1 /* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.32 2011/05/06 21:48:46 drochner Exp $ */ 2 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4 /* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41 #include <sys/cdefs.h> 42 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.32 2011/05/06 21:48:46 drochner Exp $"); 43 44 #include "opt_inet.h" 45 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46 #include "opt_inet6.h" 47 #endif 48 49 #include <sys/param.h> 50 #include <sys/systm.h> 51 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 52 #include <sys/socket.h> 53 #include <sys/syslog.h> 54 #include <sys/kernel.h> 55 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 56 #include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 57 58 #include <net/if.h> 59 60 #include <netinet/in.h> 61 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip.h> 63 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 64 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 65 66 #include <net/route.h> 67 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 69 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 70 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 71 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 72 73 #ifdef INET6 74 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 75 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 76 # ifdef __FreeBSD__ 77 # include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 78 # endif 79 #endif 80 81 #include <netipsec/key.h> 82 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 83 #include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 84 85 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 86 87 /* 88 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 89 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 90 */ 91 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 92 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 93 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 94 /* 95 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 96 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 97 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 98 */ 99 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 100 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 101 102 percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 103 104 int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 105 int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 106 107 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 108 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 109 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 110 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 111 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 113 SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 114 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 115 116 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 117 118 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 119 120 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 121 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 122 123 /* 124 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 125 */ 126 const struct auth_hash * 127 ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 128 { 129 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 130 return NULL; 131 switch (alg) { 132 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 133 return &auth_hash_null; 134 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 135 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 136 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 137 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 138 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 139 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 140 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 141 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 142 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 143 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 144 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 145 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 146 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 147 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 148 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 149 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 150 } 151 return NULL; 152 } 153 154 size_t 155 ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 156 { 157 size_t size; 158 159 if (sav != NULL) { 160 int authsize; 161 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 162 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 163 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 164 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 165 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 166 } else { 167 /* default guess */ 168 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 169 } 170 return size; 171 } 172 173 /* 174 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 175 */ 176 int 177 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 178 struct cryptoini *cria) 179 { 180 const struct auth_hash *thash; 181 int keylen; 182 183 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 184 if (thash == NULL) { 185 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 186 sav->alg_auth)); 187 return EINVAL; 188 } 189 /* 190 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 191 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 192 * later during protocol processing. 193 */ 194 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 195 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 196 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 197 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 198 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 199 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 200 return EINVAL; 201 } 202 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 203 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 204 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 205 return EINVAL; 206 } 207 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 208 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 209 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 210 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 211 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 212 return EINVAL; 213 } 214 215 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 216 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 217 218 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 219 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 220 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 221 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 222 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 223 224 return 0; 225 } 226 227 /* 228 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 229 */ 230 static int 231 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 232 { 233 struct cryptoini cria; 234 int error; 235 236 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 237 if (!error) 238 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 239 &cria, crypto_support); 240 return error; 241 } 242 243 /* 244 * Paranoia. 245 * 246 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 247 */ 248 int 249 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 250 { 251 int err; 252 253 if (sav->key_auth) 254 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 255 256 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 257 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 258 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 259 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 260 return err; 261 } 262 263 /* 264 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 265 */ 266 static int 267 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 268 { 269 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 270 unsigned char *ptr; 271 int off, count; 272 273 #ifdef INET 274 struct ip *ip; 275 #endif /* INET */ 276 277 #ifdef INET6 278 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 279 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 280 int alloc, len, ad; 281 #endif /* INET6 */ 282 283 switch (proto) { 284 #ifdef INET 285 case AF_INET: 286 /* 287 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 288 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 289 * contiguous memory. 290 */ 291 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 292 if (m == NULL) { 293 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 294 return ENOBUFS; 295 } 296 297 /* Fix the IP header */ 298 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 299 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 300 ip->ip_tos = 0; 301 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 302 ip->ip_sum = 0; 303 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 304 305 /* 306 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 307 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 308 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 309 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 310 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 311 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 312 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 313 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 314 */ 315 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 316 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 317 #else 318 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 319 #endif 320 if (!out) { 321 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 322 323 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 324 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 325 #else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 326 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 327 #endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 328 DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, " 329 "in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n", 330 skip, 331 inlen, TOHOST(inlen), 332 ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len))); 333 334 335 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 336 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 337 else 338 ip->ip_off = 0; 339 } else { 340 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 341 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 342 else 343 ip->ip_off = 0; 344 } 345 346 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 347 348 /* IPv4 option processing */ 349 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 350 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 351 off + 1 < skip) 352 ; 353 else { 354 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 355 "option length for option %d\n", 356 ptr[off])); 357 358 m_freem(m); 359 return EINVAL; 360 } 361 362 switch (ptr[off]) { 363 case IPOPT_EOL: 364 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 365 break; 366 367 case IPOPT_NOP: 368 off++; 369 break; 370 371 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 372 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 373 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 374 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 375 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 376 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 377 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 378 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 379 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 380 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 381 382 m_freem(m); 383 return EINVAL; 384 } 385 386 off += ptr[off + 1]; 387 break; 388 389 case IPOPT_LSRR: 390 case IPOPT_SSRR: 391 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 392 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 393 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 394 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 395 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 396 397 m_freem(m); 398 return EINVAL; 399 } 400 401 /* 402 * On output, if we have either of the 403 * source routing options, we should 404 * swap the destination address of the 405 * IP header with the last address 406 * specified in the option, as that is 407 * what the destination's IP header 408 * will look like. 409 */ 410 if (out) 411 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 412 sizeof(struct in_addr), 413 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 414 415 /* Fall through */ 416 default: 417 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 418 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 419 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 420 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 421 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 422 m_freem(m); 423 return EINVAL; 424 } 425 426 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 427 count = ptr[off + 1]; 428 memcpy(ptr, ipseczeroes, count); 429 off += count; 430 break; 431 } 432 433 /* Sanity check. */ 434 if (off > skip) { 435 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 436 "IPv4 options header\n")); 437 438 m_freem(m); 439 return EINVAL; 440 } 441 } 442 443 break; 444 #endif /* INET */ 445 446 #ifdef INET6 447 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 448 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 449 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 450 451 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 452 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 453 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 454 m_freem(m); 455 return EMSGSIZE; 456 } 457 458 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 459 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 460 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 461 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 462 463 /* Scoped address handling. */ 464 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 465 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 466 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 467 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 468 469 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 470 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 471 472 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 473 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 474 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 475 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 476 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 477 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 478 if (ptr == NULL) { 479 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 480 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 481 "headers\n")); 482 m_freem(m); 483 return ENOBUFS; 484 } 485 486 /* 487 * Copy all the protocol headers after 488 * the IPv6 header. 489 */ 490 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 491 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 492 alloc = 1; 493 } else { 494 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 495 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 496 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 497 alloc = 0; 498 } 499 } else 500 break; 501 502 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 503 504 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 505 switch (off) { 506 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 507 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 508 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 509 510 /* 511 * Process the mutable/immutable 512 * options -- borrows heavily from the 513 * KAME code. 514 */ 515 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 516 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 517 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 518 count++; 519 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 520 } 521 522 /* Sanity check. */ 523 if (count > len + 524 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 525 m_freem(m); 526 527 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 528 if (alloc) 529 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 530 return EINVAL; 531 } 532 533 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 534 535 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 536 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 537 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 538 ptr[count + 1]); 539 540 count += ad; 541 542 /* Sanity check. */ 543 if (count > 544 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 545 m_freem(m); 546 547 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 548 if (alloc) 549 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 550 return EINVAL; 551 } 552 } 553 554 /* Advance. */ 555 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 556 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 557 break; 558 559 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 560 /* 561 * Always include routing headers in 562 * computation. 563 */ 564 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 565 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 566 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 567 break; 568 569 default: 570 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 571 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 572 if (alloc) 573 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 574 m_freem(m); 575 return EINVAL; 576 } 577 578 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 579 if (alloc) { 580 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 581 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 582 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 583 } 584 585 break; 586 #endif /* INET6 */ 587 } 588 589 return 0; 590 } 591 592 /* 593 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 594 * passes authentication. 595 */ 596 static int 597 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 598 { 599 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 600 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 601 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 602 struct m_tag *mtag; 603 struct newah *ah; 604 int hl, rplen, authsize; 605 606 struct cryptodesc *crda; 607 struct cryptop *crp; 608 609 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 610 611 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 612 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 613 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 614 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 615 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 616 617 /* Figure out header size. */ 618 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 619 620 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 621 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 622 if (ah == NULL) { 623 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 624 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 625 m_freem(m); 626 return ENOBUFS; 627 } 628 629 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 630 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 631 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 632 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 633 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 634 m_freem(m); 635 return ENOBUFS; 636 } 637 638 /* Verify AH header length. */ 639 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 640 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 641 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 642 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 643 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 644 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 645 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 646 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 647 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 648 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 649 m_freem(m); 650 return EACCES; 651 } 652 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 653 DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n" 654 "len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n", 655 skip, protoff, 656 hl, authsize, rplen, 657 (long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)))); 658 659 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 660 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 661 if (crp == NULL) { 662 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 663 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 664 m_freem(m); 665 return ENOBUFS; 666 } 667 668 crda = crp->crp_desc; 669 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 670 671 crda->crd_skip = 0; 672 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 673 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 674 675 /* Authentication operation. */ 676 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 677 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 678 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 679 680 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 681 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 682 mtag != NULL; 683 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 684 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 685 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 686 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 687 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 688 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 689 break; 690 } 691 692 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 693 if (mtag == NULL) { 694 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 695 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 696 } else { 697 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 698 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 699 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 700 } 701 if (tc == NULL) { 702 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 703 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 704 crypto_freereq(crp); 705 m_freem(m); 706 return ENOBUFS; 707 } 708 709 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 710 if (mtag == NULL) { 711 int error; 712 713 /* 714 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 715 * and the AH header. 716 */ 717 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 718 719 { 720 u_int8_t *pppp = ((char *)(tc+1))+skip+rplen; 721 DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \ 722 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 723 authsize, 724 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 725 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 726 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11])); 727 } 728 729 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 730 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 731 732 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 733 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 734 skip, ahx->type, 0); 735 if (error != 0) { 736 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 737 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 738 free(tc, M_XDATA); 739 crypto_freereq(crp); 740 return error; 741 } 742 } 743 744 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 745 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 746 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 747 crp->crp_buf = m; 748 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 749 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 750 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 751 752 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 753 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 754 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 755 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 756 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 757 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 758 tc->tc_skip = skip; 759 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 760 761 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 762 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 763 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 764 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 765 766 if (mtag == NULL) 767 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 768 else 769 return ah_input_cb(crp); 770 } 771 772 #ifdef INET6 773 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 774 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 775 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 776 } else { \ 777 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 778 } \ 779 } while (0) 780 #else 781 #define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 782 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 783 #endif 784 785 /* 786 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 787 */ 788 static int 789 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 790 { 791 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 792 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 793 struct mbuf *m; 794 struct cryptodesc *crd; 795 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 796 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 797 struct m_tag *mtag; 798 struct secasvar *sav; 799 struct secasindex *saidx; 800 u_int8_t nxt; 801 char *ptr; 802 int s, authsize; 803 u_int16_t dport = 0; 804 u_int16_t sport = 0; 805 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 806 struct m_tag * tag = NULL; 807 #endif 808 809 crd = crp->crp_desc; 810 811 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 812 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 813 skip = tc->tc_skip; 814 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 815 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 816 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 817 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 818 819 820 #ifdef IPSEC_NAT_T 821 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 822 if ((tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_NAT_T_PORTS, NULL))) { 823 sport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[0]; 824 dport = ((u_int16_t *)(tag + 1))[1]; 825 } 826 #endif 827 828 s = splsoftnet(); 829 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 830 831 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 832 if (sav == NULL) { 833 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 834 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 835 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 836 goto bad; 837 } 838 839 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 840 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 841 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 842 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 843 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 844 845 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 846 847 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 848 if (crp->crp_etype) { 849 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 850 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 851 852 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 853 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 854 splx(s); 855 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 856 } 857 858 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 859 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 860 error = crp->crp_etype; 861 goto bad; 862 } else { 863 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 864 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 865 crp = NULL; 866 } 867 868 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 869 if (m == NULL) { 870 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 871 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 872 error = EINVAL; 873 goto bad; 874 } 875 876 /* Figure out header size. */ 877 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 878 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 879 880 if (ipsec_debug) 881 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 882 883 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 884 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 885 886 /* 887 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 888 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 889 */ 890 if (mtag == NULL) { 891 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 892 893 /* Verify authenticator. */ 894 if (memcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 895 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 896 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 897 "over %d bytes " \ 898 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 899 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 900 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 901 authsize, 902 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 903 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 904 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 905 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 906 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 907 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 908 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 909 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 910 )); 911 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 912 error = EACCES; 913 goto bad; 914 } 915 916 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 917 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 918 919 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 920 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 921 } else { 922 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 923 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 924 } 925 926 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 927 928 /* 929 * Header is now authenticated. 930 */ 931 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 932 933 /* 934 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 935 */ 936 if (sav->replay) { 937 u_int32_t seq; 938 939 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 940 sizeof (seq), &seq); 941 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 942 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 943 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 944 goto bad; 945 } 946 } 947 948 /* 949 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 950 */ 951 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 952 if (error) { 953 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 954 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 955 956 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 957 goto bad; 958 } 959 960 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 961 962 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 963 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 964 splx(s); 965 return error; 966 bad: 967 if (sav) 968 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 969 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 970 splx(s); 971 if (m != NULL) 972 m_freem(m); 973 if (tc != NULL) 974 free(tc, M_XDATA); 975 if (crp != NULL) 976 crypto_freereq(crp); 977 return error; 978 } 979 980 /* 981 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 982 */ 983 static int 984 ah_output( 985 struct mbuf *m, 986 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 987 struct mbuf **mp, 988 int skip, 989 int protoff 990 ) 991 { 992 const struct secasvar *sav; 993 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 994 struct cryptodesc *crda; 995 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 996 struct mbuf *mi; 997 struct cryptop *crp; 998 u_int16_t iplen; 999 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1000 u_int8_t prot; 1001 struct newah *ah; 1002 1003 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1004 1005 sav = isr->sav; 1006 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1007 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1008 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1009 1010 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1011 1012 /* Figure out header size. */ 1013 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1014 1015 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1016 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1017 #ifdef INET 1018 case AF_INET: 1019 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1020 break; 1021 #endif /* INET */ 1022 #ifdef INET6 1023 case AF_INET6: 1024 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1025 break; 1026 #endif /* INET6 */ 1027 default: 1028 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1029 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1030 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1031 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1032 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1033 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1034 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1035 goto bad; 1036 } 1037 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1038 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1039 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1040 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1041 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1042 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1043 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1044 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1045 error = EMSGSIZE; 1046 goto bad; 1047 } 1048 1049 /* Update the counters. */ 1050 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1051 1052 m = m_clone(m); 1053 if (m == NULL) { 1054 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1055 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1056 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1057 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1058 error = ENOBUFS; 1059 goto bad; 1060 } 1061 1062 /* Inject AH header. */ 1063 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1064 if (mi == NULL) { 1065 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1066 "%s/%08lx\n", 1067 rplen + authsize, 1068 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1069 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1070 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1071 error = ENOBUFS; 1072 goto bad; 1073 } 1074 1075 /* 1076 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1077 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1078 */ 1079 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1080 1081 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1082 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1083 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1084 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1085 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1086 1087 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1088 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1089 1090 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1091 if (sav->replay) { 1092 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1093 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1094 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1095 "%s/%08lx\n", 1096 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1097 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1098 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1099 error = EINVAL; 1100 goto bad; 1101 } 1102 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1103 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1104 if (!ipsec_replay) 1105 #endif 1106 sav->replay->count++; 1107 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1108 } 1109 1110 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1111 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1112 if (crp == NULL) { 1113 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1114 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1115 error = ENOBUFS; 1116 goto bad; 1117 } 1118 1119 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1120 1121 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1122 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1123 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1124 1125 /* Authentication operation. */ 1126 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1127 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1128 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1129 1130 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1131 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1132 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1133 if (tc == NULL) { 1134 crypto_freereq(crp); 1135 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1136 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1137 error = ENOBUFS; 1138 goto bad; 1139 } 1140 1141 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1142 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1143 1144 /* 1145 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1146 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1147 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1148 */ 1149 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1150 #ifdef INET 1151 case AF_INET: 1152 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1153 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1154 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1155 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1156 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1157 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1158 break; 1159 #endif /* INET */ 1160 1161 #ifdef INET6 1162 case AF_INET6: 1163 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1164 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1165 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1166 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1167 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1168 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1169 break; 1170 #endif /* INET6 */ 1171 } 1172 1173 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1174 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1175 1176 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1177 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1178 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1179 1180 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1181 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1182 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1183 if (error != 0) { 1184 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1185 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1186 crypto_freereq(crp); 1187 goto bad; 1188 } 1189 1190 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1191 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1192 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1193 crp->crp_buf = m; 1194 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1195 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1196 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1197 1198 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1199 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1200 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1201 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1202 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1203 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1204 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1205 1206 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1207 bad: 1208 if (m) 1209 m_freem(m); 1210 return (error); 1211 } 1212 1213 /* 1214 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1215 */ 1216 static int 1217 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1218 { 1219 int skip, protoff, error; 1220 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1221 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1222 struct secasvar *sav; 1223 struct mbuf *m; 1224 void *ptr; 1225 int s, err; 1226 1227 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1228 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1229 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1230 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1231 ptr = (tc + 1); 1232 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1233 1234 s = splsoftnet(); 1235 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1236 1237 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1238 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1239 if (sav == NULL) { 1240 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1241 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1242 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1243 goto bad; 1244 } 1245 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1246 1247 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1248 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1249 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1250 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1251 1252 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1253 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1254 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1255 splx(s); 1256 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1257 } 1258 1259 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1260 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1261 error = crp->crp_etype; 1262 goto bad; 1263 } 1264 1265 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1266 if (m == NULL) { 1267 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1268 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1269 error = EINVAL; 1270 goto bad; 1271 } 1272 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1273 1274 /* 1275 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1276 * in place. 1277 */ 1278 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1279 1280 /* No longer needed. */ 1281 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1282 crypto_freereq(crp); 1283 1284 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1285 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1286 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1287 int alen; 1288 1289 /* 1290 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1291 * the other side. 1292 */ 1293 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1294 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1295 } 1296 #endif 1297 1298 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1299 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1300 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1301 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1302 splx(s); 1303 return err; 1304 bad: 1305 if (sav) 1306 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1307 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1308 splx(s); 1309 if (m) 1310 m_freem(m); 1311 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1312 crypto_freereq(crp); 1313 return error; 1314 } 1315 1316 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1317 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1318 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1319 NULL, 1320 }; 1321 1322 INITFN void 1323 ah_attach(void) 1324 { 1325 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1326 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1327 } 1328 1329 #ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1330 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1331 #endif 1332