xref: /netbsd-src/sys/kern/subr_cprng.c (revision b7b7574d3bf8eeb51a1fa3977b59142ec6434a55)
1 /*	$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.23 2014/01/17 02:12:48 pooka Exp $ */
2 
3 /*-
4  * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
8  * by Thor Lancelot Simon and Taylor R. Campbell.
9  *
10  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12  * are met:
13  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  *
19  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
20  * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
21  * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
22  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
23  * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
24  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
25  * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
26  * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
27  * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
28  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
29  * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
30  */
31 
32 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
33 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.23 2014/01/17 02:12:48 pooka Exp $");
34 
35 #include <sys/param.h>
36 #include <sys/types.h>
37 #include <sys/condvar.h>
38 #include <sys/cprng.h>
39 #include <sys/errno.h>
40 #include <sys/event.h>		/* XXX struct knote */
41 #include <sys/fcntl.h>		/* XXX FNONBLOCK */
42 #include <sys/kernel.h>
43 #include <sys/kmem.h>
44 #include <sys/lwp.h>
45 #include <sys/once.h>
46 #include <sys/poll.h>		/* XXX POLLIN/POLLOUT/&c. */
47 #include <sys/select.h>
48 #include <sys/systm.h>
49 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
50 #include <sys/rnd.h>
51 #include <sys/rndsink.h>
52 #if DEBUG
53 #include <sys/rngtest.h>
54 #endif
55 
56 #include <crypto/nist_ctr_drbg/nist_ctr_drbg.h>
57 
58 #if defined(__HAVE_CPU_COUNTER)
59 #include <machine/cpu_counter.h>
60 #endif
61 
62 static int sysctl_kern_urnd(SYSCTLFN_PROTO);
63 static int sysctl_kern_arnd(SYSCTLFN_PROTO);
64 
65 static void	cprng_strong_generate(struct cprng_strong *, void *, size_t);
66 static void	cprng_strong_reseed(struct cprng_strong *);
67 static void	cprng_strong_reseed_from(struct cprng_strong *, const void *,
68 		    size_t, bool);
69 #if DEBUG
70 static void	cprng_strong_rngtest(struct cprng_strong *);
71 #endif
72 
73 static rndsink_callback_t	cprng_strong_rndsink_callback;
74 
75 void
76 cprng_init(void)
77 {
78 	static struct sysctllog *random_sysctllog;
79 
80 	nist_ctr_initialize();
81 
82 	sysctl_createv(&random_sysctllog, 0, NULL, NULL,
83 		       CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
84 		       CTLTYPE_INT, "urandom",
85 		       SYSCTL_DESCR("Random integer value"),
86 		       sysctl_kern_urnd, 0, NULL, 0,
87 		       CTL_KERN, KERN_URND, CTL_EOL);
88 	sysctl_createv(&random_sysctllog, 0, NULL, NULL,
89 		       CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
90 		       CTLTYPE_INT, "arandom",
91 		       SYSCTL_DESCR("n bytes of random data"),
92 		       sysctl_kern_arnd, 0, NULL, 0,
93 		       CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND, CTL_EOL);
94 }
95 
96 static inline uint32_t
97 cprng_counter(void)
98 {
99 	struct timeval tv;
100 
101 #if defined(__HAVE_CPU_COUNTER)
102 	if (cpu_hascounter())
103 		return cpu_counter32();
104 #endif
105 	if (__predict_false(cold)) {
106 		/* microtime unsafe if clock not running yet */
107 		return 0;
108 	}
109 	microtime(&tv);
110 	return (tv.tv_sec * 1000000 + tv.tv_usec);
111 }
112 
113 struct cprng_strong {
114 	char		cs_name[16];
115 	int		cs_flags;
116 	kmutex_t	cs_lock;
117 	kcondvar_t	cs_cv;
118 	struct selinfo	cs_selq;
119 	struct rndsink	*cs_rndsink;
120 	bool		cs_ready;
121 	NIST_CTR_DRBG	cs_drbg;
122 
123 	/* XXX Kludge for /dev/random `information-theoretic' properties.   */
124 	unsigned int	cs_remaining;
125 };
126 
127 struct cprng_strong *
128 cprng_strong_create(const char *name, int ipl, int flags)
129 {
130 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
131 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*cprng),
132 	    KM_SLEEP);
133 
134 	/*
135 	 * rndsink_request takes a spin lock at IPL_VM, so we can be no
136 	 * higher than that.
137 	 */
138 	KASSERT(ipl != IPL_SCHED && ipl != IPL_HIGH);
139 
140 	/* Initialize the easy fields.  */
141 	(void)strlcpy(cprng->cs_name, name, sizeof(cprng->cs_name));
142 	cprng->cs_flags = flags;
143 	mutex_init(&cprng->cs_lock, MUTEX_DEFAULT, ipl);
144 	cv_init(&cprng->cs_cv, cprng->cs_name);
145 	selinit(&cprng->cs_selq);
146 	cprng->cs_rndsink = rndsink_create(NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES,
147 	    &cprng_strong_rndsink_callback, cprng);
148 
149 	/* Get some initial entropy.  Record whether it is full entropy.  */
150 	uint8_t seed[NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES];
151 	cprng->cs_ready = rndsink_request(cprng->cs_rndsink, seed,
152 	    sizeof(seed));
153 	if (nist_ctr_drbg_instantiate(&cprng->cs_drbg, seed, sizeof(seed),
154 		&cc, sizeof(cc), cprng->cs_name, sizeof(cprng->cs_name)))
155 		/* XXX Fix nist_ctr_drbg API so this can't happen.  */
156 		panic("cprng %s: NIST CTR_DRBG instantiation failed",
157 		    cprng->cs_name);
158 	explicit_memset(seed, 0, sizeof(seed));
159 
160 	if (ISSET(flags, CPRNG_HARD))
161 		cprng->cs_remaining = NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES;
162 	else
163 		cprng->cs_remaining = 0;
164 
165 	if (!cprng->cs_ready && !ISSET(flags, CPRNG_INIT_ANY))
166 		printf("cprng %s: creating with partial entropy\n",
167 		    cprng->cs_name);
168 
169 	return cprng;
170 }
171 
172 void
173 cprng_strong_destroy(struct cprng_strong *cprng)
174 {
175 
176 	/*
177 	 * Destroy the rndsink first to prevent calls to the callback.
178 	 */
179 	rndsink_destroy(cprng->cs_rndsink);
180 
181 	KASSERT(!cv_has_waiters(&cprng->cs_cv));
182 #if 0
183 	KASSERT(!select_has_waiters(&cprng->cs_selq)) /* XXX ? */
184 #endif
185 
186 	nist_ctr_drbg_destroy(&cprng->cs_drbg);
187 	seldestroy(&cprng->cs_selq);
188 	cv_destroy(&cprng->cs_cv);
189 	mutex_destroy(&cprng->cs_lock);
190 
191 	explicit_memset(cprng, 0, sizeof(*cprng)); /* paranoia */
192 	kmem_free(cprng, sizeof(*cprng));
193 }
194 
195 /*
196  * Generate some data from cprng.  Block or return zero bytes,
197  * depending on flags & FNONBLOCK, if cprng was created without
198  * CPRNG_REKEY_ANY.
199  */
200 size_t
201 cprng_strong(struct cprng_strong *cprng, void *buffer, size_t bytes, int flags)
202 {
203 	size_t result;
204 
205 	/* Caller must loop for more than CPRNG_MAX_LEN bytes.  */
206 	bytes = MIN(bytes, CPRNG_MAX_LEN);
207 
208 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
209 
210 	if (ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_REKEY_ANY)) {
211 		if (!cprng->cs_ready)
212 			cprng_strong_reseed(cprng);
213 	} else {
214 		while (!cprng->cs_ready) {
215 			if (ISSET(flags, FNONBLOCK) ||
216 			    !ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_USE_CV) ||
217 			    cv_wait_sig(&cprng->cs_cv, &cprng->cs_lock)) {
218 				result = 0;
219 				goto out;
220 			}
221 		}
222 	}
223 
224 	/*
225 	 * Debit the entropy if requested.
226 	 *
227 	 * XXX Kludge for /dev/random `information-theoretic' properties.
228 	 */
229 	if (__predict_false(ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_HARD))) {
230 		KASSERT(0 < cprng->cs_remaining);
231 		KASSERT(cprng->cs_remaining <= NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES);
232 		if (bytes < cprng->cs_remaining) {
233 			cprng->cs_remaining -= bytes;
234 		} else {
235 			bytes = cprng->cs_remaining;
236 			cprng->cs_remaining = NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES;
237 			cprng->cs_ready = false;
238 			rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink);
239 		}
240 		KASSERT(bytes <= NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES);
241 		KASSERT(0 < cprng->cs_remaining);
242 		KASSERT(cprng->cs_remaining <= NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES);
243 	}
244 
245 	cprng_strong_generate(cprng, buffer, bytes);
246 	result = bytes;
247 
248 out:	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
249 	return result;
250 }
251 
252 static void	filt_cprng_detach(struct knote *);
253 static int	filt_cprng_event(struct knote *, long);
254 
255 static const struct filterops cprng_filtops =
256 	{ 1, NULL, filt_cprng_detach, filt_cprng_event };
257 
258 int
259 cprng_strong_kqfilter(struct cprng_strong *cprng, struct knote *kn)
260 {
261 
262 	switch (kn->kn_filter) {
263 	case EVFILT_READ:
264 		kn->kn_fop = &cprng_filtops;
265 		kn->kn_hook = cprng;
266 		mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
267 		SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&cprng->cs_selq.sel_klist, kn, kn_selnext);
268 		mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
269 		return 0;
270 
271 	case EVFILT_WRITE:
272 	default:
273 		return EINVAL;
274 	}
275 }
276 
277 static void
278 filt_cprng_detach(struct knote *kn)
279 {
280 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kn->kn_hook;
281 
282 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
283 	SLIST_REMOVE(&cprng->cs_selq.sel_klist, kn, knote, kn_selnext);
284 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
285 }
286 
287 static int
288 filt_cprng_event(struct knote *kn, long hint)
289 {
290 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kn->kn_hook;
291 	int ret;
292 
293 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
294 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
295 	else
296 		mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
297 	if (cprng->cs_ready) {
298 		kn->kn_data = CPRNG_MAX_LEN; /* XXX Too large?  */
299 		ret = 1;
300 	} else {
301 		ret = 0;
302 	}
303 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
304 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
305 	else
306 		mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
307 
308 	return ret;
309 }
310 
311 int
312 cprng_strong_poll(struct cprng_strong *cprng, int events)
313 {
314 	int revents;
315 
316 	if (!ISSET(events, (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM)))
317 		return 0;
318 
319 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
320 	if (cprng->cs_ready) {
321 		revents = (events & (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM));
322 	} else {
323 		selrecord(curlwp, &cprng->cs_selq);
324 		revents = 0;
325 	}
326 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
327 
328 	return revents;
329 }
330 
331 /*
332  * XXX Move nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_advised_p and
333  * nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_needed_p into the nist_ctr_drbg API and make
334  * the NIST_CTR_DRBG structure opaque.
335  */
336 static bool
337 nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_advised_p(NIST_CTR_DRBG *drbg)
338 {
339 
340 	return (drbg->reseed_counter > (NIST_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL / 2));
341 }
342 
343 static bool
344 nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_needed_p(NIST_CTR_DRBG *drbg)
345 {
346 
347 	return (drbg->reseed_counter >= NIST_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
348 }
349 
350 /*
351  * Generate some data from the underlying generator.
352  */
353 static void
354 cprng_strong_generate(struct cprng_strong *cprng, void *buffer, size_t bytes)
355 {
356 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
357 
358 	KASSERT(bytes <= CPRNG_MAX_LEN);
359 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
360 
361 	/*
362 	 * Generate some data from the NIST CTR_DRBG.  Caller
363 	 * guarantees reseed if we're not ready, and if we exhaust the
364 	 * generator, we mark ourselves not ready.  Consequently, this
365 	 * call to the CTR_DRBG should not fail.
366 	 */
367 	if (__predict_false(nist_ctr_drbg_generate(&cprng->cs_drbg, buffer,
368 		    bytes, &cc, sizeof(cc))))
369 		panic("cprng %s: NIST CTR_DRBG failed", cprng->cs_name);
370 
371 	/*
372 	 * If we've been seeing a lot of use, ask for some fresh
373 	 * entropy soon.
374 	 */
375 	if (__predict_false(nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_advised_p(&cprng->cs_drbg)))
376 		rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink);
377 
378 	/*
379 	 * If we just exhausted the generator, inform the next user
380 	 * that we need a reseed.
381 	 */
382 	if (__predict_false(nist_ctr_drbg_reseed_needed_p(&cprng->cs_drbg))) {
383 		cprng->cs_ready = false;
384 		rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink); /* paranoia */
385 	}
386 }
387 
388 /*
389  * Reseed with whatever we can get from the system entropy pool right now.
390  */
391 static void
392 cprng_strong_reseed(struct cprng_strong *cprng)
393 {
394 	uint8_t seed[NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES];
395 
396 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
397 
398 	const bool full_entropy = rndsink_request(cprng->cs_rndsink, seed,
399 	    sizeof(seed));
400 	cprng_strong_reseed_from(cprng, seed, sizeof(seed), full_entropy);
401 	explicit_memset(seed, 0, sizeof(seed));
402 }
403 
404 /*
405  * Reseed with the given seed.  If we now have full entropy, notify waiters.
406  */
407 static void
408 cprng_strong_reseed_from(struct cprng_strong *cprng,
409     const void *seed, size_t bytes, bool full_entropy)
410 {
411 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
412 
413 	KASSERT(bytes == NIST_BLOCK_KEYLEN_BYTES);
414 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
415 
416 	/*
417 	 * Notify anyone interested in the partiality of entropy in our
418 	 * seed -- anyone waiting for full entropy, or any system
419 	 * operators interested in knowing when the entropy pool is
420 	 * running on fumes.
421 	 */
422 	if (full_entropy) {
423 		if (!cprng->cs_ready) {
424 			cprng->cs_ready = true;
425 			cv_broadcast(&cprng->cs_cv);
426 			selnotify(&cprng->cs_selq, (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM),
427 			    NOTE_SUBMIT);
428 		}
429 	} else {
430 		/*
431 		 * XXX Is there is any harm in reseeding with partial
432 		 * entropy when we had full entropy before?  If so,
433 		 * remove the conditional on this message.
434 		 */
435 		if (!cprng->cs_ready &&
436 		    !ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_REKEY_ANY))
437 			printf("cprng %s: reseeding with partial entropy\n",
438 			    cprng->cs_name);
439 	}
440 
441 	if (nist_ctr_drbg_reseed(&cprng->cs_drbg, seed, bytes, &cc, sizeof(cc)))
442 		/* XXX Fix nist_ctr_drbg API so this can't happen.  */
443 		panic("cprng %s: NIST CTR_DRBG reseed failed", cprng->cs_name);
444 
445 #if DEBUG
446 	cprng_strong_rngtest(cprng);
447 #endif
448 }
449 
450 #if DEBUG
451 /*
452  * Generate some output and apply a statistical RNG test to it.
453  */
454 static void
455 cprng_strong_rngtest(struct cprng_strong *cprng)
456 {
457 
458 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
459 
460 	/* XXX Switch to a pool cache instead?  */
461 	rngtest_t *const rt = kmem_intr_alloc(sizeof(*rt), KM_NOSLEEP);
462 	if (rt == NULL)
463 		/* XXX Warn?  */
464 		return;
465 
466 	(void)strlcpy(rt->rt_name, cprng->cs_name, sizeof(rt->rt_name));
467 
468 	if (nist_ctr_drbg_generate(&cprng->cs_drbg, rt->rt_b, sizeof(rt->rt_b),
469 		NULL, 0))
470 		panic("cprng %s: NIST CTR_DRBG failed after reseed",
471 		    cprng->cs_name);
472 
473 	if (rngtest(rt)) {
474 		printf("cprng %s: failed statistical RNG test\n",
475 		    cprng->cs_name);
476 		/* XXX Not clear that this does any good...  */
477 		cprng->cs_ready = false;
478 		rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink);
479 	}
480 
481 	explicit_memset(rt, 0, sizeof(*rt)); /* paranoia */
482 	kmem_intr_free(rt, sizeof(*rt));
483 }
484 #endif
485 
486 /*
487  * Feed entropy from an rndsink request into the CPRNG for which the
488  * request was issued.
489  */
490 static void
491 cprng_strong_rndsink_callback(void *context, const void *seed, size_t bytes)
492 {
493 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = context;
494 
495 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
496 	/* Assume that rndsinks provide only full-entropy output.  */
497 	cprng_strong_reseed_from(cprng, seed, bytes, true);
498 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
499 }
500 
501 static cprng_strong_t *sysctl_prng;
502 
503 static int
504 makeprng(void)
505 {
506 
507 	/* can't create in cprng_init(), too early */
508 	sysctl_prng = cprng_strong_create("sysctl", IPL_NONE,
509 					  CPRNG_INIT_ANY|CPRNG_REKEY_ANY);
510 	return 0;
511 }
512 
513 /*
514  * sysctl helper routine for kern.urandom node. Picks a random number
515  * for you.
516  */
517 static int
518 sysctl_kern_urnd(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
519 {
520 	static ONCE_DECL(control);
521 	int v, rv;
522 
523 	RUN_ONCE(&control, makeprng);
524 	rv = cprng_strong(sysctl_prng, &v, sizeof(v), 0);
525 	if (rv == sizeof(v)) {
526 		struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
527 		node.sysctl_data = &v;
528 		return (sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node)));
529 	}
530 	else
531 		return (EIO);	/*XXX*/
532 }
533 
534 /*
535  * sysctl helper routine for kern.arandom node. Picks a random number
536  * for you.
537  */
538 static int
539 sysctl_kern_arnd(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
540 {
541 	int error;
542 	void *v;
543 	struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
544 
545 	if (*oldlenp == 0)
546 		return 0;
547 	/*
548 	 * This code used to allow sucking 8192 bytes at a time out
549 	 * of the kernel arc4random generator.  Evidently there is some
550 	 * very old OpenBSD application code that may try to do this.
551 	 *
552 	 * Note that this node is documented as type "INT" -- 4 or 8
553 	 * bytes, not 8192.
554 	 *
555 	 * We continue to support this abuse of the "len" pointer here
556 	 * but only 256 bytes at a time, as, anecdotally, the actual
557 	 * application use here was to generate RC4 keys in userspace.
558 	 *
559 	 * Support for such large requests will probably be removed
560 	 * entirely in the future.
561 	 */
562 	if (*oldlenp > 256)
563 		return E2BIG;
564 
565 	v = kmem_alloc(*oldlenp, KM_SLEEP);
566 	cprng_fast(v, *oldlenp);
567 	node.sysctl_data = v;
568 	node.sysctl_size = *oldlenp;
569 	error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
570 	kmem_free(v, *oldlenp);
571 	return error;
572 }
573