1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.33 2011/05/24 19:10:08 drochner Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.33 2011/05/24 19:10:08 drochner Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/systm.h> 51 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 52 #include <sys/socket.h> 53 #include <sys/syslog.h> 54 #include <sys/kernel.h> 55 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 56 #include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 57 58 #include <net/if.h> 59 60 #include <netinet/in.h> 61 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 64 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 65 66 #include <net/route.h> 67 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 70 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 71 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 72 73 #ifdef INET6 74 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 75 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 76 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 77 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 78 # endif 79 #endif 80 81 #include <netipsec/key.h> 82 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 83 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 84 85 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 86 87 /* 88 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 89 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 90 */ 91 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 92 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 93 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 94 /* 95 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 96 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 97 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 98 */ 99 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 100 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 101 102 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 103 104 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 105 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 106 107 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 108 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 109 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 110 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 111 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 113 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 114 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 115 116 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 117 118 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 119 120 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 121 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 122 123 /* 124 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 125 */ 126 const struct auth_hash * 127 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 128 { 129 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 130 return NULL; 131 switch (alg) { 132 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 133 return &auth_hash_null; 134 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 135 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 136 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 137 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 138 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 139 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 140 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 141 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 142 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 143 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 144 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 145 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 146 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 147 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 148 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 149 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 150 case SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC: 151 return &auth_hash_aes_xcbc_mac_96; 152 } 153 return NULL; 154 } 155 156 size_t 157 ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 158 { 159 size_t size; 160 161 if (sav != NULL) { 162 int authsize; 163 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 164 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 165 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 166 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 167 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 168 } else { 169 /* default guess */ 170 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 171 } 172 return size; 173 } 174 175 /* 176 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 177 */ 178 int 179 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 180 struct cryptoini *cria) 181 { 182 const struct auth_hash *thash; 183 int keylen; 184 185 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 186 if (thash == NULL) { 187 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 188 sav->alg_auth)); 189 return EINVAL; 190 } 191 /* 192 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 193 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 194 * later during protocol processing. 195 */ 196 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 197 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 198 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 199 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 200 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 201 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 202 return EINVAL; 203 } 204 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 205 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 206 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 207 return EINVAL; 208 } 209 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 210 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 211 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 212 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 213 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 214 return EINVAL; 215 } 216 217 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 218 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 219 220 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 221 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 222 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 223 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 224 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 225 226 return 0; 227 } 228 229 /* 230 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 231 */ 232 static int 233 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 234 { 235 struct cryptoini cria; 236 int error; 237 238 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 239 if (!error) 240 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 241 &cria, crypto_support); 242 return error; 243 } 244 245 /* 246 * Paranoia. 247 * 248 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 249 */ 250 int 251 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 252 { 253 int err; 254 255 if (sav->key_auth) 256 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 257 258 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 259 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 260 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 261 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 262 return err; 263 } 264 265 /* 266 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 267 */ 268 static int 269 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 270 { 271 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 272 unsigned char *ptr; 273 int off, count; 274 275 #ifdef INET 276 struct ip *ip; 277 #endif /* INET */ 278 279 #ifdef INET6 280 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 281 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 282 int alloc, len, ad; 283 #endif /* INET6 */ 284 285 switch (proto) { 286 #ifdef INET 287 case AF_INET: 288 /* 289 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 290 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 291 * contiguous memory. 292 */ 293 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 294 if (m == NULL) { 295 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 296 return ENOBUFS; 297 } 298 299 /* Fix the IP header */ 300 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 301 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 302 ip->ip_tos = 0; 303 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 304 ip->ip_sum = 0; 305 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 306 307 /* 308 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 309 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 310 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 311 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 312 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 313 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 314 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 315 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 316 */ 317 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 318 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 319 #else 320 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 321 #endif 322 if (!out) { 323 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 324 325 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 326 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 327 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 328 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 329 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 330 DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, " 331 "in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n", 332 skip, 333 inlen, TOHOST(inlen), 334 ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len))); 335 336 337 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 338 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 339 else 340 ip->ip_off = 0; 341 } else { 342 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 343 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 344 else 345 ip->ip_off = 0; 346 } 347 348 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 349 350 /* IPv4 option processing */ 351 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 352 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 353 off + 1 < skip) 354 ; 355 else { 356 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 357 "option length for option %d\n", 358 ptr[off])); 359 360 m_freem(m); 361 return EINVAL; 362 } 363 364 switch (ptr[off]) { 365 case IPOPT_EOL: 366 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 367 break; 368 369 case IPOPT_NOP: 370 off++; 371 break; 372 373 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 374 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 375 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 376 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 377 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 378 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 379 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 380 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 381 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 382 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 383 384 m_freem(m); 385 return EINVAL; 386 } 387 388 off += ptr[off + 1]; 389 break; 390 391 case IPOPT_LSRR: 392 case IPOPT_SSRR: 393 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 394 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 395 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 396 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 397 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 398 399 m_freem(m); 400 return EINVAL; 401 } 402 403 /* 404 * On output, if we have either of the 405 * source routing options, we should 406 * swap the destination address of the 407 * IP header with the last address 408 * specified in the option, as that is 409 * what the destination's IP header 410 * will look like. 411 */ 412 if (out) 413 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 414 sizeof(struct in_addr), 415 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 416 417 /* Fall through */ 418 default: 419 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 420 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 421 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 422 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 423 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 424 m_freem(m); 425 return EINVAL; 426 } 427 428 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 429 count = ptr[off + 1]; 430 memcpy(ptr, ipseczeroes, count); 431 off += count; 432 break; 433 } 434 435 /* Sanity check. */ 436 if (off > skip) { 437 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 438 "IPv4 options header\n")); 439 440 m_freem(m); 441 return EINVAL; 442 } 443 } 444 445 break; 446 #endif /* INET */ 447 448 #ifdef INET6 449 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 450 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 451 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 452 453 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 454 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 455 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 456 m_freem(m); 457 return EMSGSIZE; 458 } 459 460 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 461 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 462 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 463 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 464 465 /* Scoped address handling. */ 466 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 467 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 468 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 469 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 470 471 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 472 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 473 474 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 475 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 476 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 477 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 478 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 479 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 480 if (ptr == NULL) { 481 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 482 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 483 "headers\n")); 484 m_freem(m); 485 return ENOBUFS; 486 } 487 488 /* 489 * Copy all the protocol headers after 490 * the IPv6 header. 491 */ 492 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 493 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 494 alloc = 1; 495 } else { 496 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 497 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 498 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 499 alloc = 0; 500 } 501 } else 502 break; 503 504 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 505 506 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 507 switch (off) { 508 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 509 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 510 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 511 512 /* 513 * Process the mutable/immutable 514 * options -- borrows heavily from the 515 * KAME code. 516 */ 517 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 518 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 519 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 520 count++; 521 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 522 } 523 524 /* Sanity check. */ 525 if (count > len + 526 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 527 m_freem(m); 528 529 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 530 if (alloc) 531 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 532 return EINVAL; 533 } 534 535 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 536 537 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 538 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 539 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 540 ptr[count + 1]); 541 542 count += ad; 543 544 /* Sanity check. */ 545 if (count > 546 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 547 m_freem(m); 548 549 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 550 if (alloc) 551 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 552 return EINVAL; 553 } 554 } 555 556 /* Advance. */ 557 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 558 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 559 break; 560 561 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 562 /* 563 * Always include routing headers in 564 * computation. 565 */ 566 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 567 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 568 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 569 break; 570 571 default: 572 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 573 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 574 if (alloc) 575 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 576 m_freem(m); 577 return EINVAL; 578 } 579 580 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 581 if (alloc) { 582 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 583 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 584 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 585 } 586 587 break; 588 #endif /* INET6 */ 589 } 590 591 return 0; 592 } 593 594 /* 595 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 596 * passes authentication. 597 */ 598 static int 599 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 600 { 601 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 602 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 603 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 604 struct m_tag *mtag; 605 struct newah *ah; 606 int hl, rplen, authsize; 607 608 struct cryptodesc *crda; 609 struct cryptop *crp; 610 611 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 612 613 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 614 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 615 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 616 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 617 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 618 619 /* Figure out header size. */ 620 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 621 622 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 623 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 624 if (ah == NULL) { 625 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 626 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 627 m_freem(m); 628 return ENOBUFS; 629 } 630 631 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 632 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 633 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 634 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 635 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 636 m_freem(m); 637 return ENOBUFS; 638 } 639 640 /* Verify AH header length. */ 641 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 642 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 643 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 644 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 645 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 646 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 647 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 648 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 649 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 650 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 651 m_freem(m); 652 return EACCES; 653 } 654 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 655 DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n" 656 "len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n", 657 skip, protoff, 658 hl, authsize, rplen, 659 (long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)))); 660 661 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 662 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 663 if (crp == NULL) { 664 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 665 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 666 m_freem(m); 667 return ENOBUFS; 668 } 669 670 crda = crp->crp_desc; 671 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 672 673 crda->crd_skip = 0; 674 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 675 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 676 677 /* Authentication operation. */ 678 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 679 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 680 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 681 682 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 683 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 684 mtag != NULL; 685 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 686 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 687 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 688 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 689 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 690 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 691 break; 692 } 693 694 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 695 if (mtag == NULL) { 696 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 697 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 698 } else { 699 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 700 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 701 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 702 } 703 if (tc == NULL) { 704 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 705 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 706 crypto_freereq(crp); 707 m_freem(m); 708 return ENOBUFS; 709 } 710 711 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 712 if (mtag == NULL) { 713 int error; 714 715 /* 716 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 717 * and the AH header. 718 */ 719 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 720 721 { 722 u_int8_t *pppp = ((char *)(tc+1))+skip+rplen; 723 DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \ 724 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 725 authsize, 726 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 727 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 728 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11])); 729 } 730 731 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 732 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 733 734 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 735 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 736 skip, ahx->type, 0); 737 if (error != 0) { 738 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 739 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 740 free(tc, M_XDATA); 741 crypto_freereq(crp); 742 return error; 743 } 744 } 745 746 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 747 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 748 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 749 crp->crp_buf = m; 750 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 751 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 752 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 753 754 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 755 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 756 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 757 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 758 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 759 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 760 tc->tc_skip = skip; 761 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 762 763 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 764 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 765 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 766 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 767 768 if (mtag == NULL) 769 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 770 else 771 return ah_input_cb(crp); 772 } 773 774 #ifdef INET6 775 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 776 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 777 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 778 } else { \ 779 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 780 } \ 781 } while (0) 782 #else 783 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 784 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 785 #endif 786 787 /* 788 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 789 */ 790 static int 791 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 792 { 793 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 794 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 795 struct mbuf *m; 796 struct cryptodesc *crd; 797 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 798 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 799 struct m_tag *mtag; 800 struct secasvar *sav; 801 struct secasindex *saidx; 802 u_int8_t nxt; 803 char *ptr; 804 int s, authsize; 805 u_int16_t dport = 0; 806 u_int16_t sport = 0; 807 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 808 struct m_tag * tag = NULL; 809 #endif 810 811 crd = crp->crp_desc; 812 813 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 814 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 815 skip = tc->tc_skip; 816 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 817 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 818 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 819 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 820 821 822 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 823 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 824 if ((tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL))) { 825 sport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[0]; 826 dport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1]; 827 } 828 #endif 829 830 s = splsoftnet(); 831 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 832 833 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 834 if (sav == NULL) { 835 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 836 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 837 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 838 goto bad; 839 } 840 841 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 842 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 843 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 844 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 845 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 846 847 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 848 849 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 850 if (crp->crp_etype) { 851 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 852 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 853 854 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 855 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 856 splx(s); 857 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 858 } 859 860 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 861 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 862 error = crp->crp_etype; 863 goto bad; 864 } else { 865 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 866 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 867 crp = NULL; 868 } 869 870 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 871 if (m == NULL) { 872 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 873 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 874 error = EINVAL; 875 goto bad; 876 } 877 878 /* Figure out header size. */ 879 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 880 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 881 882 if (ipsec_debug) 883 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 884 885 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 886 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 887 888 /* 889 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 890 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 891 */ 892 if (mtag == NULL) { 893 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 894 895 /* Verify authenticator. */ 896 if (memcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 897 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 898 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 899 "over %d bytes " \ 900 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 901 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 902 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 903 authsize, 904 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 905 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 906 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 907 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 908 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 909 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 910 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 911 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 912 )); 913 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 914 error = EACCES; 915 goto bad; 916 } 917 918 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 919 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 920 921 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 922 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 923 } else { 924 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 925 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 926 } 927 928 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 929 930 /* 931 * Header is now authenticated. 932 */ 933 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 934 935 /* 936 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 937 */ 938 if (sav->replay) { 939 u_int32_t seq; 940 941 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 942 sizeof (seq), &seq); 943 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 944 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 945 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 946 goto bad; 947 } 948 } 949 950 /* 951 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 952 */ 953 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 954 if (error) { 955 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 956 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 957 958 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 959 goto bad; 960 } 961 962 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 963 964 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 965 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 966 splx(s); 967 return error; 968 bad: 969 if (sav) 970 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 971 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 972 splx(s); 973 if (m != NULL) 974 m_freem(m); 975 if (tc != NULL) 976 free(tc, M_XDATA); 977 if (crp != NULL) 978 crypto_freereq(crp); 979 return error; 980 } 981 982 /* 983 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 984 */ 985 static int 986 ah_output( 987 struct mbuf *m, 988 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 989 struct mbuf **mp, 990 int skip, 991 int protoff 992 ) 993 { 994 const struct secasvar *sav; 995 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 996 struct cryptodesc *crda; 997 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 998 struct mbuf *mi; 999 struct cryptop *crp; 1000 u_int16_t iplen; 1001 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1002 u_int8_t prot; 1003 struct newah *ah; 1004 1005 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1006 1007 sav = isr->sav; 1008 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1009 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1010 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1011 1012 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1013 1014 /* Figure out header size. */ 1015 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1016 1017 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1018 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1019 #ifdef INET 1020 case AF_INET: 1021 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1022 break; 1023 #endif /* INET */ 1024 #ifdef INET6 1025 case AF_INET6: 1026 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1027 break; 1028 #endif /* INET6 */ 1029 default: 1030 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1031 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1032 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1033 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1034 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1035 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1036 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1037 goto bad; 1038 } 1039 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1040 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1041 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1042 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1043 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1044 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1045 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1046 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1047 error = EMSGSIZE; 1048 goto bad; 1049 } 1050 1051 /* Update the counters. */ 1052 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1053 1054 m = m_clone(m); 1055 if (m == NULL) { 1056 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1057 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1058 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1059 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1060 error = ENOBUFS; 1061 goto bad; 1062 } 1063 1064 /* Inject AH header. */ 1065 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1066 if (mi == NULL) { 1067 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1068 "%s/%08lx\n", 1069 rplen + authsize, 1070 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1071 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1072 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1073 error = ENOBUFS; 1074 goto bad; 1075 } 1076 1077 /* 1078 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1079 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1080 */ 1081 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1082 1083 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1084 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1085 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1086 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1087 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1088 1089 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1090 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1091 1092 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1093 if (sav->replay) { 1094 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1095 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1096 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1097 "%s/%08lx\n", 1098 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1099 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1100 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1101 error = EINVAL; 1102 goto bad; 1103 } 1104 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1105 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1106 if (!ipsec_replay) 1107 #endif 1108 sav->replay->count++; 1109 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1110 } 1111 1112 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1113 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1114 if (crp == NULL) { 1115 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1116 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1117 error = ENOBUFS; 1118 goto bad; 1119 } 1120 1121 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1122 1123 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1124 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1125 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1126 1127 /* Authentication operation. */ 1128 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1129 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1130 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1131 1132 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1133 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1134 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1135 if (tc == NULL) { 1136 crypto_freereq(crp); 1137 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1138 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1139 error = ENOBUFS; 1140 goto bad; 1141 } 1142 1143 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1144 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1145 1146 /* 1147 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1148 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1149 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1150 */ 1151 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1152 #ifdef INET 1153 case AF_INET: 1154 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1155 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1156 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1157 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1158 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1159 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1160 break; 1161 #endif /* INET */ 1162 1163 #ifdef INET6 1164 case AF_INET6: 1165 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1166 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1167 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1168 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1169 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1170 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1171 break; 1172 #endif /* INET6 */ 1173 } 1174 1175 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1176 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1177 1178 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1179 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1180 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1181 1182 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1183 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1184 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1185 if (error != 0) { 1186 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1187 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1188 crypto_freereq(crp); 1189 goto bad; 1190 } 1191 1192 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1193 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1194 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1195 crp->crp_buf = m; 1196 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1197 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1198 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1199 1200 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1201 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1202 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1203 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1204 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1205 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1206 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1207 1208 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1209 bad: 1210 if (m) 1211 m_freem(m); 1212 return (error); 1213 } 1214 1215 /* 1216 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1217 */ 1218 static int 1219 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1220 { 1221 int skip, protoff, error; 1222 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1223 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1224 struct secasvar *sav; 1225 struct mbuf *m; 1226 void *ptr; 1227 int s, err; 1228 1229 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1230 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1231 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1232 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1233 ptr = (tc + 1); 1234 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1235 1236 s = splsoftnet(); 1237 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1238 1239 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1240 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1241 if (sav == NULL) { 1242 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1243 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1244 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1245 goto bad; 1246 } 1247 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1248 1249 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1250 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1251 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1252 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1253 1254 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1255 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1256 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1257 splx(s); 1258 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1259 } 1260 1261 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1262 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1263 error = crp->crp_etype; 1264 goto bad; 1265 } 1266 1267 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1268 if (m == NULL) { 1269 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1270 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1271 error = EINVAL; 1272 goto bad; 1273 } 1274 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1275 1276 /* 1277 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1278 * in place. 1279 */ 1280 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1281 1282 /* No longer needed. */ 1283 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1284 crypto_freereq(crp); 1285 1286 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1287 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1288 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1289 int alen; 1290 1291 /* 1292 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1293 * the other side. 1294 */ 1295 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1296 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1297 } 1298 #endif 1299 1300 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1301 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1302 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1303 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1304 splx(s); 1305 return err; 1306 bad: 1307 if (sav) 1308 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1309 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1310 splx(s); 1311 if (m) 1312 m_freem(m); 1313 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1314 crypto_freereq(crp); 1315 return error; 1316 } 1317 1318 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1319 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1320 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1321 NULL, 1322 }; 1323 1324 INITFN void 1325 ah_attach(void) 1326 { 1327 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1328 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1329 } 1330 1331 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1332 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1333 #endif 1334