1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.44 2015/03/30 03:51:50 ozaki-r Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.44 2015/03/30 03:51:50 ozaki-r Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 #include "opt_ipsec.h" 49 50 #include <sys/param.h> 51 #include <sys/systm.h> 52 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 53 #include <sys/socket.h> 54 #include <sys/syslog.h> 55 #include <sys/kernel.h> 56 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 57 #include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 58 59 #include <net/if.h> 60 61 #include <netinet/in.h> 62 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip.h> 64 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 65 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 66 67 #include <net/route.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 70 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 71 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 72 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 73 74 #ifdef INET6 75 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 76 #include <netinet6/scope6_var.h> 77 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 78 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 79 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 80 # endif 81 #endif 82 83 #include <netipsec/key.h> 84 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 85 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 86 87 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 88 89 /* 90 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 91 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 92 */ 93 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 94 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 95 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 96 /* 97 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 98 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 99 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 100 */ 101 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 102 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 103 104 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 105 106 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 107 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 108 109 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 110 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 111 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 113 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 114 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 115 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 116 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 117 118 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 119 120 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 121 122 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 123 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 124 125 /* 126 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 127 */ 128 const struct auth_hash * 129 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 130 { 131 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 132 return NULL; 133 switch (alg) { 134 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 135 return &auth_hash_null; 136 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 137 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 138 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 139 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 140 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 141 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 142 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 143 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 144 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 145 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 146 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 147 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 148 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 149 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 150 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 151 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 152 case SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC: 153 return &auth_hash_aes_xcbc_mac_96; 154 } 155 return NULL; 156 } 157 158 size_t 159 ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 160 { 161 size_t size; 162 163 if (sav != NULL) { 164 int authsize; 165 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 166 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 167 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 168 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 169 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 170 } else { 171 /* default guess */ 172 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 173 } 174 return size; 175 } 176 177 /* 178 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 179 */ 180 int 181 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 182 struct cryptoini *cria) 183 { 184 const struct auth_hash *thash; 185 int keylen; 186 187 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 188 if (thash == NULL) { 189 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 190 sav->alg_auth)); 191 return EINVAL; 192 } 193 /* 194 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 195 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 196 * later during protocol processing. 197 */ 198 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 199 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 200 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 201 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 202 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 203 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 204 return EINVAL; 205 } 206 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 207 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 208 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 209 return EINVAL; 210 } 211 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 212 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 213 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 214 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 215 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 216 return EINVAL; 217 } 218 219 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 220 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 221 222 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 223 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 224 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 225 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 226 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 227 228 return 0; 229 } 230 231 /* 232 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 233 */ 234 static int 235 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 236 { 237 struct cryptoini cria; 238 int error; 239 240 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 241 if (!error) 242 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 243 &cria, crypto_support); 244 return error; 245 } 246 247 /* 248 * Paranoia. 249 * 250 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 251 */ 252 int 253 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 254 { 255 int err; 256 257 if (sav->key_auth) 258 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 259 260 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 261 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 262 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 263 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 264 return err; 265 } 266 267 /* 268 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 269 */ 270 static int 271 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 272 { 273 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 274 unsigned char *ptr; 275 int off, count; 276 277 #ifdef INET 278 struct ip *ip; 279 #endif /* INET */ 280 281 #ifdef INET6 282 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 283 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 284 int alloc, ad, nxt; 285 #endif /* INET6 */ 286 287 switch (proto) { 288 #ifdef INET 289 case AF_INET: 290 /* 291 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 292 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 293 * contiguous memory. 294 */ 295 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 296 if (m == NULL) { 297 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 298 return ENOBUFS; 299 } 300 301 /* Fix the IP header */ 302 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 303 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 304 ip->ip_tos = 0; 305 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 306 ip->ip_sum = 0; 307 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 308 309 /* 310 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 311 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 312 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 313 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 314 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 315 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 316 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 317 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 318 */ 319 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 320 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 321 #else 322 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 323 #endif 324 if (!out) { 325 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 326 327 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 328 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 329 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 330 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 331 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 332 333 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 334 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 335 else 336 ip->ip_off = 0; 337 } else { 338 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 339 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 340 else 341 ip->ip_off = 0; 342 } 343 344 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *); 345 346 /* IPv4 option processing */ 347 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 348 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 349 off + 1 < skip) 350 ; 351 else { 352 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 353 "option length for option %d\n", 354 ptr[off])); 355 356 m_freem(m); 357 return EINVAL; 358 } 359 360 switch (ptr[off]) { 361 case IPOPT_EOL: 362 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 363 break; 364 365 case IPOPT_NOP: 366 off++; 367 break; 368 369 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 370 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 371 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 372 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 373 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 374 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 375 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 376 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 377 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 378 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 379 380 m_freem(m); 381 return EINVAL; 382 } 383 384 off += ptr[off + 1]; 385 break; 386 387 case IPOPT_LSRR: 388 case IPOPT_SSRR: 389 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 390 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 391 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 392 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 393 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 394 395 m_freem(m); 396 return EINVAL; 397 } 398 399 /* 400 * On output, if we have either of the 401 * source routing options, we should 402 * swap the destination address of the 403 * IP header with the last address 404 * specified in the option, as that is 405 * what the destination's IP header 406 * will look like. 407 */ 408 if (out) 409 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 410 sizeof(struct in_addr), 411 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 412 413 /* Fall through */ 414 default: 415 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 416 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 417 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 418 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 419 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 420 m_freem(m); 421 return EINVAL; 422 } 423 424 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 425 count = ptr[off + 1]; 426 memcpy(ptr + off, ipseczeroes, count); 427 off += count; 428 break; 429 } 430 431 /* Sanity check. */ 432 if (off > skip) { 433 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 434 "IPv4 options header\n")); 435 436 m_freem(m); 437 return EINVAL; 438 } 439 } 440 441 break; 442 #endif /* INET */ 443 444 #ifdef INET6 445 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 446 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 447 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 448 449 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 450 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 451 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 452 m_freem(m); 453 return EMSGSIZE; 454 } 455 456 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 457 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 458 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 459 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 460 461 /* Scoped address handling. */ 462 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 463 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 464 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 465 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 466 467 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 468 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 469 470 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 471 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 472 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 473 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 474 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 475 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 476 if (ptr == NULL) { 477 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 478 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 479 "headers\n")); 480 m_freem(m); 481 return ENOBUFS; 482 } 483 484 /* 485 * Copy all the protocol headers after 486 * the IPv6 header. 487 */ 488 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 489 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 490 alloc = 1; 491 } else { 492 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 493 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 494 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 495 alloc = 0; 496 } 497 } else 498 break; 499 500 nxt = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 501 502 for (off = 0; off < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 503 switch (nxt) { 504 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 505 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 506 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 507 508 /* 509 * Process the mutable/immutable 510 * options -- borrows heavily from the 511 * KAME code. 512 */ 513 for (count = off + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 514 count < off + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 515 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 516 count++; 517 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 518 } 519 520 /* Sanity check. */ 521 if (count > off + 522 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 523 m_freem(m); 524 525 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 526 if (alloc) 527 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 528 return EINVAL; 529 } 530 531 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 532 533 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 534 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 535 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 536 ptr[count + 1]); 537 538 count += ad; 539 540 /* Sanity check. */ 541 if (count > 542 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 543 m_freem(m); 544 545 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 546 if (alloc) 547 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 548 return EINVAL; 549 } 550 } 551 552 /* Advance. */ 553 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 554 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 555 break; 556 557 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 558 /* 559 * Always include routing headers in 560 * computation. 561 */ 562 { 563 struct ip6_rthdr *rh; 564 565 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 566 rh = (struct ip6_rthdr *)(ptr + off); 567 /* 568 * must adjust content to make it look like 569 * its final form (as seen at the final 570 * destination). 571 * we only know how to massage type 0 routing 572 * header. 573 */ 574 if (out && rh->ip6r_type == IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0) { 575 struct ip6_rthdr0 *rh0; 576 struct in6_addr *addr, finaldst; 577 int i; 578 579 rh0 = (struct ip6_rthdr0 *)rh; 580 addr = (struct in6_addr *)(rh0 + 1); 581 582 for (i = 0; i < rh0->ip6r0_segleft; i++) 583 in6_clearscope(&addr[i]); 584 585 finaldst = addr[rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1]; 586 memmove(&addr[1], &addr[0], 587 sizeof(struct in6_addr) * 588 (rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1)); 589 590 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 591 addr[0] = ip6.ip6_dst; 592 ip6.ip6_dst = finaldst; 593 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 594 595 rh0->ip6r0_segleft = 0; 596 } 597 598 /* advance */ 599 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 600 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 601 break; 602 } 603 604 default: 605 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 606 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 607 if (alloc) 608 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 609 m_freem(m); 610 return EINVAL; 611 } 612 613 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 614 if (alloc) { 615 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 616 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 617 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 618 } 619 620 break; 621 #endif /* INET6 */ 622 } 623 624 return 0; 625 } 626 627 /* 628 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 629 * passes authentication. 630 */ 631 static int 632 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 633 { 634 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 635 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 636 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 637 struct m_tag *mtag; 638 struct newah *ah; 639 int hl, rplen, authsize, error; 640 641 struct cryptodesc *crda; 642 struct cryptop *crp; 643 644 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 645 646 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 647 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 648 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 649 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 650 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 651 652 /* Figure out header size. */ 653 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 654 655 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 656 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 657 if (ah == NULL) { 658 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 659 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 660 m_freem(m); 661 return ENOBUFS; 662 } 663 664 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 665 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 666 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 667 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 668 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 669 m_freem(m); 670 return ENOBUFS; 671 } 672 673 /* Verify AH header length. */ 674 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 675 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 676 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 677 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 678 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 679 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 680 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 681 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 682 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 683 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 684 m_freem(m); 685 return EACCES; 686 } 687 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 688 689 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 690 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 691 if (crp == NULL) { 692 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 693 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 694 m_freem(m); 695 return ENOBUFS; 696 } 697 698 crda = crp->crp_desc; 699 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 700 701 crda->crd_skip = 0; 702 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 703 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 704 705 /* Authentication operation. */ 706 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 707 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 708 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 709 710 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 711 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 712 mtag != NULL; 713 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 714 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 715 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 716 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 717 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 718 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 719 break; 720 } 721 722 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 723 if (mtag == NULL) { 724 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 725 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 726 } else { 727 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 728 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 729 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 730 } 731 if (tc == NULL) { 732 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 733 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 734 crypto_freereq(crp); 735 m_freem(m); 736 return ENOBUFS; 737 } 738 739 error = m_makewritable(&m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, M_NOWAIT); 740 if (error) { 741 m_freem(m); 742 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to copyback_cow\n")); 743 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 744 free(tc, M_XDATA); 745 crypto_freereq(crp); 746 return error; 747 } 748 749 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 750 if (mtag == NULL) { 751 /* 752 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 753 * and the AH header. 754 */ 755 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 756 757 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 758 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 759 760 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 761 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 762 skip, ahx->type, 0); 763 if (error != 0) { 764 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 765 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 766 free(tc, M_XDATA); 767 crypto_freereq(crp); 768 return error; 769 } 770 } 771 772 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 773 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 774 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 775 crp->crp_buf = m; 776 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 777 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 778 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 779 780 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 781 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 782 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 783 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 784 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 785 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 786 tc->tc_skip = skip; 787 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 788 789 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 790 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 791 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 792 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 793 794 if (mtag == NULL) 795 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 796 else 797 return ah_input_cb(crp); 798 } 799 800 #ifdef INET6 801 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 802 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 803 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 804 } else { \ 805 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 806 } \ 807 } while (0) 808 #else 809 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 810 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 811 #endif 812 813 /* 814 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 815 */ 816 static int 817 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 818 { 819 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 820 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 821 struct mbuf *m; 822 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 823 struct m_tag *mtag; 824 struct secasvar *sav; 825 struct secasindex *saidx; 826 u_int8_t nxt; 827 char *ptr; 828 int s, authsize; 829 u_int16_t dport; 830 u_int16_t sport; 831 832 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 833 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 834 skip = tc->tc_skip; 835 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 836 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 837 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 838 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 839 840 841 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 842 nat_t_ports_get(m, &dport, &sport); 843 844 s = splsoftnet(); 845 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 846 847 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 848 if (sav == NULL) { 849 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 850 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 851 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 852 goto bad; 853 } 854 855 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 856 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 857 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 858 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 859 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 860 861 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 862 if (crp->crp_etype) { 863 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 864 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 865 866 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 867 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 868 splx(s); 869 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 870 } 871 872 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 873 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 874 error = crp->crp_etype; 875 goto bad; 876 } else { 877 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 878 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 879 crp = NULL; 880 } 881 882 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 883 if (m == NULL) { 884 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 885 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 886 error = EINVAL; 887 goto bad; 888 } 889 890 /* Figure out header size. */ 891 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 892 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 893 894 if (ipsec_debug) 895 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 896 897 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 898 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 899 900 /* 901 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 902 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 903 */ 904 if (mtag == NULL) { 905 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 906 907 /* Verify authenticator. */ 908 if (!consttime_memequal(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 909 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 910 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 911 "over %d bytes " \ 912 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 913 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 914 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 915 authsize, 916 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 917 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 918 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 919 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 920 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 921 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 922 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 923 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 924 )); 925 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 926 error = EACCES; 927 goto bad; 928 } 929 930 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 931 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 932 933 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 934 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 935 } else { 936 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 937 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 938 } 939 940 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 941 942 /* 943 * Header is now authenticated. 944 */ 945 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 946 947 /* 948 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 949 */ 950 if (sav->replay) { 951 u_int32_t seq; 952 953 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 954 sizeof (seq), &seq); 955 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 956 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 957 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 958 goto bad; 959 } 960 } 961 962 /* 963 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 964 */ 965 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 966 if (error) { 967 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 968 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 969 970 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 971 goto bad; 972 } 973 974 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 975 976 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 977 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 978 splx(s); 979 return error; 980 bad: 981 if (sav) 982 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 983 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 984 splx(s); 985 if (m != NULL) 986 m_freem(m); 987 if (tc != NULL) 988 free(tc, M_XDATA); 989 if (crp != NULL) 990 crypto_freereq(crp); 991 return error; 992 } 993 994 /* 995 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 996 */ 997 static int 998 ah_output( 999 struct mbuf *m, 1000 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 1001 struct mbuf **mp, 1002 int skip, 1003 int protoff 1004 ) 1005 { 1006 const struct secasvar *sav; 1007 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 1008 struct cryptodesc *crda; 1009 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1010 struct mbuf *mi; 1011 struct cryptop *crp; 1012 u_int16_t iplen; 1013 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1014 u_int8_t prot; 1015 struct newah *ah; 1016 1017 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1018 1019 sav = isr->sav; 1020 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1021 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1022 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1023 1024 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1025 1026 /* Figure out header size. */ 1027 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1028 1029 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1030 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1031 #ifdef INET 1032 case AF_INET: 1033 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1034 break; 1035 #endif /* INET */ 1036 #ifdef INET6 1037 case AF_INET6: 1038 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1039 break; 1040 #endif /* INET6 */ 1041 default: 1042 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1043 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1044 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1045 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1046 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1047 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1048 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1049 goto bad; 1050 } 1051 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1052 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1053 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1054 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1055 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1056 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1057 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1058 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1059 error = EMSGSIZE; 1060 goto bad; 1061 } 1062 1063 /* Update the counters. */ 1064 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1065 1066 m = m_clone(m); 1067 if (m == NULL) { 1068 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1069 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1070 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1071 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1072 error = ENOBUFS; 1073 goto bad; 1074 } 1075 1076 /* Inject AH header. */ 1077 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1078 if (mi == NULL) { 1079 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1080 "%s/%08lx\n", 1081 rplen + authsize, 1082 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1083 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1084 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1085 error = ENOBUFS; 1086 goto bad; 1087 } 1088 1089 /* 1090 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1091 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1092 */ 1093 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1094 1095 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1096 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1097 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1098 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1099 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1100 1101 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1102 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1103 1104 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1105 if (sav->replay) { 1106 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1107 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1108 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1109 "%s/%08lx\n", 1110 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1111 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1112 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1113 error = EINVAL; 1114 goto bad; 1115 } 1116 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1117 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1118 if (!ipsec_replay) 1119 #endif 1120 sav->replay->count++; 1121 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1122 } 1123 1124 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1125 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1126 if (crp == NULL) { 1127 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1128 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1129 error = ENOBUFS; 1130 goto bad; 1131 } 1132 1133 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1134 1135 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1136 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1137 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1138 1139 /* Authentication operation. */ 1140 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1141 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1142 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1143 1144 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1145 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1146 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1147 if (tc == NULL) { 1148 crypto_freereq(crp); 1149 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1150 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1151 error = ENOBUFS; 1152 goto bad; 1153 } 1154 1155 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1156 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1157 1158 /* 1159 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1160 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1161 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1162 */ 1163 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1164 #ifdef INET 1165 case AF_INET: 1166 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1167 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1168 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1169 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1170 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1171 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1172 break; 1173 #endif /* INET */ 1174 1175 #ifdef INET6 1176 case AF_INET6: 1177 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1178 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1179 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1180 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1181 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1182 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1183 break; 1184 #endif /* INET6 */ 1185 } 1186 1187 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1188 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1189 1190 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1191 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1192 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1193 1194 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1195 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1196 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1197 if (error != 0) { 1198 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1199 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1200 crypto_freereq(crp); 1201 goto bad; 1202 } 1203 1204 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1205 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1206 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1207 crp->crp_buf = m; 1208 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1209 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1210 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1211 1212 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1213 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1214 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1215 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1216 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1217 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1218 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1219 1220 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1221 bad: 1222 if (m) 1223 m_freem(m); 1224 return (error); 1225 } 1226 1227 /* 1228 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1229 */ 1230 static int 1231 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1232 { 1233 int skip, error; 1234 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1235 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1236 struct secasvar *sav; 1237 struct mbuf *m; 1238 void *ptr; 1239 int s, err; 1240 1241 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1242 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1243 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1244 ptr = (tc + 1); 1245 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1246 1247 s = splsoftnet(); 1248 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1249 1250 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1251 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1252 if (sav == NULL) { 1253 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1254 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1255 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1256 goto bad; 1257 } 1258 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1259 1260 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1261 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1262 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1263 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1264 1265 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1266 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1267 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1268 splx(s); 1269 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1270 } 1271 1272 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1273 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1274 error = crp->crp_etype; 1275 goto bad; 1276 } 1277 1278 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1279 if (m == NULL) { 1280 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1281 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1282 error = EINVAL; 1283 goto bad; 1284 } 1285 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1286 1287 /* 1288 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1289 * in place. 1290 */ 1291 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1292 1293 /* No longer needed. */ 1294 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1295 crypto_freereq(crp); 1296 1297 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1298 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1299 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1300 int alen; 1301 1302 /* 1303 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1304 * the other side. 1305 */ 1306 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1307 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1308 } 1309 #endif 1310 1311 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1312 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1313 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1314 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1315 splx(s); 1316 return err; 1317 bad: 1318 if (sav) 1319 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1320 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1321 splx(s); 1322 if (m) 1323 m_freem(m); 1324 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1325 crypto_freereq(crp); 1326 return error; 1327 } 1328 1329 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1330 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1331 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1332 NULL, 1333 }; 1334 1335 INITFN void 1336 ah_attach(void) 1337 { 1338 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1339 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1340 } 1341 1342 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1343 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1344 #endif 1345