xref: /netbsd-src/external/bsd/file/dist/magic/magdir/pgp-binary-keys (revision 25f16eeab3cef3574b7944f484c90bae9f02e957)

#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# $File: pgp-binary-keys,v 1.1 2020/10/14 21:07:29 christos Exp $
# pgp-binary-keys: This file handles pgp binary keys.
#
# An PGP certificate or message doesn't have a fixed header.  Instead,
# they are sequences of packets:
#
#   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.3
#
# whose order conforms to a grammar:
#
#   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-11
#
# Happily most packets have a few fields that are constrained, which
# allow us to fingerprint them with relatively high certainty.
#
# A PGP packet is described by a single byte: the so-called CTB.  The
# high-bit is always set.  If bit 6 is set, then it is a so-called
# new-style CTB; if bit 6 is clear, then it is a so-called old-style
# CTB.  Old-style CTBs have only four bits of type information; bits
# 1-0 are used to describe the length.  New-style CTBs have 6 bits of
# type information.
#
# Following the CTB is the packet's length in bytes.  If we blindly
# advance the file cursor by this amount past the end of the length
# information we come to the next packet.
#
# Data Structures
# ===============
#
# New Style CTB
# -------------
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.2.2
#
#   76543210
#   ||\----/
#   ||  tag
#   |always 1
#   always 1
#
#      Tag   bits 7 and 6 set
#       0       0xC0        -- Reserved - a packet tag MUST NOT have this value
#       1       0xC1        -- Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
#       2       0xC2        -- Signature Packet
#       3       0xC3        -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
#       4       0xC4        -- One-Pass Signature Packet
#       5       0xC5        -- Secret-Key Packet
#       6       0xC6        -- Public-Key Packet
#       7       0xC7        -- Secret-Subkey Packet
#       8       0xC8        -- Compressed Data Packet
#       9       0xC9        -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
#       10      0xCA        -- Marker Packet
#       11      0xCB        -- Literal Data Packet
#       12      0xCC        -- Trust Packet
#       13      0xCD        -- User ID Packet
#       14      0xCE        -- Public-Subkey Packet
#       17      0xD1        -- User Attribute Packet
#       18      0xD2        -- Sym. Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet
#       19      0xD3        -- Modification Detection Code Packet
#       60 to 63 -- Private or Experimental Values
#
# The CTB is followed by the length header, which is densely encoded:
#
#   if length[0] is:
#     0..191: one byte length (length[0])
#     192..223: two byte length ((length[0] - 192) * 256 + length[2] + 192
#     224..254: four byte length (big endian interpretation of length[1..5])
#     255: partial body encoding
#
# The partial body encoding is similar to HTTP's chunk encoding.  It
# is only allowed for container packets (SEIP, Compressed Data and
# Literal).
#
# Old Style CTB
# -------------
#
#  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.2.1
#
# CTB:
#
#   76543210
#   ||\--/\/
#   ||  |  length encoding
#   ||  tag
#   |always 0
#   always 1
#
# Tag:
#
#      Tag   bit 7 set, bits 6, 1, 0 clear
#       0       0x80        -- Reserved - a packet tag MUST NOT have this value
#       1       0x84        -- Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
#       2       0x88        -- Signature Packet
#       3       0x8C        -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
#       4       0x90        -- One-Pass Signature Packet
#       5       0x94        -- Secret-Key Packet
#       6       0x98        -- Public-Key Packet
#       7       0x9C        -- Secret-Subkey Packet
#       8       0xA0        -- Compressed Data Packet
#       9       0xA4        -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
#       10      0xA8        -- Marker Packet
#       11      0xAC        -- Literal Data Packet
#       12      0xB0        -- Trust Packet
#       13      0xB4        -- User ID Packet
#       14      0xB8        -- Public-Subkey Packet
#
# Length encoding:
#
#     Value
#       0      1 byte length (following byte is the length)
#       1      2 byte length (following two bytes are the length)
#       2      4 byte length (following four bytes are the length)
#       3      indeterminate length: natural end of packet, e.g., EOF
#
# An indeterminate length is only allowed for container packets
# (SEIP, Compressed Data and Literal).
#
# Certificates
# ------------
#
# We check the first three packets to determine if a sequence of
# OpenPGP packets is likely to be a certificate.  The grammar allows
# the following prefixes:
#
#   [Primary Key] [SIG] (EOF or another certificate)
#   [Primary Key] [SIG]            [User ID]        [SIG]...
#   [Primary Key] [SIG]            [User Attribute] [SIG]...
#   [Primary Key] [SIG]            [Subkey]         [SIG]...
#   [Primary Key] [User ID]        [SIG]...
#   [Primary Key] [User Attribute] [SIG]...
#   [Primary Key] [Subkey]         [SIG]...
#
# Any number of marker packets are also allowed between each packet,
# but they are not normally used and we don't currently check for
# them.
#
# The keys and subkeys may be public or private.
#

# Key packets and signature packets are versioned.  There are two
# packet versions that we need to worry about in practice: v3 and v4.
# v4 packets were introduced in RFC 2440, which was published in 1998.
# It also deprecated v3 packets.  There are no actively used v3
# certificates (GnuPG removed the code to support them in November
# 2014).  But there are v3 keys lying around and it is useful to
# identify them.  The next version of OpenPGP will introduce v5 keys.
# The document has not yet been standardized so changes are still
# possible.  But, for our purposes, it appears that v5 data structures
# will be identical to v4 data structures modulo the version number.
#
#   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2440
#   https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q4/000358.html
#   https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-09.html#name-key-material-packet




# The first packet has to be a public key or a secret key.
#
# New-Style Public Key
0	ubyte			=0xC6	OpenPGP Public Key
>&0	use			primary_key_length_new
# New-Style Secret Key
0	ubyte			=0xC5	OpenPGP Secret Key
>&0	use			primary_key_length_new
# Old-Style Public Key
0	ubyte&0xFC		=0x98	OpenPGP Public Key
>&-1	use			primary_key_length_old
# Old-Style Secret Key
0	ubyte&0xFC		=0x94	OpenPGP Secret Key
>&-1	use			primary_key_length_old

# Parse the length, check the packet's body and finally advance to the
# next packet.

# There are 4 different new-style length encodings, but the partial
# body encoding is only acceptable for the SEIP, Compressed Data, and
# Literal packets, which isn't valid for any packets in a certificate
# so we ignore it.
0		name		primary_key_length_new
>&0		ubyte		<192
#>>&0		ubyte		x		(1 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&0		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-1.B)	use		sig_or_component_1
>&0		ubyte		>191
>>&-1		ubyte		<225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192)
# = 48960
#>>>&0		ubeshort		x	(2 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&1		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>>&(&-2.S-48960)	use	sig_or_component_1
>&0		ubyte		=255
#>>&0   	belong		x		(5 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&4		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-4.L)	use		sig_or_component_1
# Partial body encoding (only valid for container packets).
# >&0		ubyte	>224
# >>&0		ubyte		<255		partial body encoding

# There are 4 different old-style length encodings, but the
# indeterminate length encoding is only acceptable for the SEIP,
# Compressed Data, and Literal packets, which isn't valid for any
# packets in a certificate.
0		name		primary_key_length_old
#>&0		ubyte		x		(ctb: %x)
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=0
#>>&0    	ubyte		x		(1 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&1		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-1.B)	use		sig_or_component_1
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=1
#>>&0    	ubeshort	x		(2 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&2		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-2.S)	use		sig_or_component_1
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=2
#>>&0    	ubelong	x		(4 byte length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&4		use		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
>>>&(&-4.L)	use		sig_or_component_1

# Check the Key.
#
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.2
0		name		pgp_binary_key_pk_check
# Valid versions are: 2, 3, 4.  5 is proposed in RFC 4880bis.
# Anticipate a v6 / v7 format that like v5 is compatible with v4.
# key format in a decade or so :D.
>&0		ubyte		>1
>>&-1		ubyte		<8
>>>&-1		byte		x		Version %d
# Check that keys were created after 1990.
# (1990 - 1970) * 365.2524 * 24 * 60 * 60 = 631156147
>>>&0		bedate		>631156147      \b, Created %s
>>>>&-5		ubyte		>3
>>>>>&4		use		pgp_binary_key_algo
>>>>&-5		ubyte		<4
>>>>>&6		use		pgp_binary_key_algo

# Print out the key's algorithm and the number of bits, if this is
# relevant (ECC keys are a fixed size).
0		name		pgp_binary_key_algo
>0		clear		x
>&0		ubyte		=1	\b, RSA (Encrypt or Sign,
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b %d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=2	\b, RSA (Encrypt,
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b %d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=3	\b, RSA (Sign,
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b %d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=16	\b, El Gamal (Encrypt,
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b %d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=17	\b, DSA
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b (%d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=18	\b, ECDH
>&0		ubyte		=19	\b, ECDSA
>&0		ubyte		=20	\b, El Gamal (Encrypt or Sign,
>>&0		ubeshort	x	\b %d bits)
>&0		ubyte		=22	\b, EdDSA
>&0		default         x
>>&0		ubyte		x	\b, Unknown Algorithm (0x%x)

# Match all possible second packets.
0	name		sig_or_component_1
#>0	ubyte		x	(ctb: %x)
>&0	ubyte		=0xC2
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Signature
>>&0	use		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xCD
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User ID
>>&0	use		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xCE
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Public Subkey
>>&0	use		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xC7
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Secret Subkey
>>&0	use		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xD1
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User Attribute
>>&0	use		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0x88
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Signature
>>&-1	use		sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0xB4
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User ID
>>&-1	use		sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0xB8
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Public Subkey
>>&-1	use		sig_or_component_1_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0x9C
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Secret Subkey
>>&-1	use		sig_or_component_1_length_old

# Copy of 'primary_key_length_new', but calls cert_packet_3.
0		name		sig_or_component_1_length_new
>&0		ubyte		<192
#>>&0		ubyte		x		(1 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-1.B)	use		cert_packet_3
>&0		ubyte		>191
>>&-1		ubyte		<225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 + 1 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192 - 1)
# = 48959
#>>>&-1		ubeshort		x	(2 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&(&-1.S-48959)	use	cert_packet_3
>&0		ubyte		=255
#>>&0   	belong		x		(5 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-4.L)	use		cert_packet_3
# Partial body encoding (only valid for container packets).
# >&0		ubyte	>224
# >>&0		ubyte		<255		partial body encoding

0		name		sig_or_component_1_length_old
#>&0		ubyte		x		(ctb: %x)
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=0
#>>&0    	ubyte		x		(1 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.B+1)	use		cert_packet_3
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=1
#>>&0    	ubeshort	x		(2 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.S+2)	use		cert_packet_3
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=2
#>>&0    	ubelong	x		(4 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.L+4)	use		cert_packet_3

# Copy of above.
0	name		cert_packet_3
#>0	ubyte		x	(ctb: %x)
>&0	ubyte		=0xC2
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Signature
>>&0	use		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xCD
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User ID
>>&0	use		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xCE
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Public Subkey
>>&0	use		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xC7
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Secret Subkey
>>&0	use		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0	ubyte		=0xD1
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User Attribute
>>&0	use		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0x88
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Signature
>>&-1	use		cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0xB4
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; User ID
>>&-1	use		cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0xB8
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Public Subkey
>>&-1	use		cert_packet_3_length_old
>&0	ubyte&0xFC	=0x9C
>>0	ubyte		x	\b; Secret Subkey
>>&-1	use		cert_packet_3_length_old

# Copy of above.
0		name		cert_packet_3_length_new
>&0		ubyte		<192
#>>&0		ubyte		x		(1 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-1.B)	use		pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0		ubyte		>191
>>&-1		ubyte		<225
# offset = ((offset[0] - 192) << 8) + offset[1] + 192 + 1 (for the length header)
# raw - (192 * 256 - 192 - 1)
# = 48959
#>>>&-1		ubeshort		x	(2 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>>&(&-1.S-48959)	use	pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0		ubyte		=255
#>>&0   	belong		x		(5 byte new length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&-4.L)	use		pgp_binary_keys_end

0		name		cert_packet_3_length_old
#>&0		ubyte		x		(ctb: %x)
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=0
#>>&0    	ubyte		x		(1 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.B+1)	use		pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=1
#>>&0    	ubeshort	x		(2 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.S+2)	use		pgp_binary_keys_end
>&0		ubyte&0x3	=2
#>>&0    	ubelong	x		(4 byte old length encoding, %d bytes)
>>&(&0.L+4)	use		pgp_binary_keys_end

# We managed to parse the first three packets of the certificate.  Declare
# victory.
0		name		pgp_binary_keys_end
>0		byte		x		\b; OpenPGP Certificate
!:mime		application/pgp-keys
!:ext		pgp/gpg/pkr/asd