes authentication. 600 */ 601 static int 602 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 603 { 604 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 605 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 606 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 607 struct m_tag *mtag; 608 struct newah *ah; 609 int hl, rplen, authsize; 610 611 struct cryptodesc *crda; 612 struct cryptop *crp; 613 614 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 615 616 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 617 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 618 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 619 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 620 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 621 622 /* Figure out header size. */ 623 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 624 625 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 626 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 627 if (ah == NULL) { 628 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 629 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 630 m_freem(m); 631 return ENOBUFS; 632 } 633 634 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 635 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 636 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 637 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 638 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 639 m_freem(m); 640 return ENOBUFS; 641 } 642 643 /* Verify AH header length. */ 644 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 645 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 646 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 647 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 648 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 649 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 650 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 651 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 652 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 653 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 654 m_freem(m); 655 return EACCES; 656 } 657 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 658 DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n" 659 "len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n", 660 skip, protoff, 661 hl, authsize, rplen, 662 (long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)))); 663 664 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 665 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 666 if (crp == NULL) { 667 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 668 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 669 m_freem(m); 670 return ENOBUFS; 671 } 672 673 crda = crp->crp_desc; 674 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 675 676 crda->crd_skip = 0; 677 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 678 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 679 680 /* Authentication operation. */ 681 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 682 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 683 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 684 685 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 686 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 687 mtag != NULL; 688 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 689 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 690 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 691 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 692 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 693 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 694 break; 695 } 696 697 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 698 if (mtag == NULL) { 699 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 700 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 701 } else { 702 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 703 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 704 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 705 } 706 if (tc == NULL) { 707 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 708 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 709 crypto_freereq(crp); 710 m_freem(m); 711 return ENOBUFS; 712 } 713 714 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 715 if (mtag == NULL) { 716 int error; 717 718 /* 719 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 720 * and the AH header. 721 */ 722 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 723 724 { 725 u_int8_t *pppp = ((char *)(tc+1))+skip+rplen; 726 DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \ 727 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 728 authsize, 729 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 730 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 731 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11])); 732 } 733 734 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 735 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 736 737 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 738 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 739 skip, ahx->type, 0); 740 if (error != 0) { 741 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 742 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 743 free(tc, M_XDATA); 744 crypto_freereq(crp); 745 return error; 746 } 747 } 748 749 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 750 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 751 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 752 crp->crp_buf = m; 753 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 754 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 755 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 756 757 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 758 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 759 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 760 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 761 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 762 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 763 tc->tc_skip = skip; 764 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 765 766 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 767 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 768 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 769 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 770 771 if (mtag == NULL) 772 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 773 else 774 return ah_input_cb(crp); 775 } 776 777 #ifdef INET6 778 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 779 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 780 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 781 } else { \ 782 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 783 } \ 784 } while (0) 785 #else 786 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 787 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 788 #endif 789 790 /* 791 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 792 */ 793 static int 794 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 795 { 796 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 797 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 798 struct mbuf *m; 799 struct cryptodesc *crd; 800 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 801 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 802 struct m_tag *mtag; 803 struct secasvar *sav; 804 struct secasindex *saidx; 805 u_int8_t nxt; 806 char *ptr; 807 int s, authsize; 808 u_int16_t dport = 0; 809 u_int16_t sport = 0; 810 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 811 struct m_tag * tag = NULL; 812 #endif 813 814 crd = crp->crp_desc; 815 816 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 817 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 818 skip = tc->tc_skip; 819 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 820 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 821 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 822 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 823 824 825 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 826 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 827 if ((tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL))) { 828 sport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[0]; 829 dport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1]; 830 } 831 #endif 832 833 s = splsoftnet(); 834 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 835 836 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 837 if (sav == NULL) { 838 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 839 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 840 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 841 goto bad; 842 } 843 844 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 845 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 846 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 847 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 848 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 849 850 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 851 852 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 853 if (crp->crp_etype) { 854 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 855 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 856 857 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 858 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 859 splx(s); 860 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 861 } 862 863 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 864 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 865 error = crp->crp_etype; 866 goto bad; 867 } else { 868 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 869 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 870 crp = NULL; 871 } 872 873 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 874 if (m == NULL) { 875 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 876 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 877 error = EINVAL; 878 goto bad; 879 } 880 881 /* Figure out header size. */ 882 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 883 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 884 885 if (ipsec_debug) 886 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 887 888 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 889 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 890 891 /* 892 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 893 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 894 */ 895 if (mtag == NULL) { 896 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 897 898 /* Verify authenticator. */ 899 if (memcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 900 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 901 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 902 "over %d bytes " \ 903 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 904 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 905 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 906 authsize, 907 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 908 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 909 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 910 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 911 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 912 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 913 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 914 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 915 )); 916 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 917 error = EACCES; 918 goto bad; 919 } 920 921 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 922 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 923 924 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 925 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 926 } else { 927 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 928 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 929 } 930 931 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 932 933 /* 934 * Header is now authenticated. 935 */ 936 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 937 938 /* 939 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 940 */ 941 if (sav->replay) { 942 u_int32_t seq; 943 944 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 945 sizeof (seq), &seq); 946 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 947 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 948 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 949 goto bad; 950 } 951 } 952 953 /* 954 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 955 */ 956 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 957 if (error) { 958 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 959 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 960 961 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 962 goto bad; 963 } 964 965 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 966 967 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 968 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 969 splx(s); 970 return error; 971 bad: 972 if (sav) 973 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 974 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 975 splx(s); 976 if (m != NULL) 977 m_freem(m); 978 if (tc != NULL) 979 free(tc, M_XDATA); 980 if (crp != NULL) 981 crypto_freereq(crp); 982 return error; 983 } 984 985 /* 986 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 987 */ 988 static int 989 ah_output( 990 struct mbuf *m, 991 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 992 struct mbuf **mp, 993 int skip, 994 int protoff 995 ) 996 { 997 const struct secasvar *sav; 998 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 999 struct cryptodesc *crda; 1000 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1001 struct mbuf *mi; 1002 struct cryptop *crp; 1003 u_int16_t iplen; 1004 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1005 u_int8_t prot; 1006 struct newah *ah; 1007 1008 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1009 1010 sav = isr->sav; 1011 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1012 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1013 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1014 1015 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1016 1017 /* Figure out header size. */ 1018 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1019 1020 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1021 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1022 #ifdef INET 1023 case AF_INET: 1024 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1025 break; 1026 #endif /* INET */ 1027 #ifdef INET6 1028 case AF_INET6: 1029 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1030 break; 1031 #endif /* INET6 */ 1032 default: 1033 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1034 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1035 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1036 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1037 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1038 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1039 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1040 goto bad; 1041 } 1042 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1043 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1044 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1045 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1046 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1047 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1048 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1049 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1050 error = EMSGSIZE; 1051 goto bad; 1052 } 1053 1054 /* Update the counters. */ 1055 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1056 1057 m = m_clone(m); 1058 if (m == NULL) { 1059 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1060 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1061 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1062 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1063 error = ENOBUFS; 1064 goto bad; 1065 } 1066 1067 /* Inject AH header. */ 1068 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1069 if (mi == NULL) { 1070 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1071 "%s/%08lx\n", 1072 rplen + authsize, 1073 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1074 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1075 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1076 error = ENOBUFS; 1077 goto bad; 1078 } 1079 1080 /* 1081 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1082 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1083 */ 1084 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1085 1086 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1087 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1088 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1089 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1090 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1091 1092 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1093 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1094 1095 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1096 if (sav->replay) { 1097 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1098 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1099 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1100 "%s/%08lx\n", 1101 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1102 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1103 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1104 error = EINVAL; 1105 goto bad; 1106 } 1107 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1108 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1109 if (!ipsec_replay) 1110 #endif 1111 sav->replay->count++; 1112 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1113 } 1114 1115 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1116 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1117 if (crp == NULL) { 1118 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1119 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1120 error = ENOBUFS; 1121 goto bad; 1122 } 1123 1124 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1125 1126 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1127 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1128 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1129 1130 /* Authentication operation. */ 1131 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1132 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1133 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1134 1135 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1136 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1137 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1138 if (tc == NULL) { 1139 crypto_freereq(crp); 1140 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1141 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1142 error = ENOBUFS; 1143 goto bad; 1144 } 1145 1146 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1147 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1148 1149 /* 1150 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1151 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1152 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1153 */ 1154 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1155 #ifdef INET 1156 case AF_INET: 1157 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1158 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1159 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1160 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1161 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1162 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1163 break; 1164 #endif /* INET */ 1165 1166 #ifdef INET6 1167 case AF_INET6: 1168 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1169 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1170 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1171 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1172 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1173 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1174 break; 1175 #endif /* INET6 */ 1176 } 1177 1178 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1179 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1180 1181 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1182 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1183 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1184 1185 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1186 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1187 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1188 if (error != 0) { 1189 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1190 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1191 crypto_freereq(crp); 1192 goto bad; 1193 } 1194 1195 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1196 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1197 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1198 crp->crp_buf = m; 1199 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1200 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1201 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1202 1203 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1204 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1205 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1206 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1207 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1208 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1209 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1210 1211 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1212 bad: 1213 if (m) 1214 m_freem(m); 1215 return (error); 1216 } 1217 1218 /* 1219 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1220 */ 1221 static int 1222 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1223 { 1224 int skip, protoff, error; 1225 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1226 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1227 struct secasvar *sav; 1228 struct mbuf *m; 1229 void *ptr; 1230 int s, err; 1231 1232 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1233 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1234 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1235 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1236 ptr = (tc + 1); 1237 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1238 1239 s = splsoftnet(); 1240 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1241 1242 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1243 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1244 if (sav == NULL) { 1245 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1246 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1247 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1248 goto bad; 1249 } 1250 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1251 1252 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1253 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1254 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1255 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1256 1257 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1258 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1259 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1260 splx(s); 1261 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1262 } 1263 1264 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1265 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1266 error = crp->crp_etype; 1267 goto bad; 1268 } 1269 1270 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1271 if (m == NULL) { 1272 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1273 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1274 error = EINVAL; 1275 goto bad; 1276 } 1277 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1278 1279 /* 1280 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1281 * in place. 1282 */ 1283 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1284 1285 /* No longer needed. */ 1286 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1287 crypto_freereq(crp); 1288 1289 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1290 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1291 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1292 int alen; 1293 1294 /* 1295 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1296 * the other side. 1297 */ 1298 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1299 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1300 } 1301 #endif 1302 1303 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1304 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1305 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1306 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1307 splx(s); 1308 return err; 1309 bad: 1310 if (sav) 1311 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1312 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1313 splx(s); 1314 if (m) 1315 m_freem(m); 1316 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1317 crypto_freereq(crp); 1318 return error; 1319 } 1320 1321 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1322 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1323 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1324 NULL, 1325 }; 1326 1327 INITFN void 1328 ah_attach(void) 1329 { 1330 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1331 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1332 } 1333 1334 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1335 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1336 #endif 1337