xref: /netbsd-src/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/clientloop.c (revision 181254a7b1bdde6873432bffef2d2decc4b5c22f)
1 /*	$NetBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.29 2020/05/28 17:05:49 christos Exp $	*/
2 /* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.344 2020/04/24 02:19:40 dtucker Exp $ */
3 /*
4  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
5  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
6  *                    All rights reserved
7  * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
8  *
9  * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
10  * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
11  * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
12  * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
13  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
14  *
15  *
16  * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
17  *
18  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
19  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
20  * are met:
21  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
22  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
23  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
24  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
25  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
26  *
27  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
28  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
29  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
30  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
31  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
32  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
33  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
34  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
35  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
36  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
37  *
38  *
39  * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
40  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
41  *
42  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
43  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
44  * are met:
45  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
46  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
47  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
48  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
49  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
50  *
51  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
52  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
53  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
54  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
55  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
56  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
57  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
58  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
59  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
60  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
61  */
62 
63 #include "includes.h"
64 __RCSID("$NetBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.29 2020/05/28 17:05:49 christos Exp $");
65 
66 #include <sys/types.h>
67 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
68 #include <sys/stat.h>
69 #include <sys/socket.h>
70 #include <sys/time.h>
71 #include <sys/queue.h>
72 
73 #include <ctype.h>
74 #include <errno.h>
75 #include <paths.h>
76 #include <signal.h>
77 #include <stdio.h>
78 #include <stdlib.h>
79 #include <string.h>
80 #include <stdarg.h>
81 #include <termios.h>
82 #include <pwd.h>
83 #include <unistd.h>
84 #include <limits.h>
85 
86 #include "xmalloc.h"
87 #include "ssh.h"
88 #include "ssh2.h"
89 #include "packet.h"
90 #include "sshbuf.h"
91 #include "compat.h"
92 #include "channels.h"
93 #include "dispatch.h"
94 #include "sshkey.h"
95 #include "cipher.h"
96 #include "kex.h"
97 #include "myproposal.h"
98 #include "log.h"
99 #include "misc.h"
100 #include "readconf.h"
101 #include "clientloop.h"
102 #include "sshconnect.h"
103 #include "authfd.h"
104 #include "atomicio.h"
105 #include "sshpty.h"
106 #include "match.h"
107 #include "msg.h"
108 #include "getpeereid.h"
109 #include "ssherr.h"
110 #include "hostfile.h"
111 
112 /* import options */
113 extern Options options;
114 
115 /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
116 extern int stdin_null_flag;
117 
118 /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
119 extern int no_shell_flag;
120 
121 /* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */
122 extern int fork_after_authentication_flag;
123 
124 /* Control socket */
125 extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
126 
127 /*
128  * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
129  * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
130  * configuration file.
131  */
132 extern char *host;
133 
134 /*
135  * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different
136  * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
137  */
138 extern char *forward_agent_sock_path;
139 
140 /*
141  * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
142  * not yet been processed.  This will cause a message indicating the new
143  * window size to be sent to the server a little later.  This is volatile
144  * because this is updated in a signal handler.
145  */
146 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
147 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
148 
149 /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
150 static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
151 
152 /* Common data for the client loop code. */
153 volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
154 static int last_was_cr;		/* Last character was a newline. */
155 static int exit_status;		/* Used to store the command exit status. */
156 static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer;	/* Used for final exit message. */
157 static int connection_in;	/* Connection to server (input). */
158 static int connection_out;	/* Connection to server (output). */
159 static int need_rekeying;	/* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
160 static int session_closed;	/* In SSH2: login session closed. */
161 static u_int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
162 
163 static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
164 int	session_ident = -1;
165 
166 /* Track escape per proto2 channel */
167 struct escape_filter_ctx {
168 	int escape_pending;
169 	int escape_char;
170 };
171 
172 /* Context for channel confirmation replies */
173 struct channel_reply_ctx {
174 	const char *request_type;
175 	int id;
176 	enum confirm_action action;
177 };
178 
179 /* Global request success/failure callbacks */
180 /* XXX move to struct ssh? */
181 struct global_confirm {
182 	TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
183 	global_confirm_cb *cb;
184 	void *ctx;
185 	int ref_count;
186 };
187 TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
188 static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
189     TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
190 
191 void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *);
192 
193 /*
194  * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH).  This just sets a
195  * flag indicating that the window has changed.
196  */
197 /*ARGSUSED */
198 static void
199 window_change_handler(int sig)
200 {
201 	received_window_change_signal = 1;
202 }
203 
204 /*
205  * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate.  These
206  * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
207  */
208 /*ARGSUSED */
209 static void
210 signal_handler(int sig)
211 {
212 	received_signal = sig;
213 	quit_pending = 1;
214 }
215 
216 /*
217  * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
218  * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
219  * ControlPersist timeout.  Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
220  * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
221  */
222 static void
223 set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh)
224 {
225 	if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
226 	    || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
227 		/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
228 		control_persist_exit_time = 0;
229 	} else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) {
230 		/* some client connections are still open */
231 		if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
232 			debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
233 		control_persist_exit_time = 0;
234 	} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
235 		/* a client connection has recently closed */
236 		control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
237 			(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
238 		debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
239 		    options.control_persist_timeout);
240 	}
241 	/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
242 }
243 
244 #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
245 static int
246 client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
247 {
248 	size_t i, dlen;
249 
250 	if (display == NULL)
251 		return 0;
252 
253 	dlen = strlen(display);
254 	for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
255 		if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
256 		    strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
257 			debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
258 			return 0;
259 		}
260 	}
261 	return 1;
262 }
263 
264 #define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
265 #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
266 int
267 client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display,
268     const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout,
269     char **_proto, char **_data)
270 {
271 	char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512];
272 	char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
273 	static char proto[512], data[512];
274 	FILE *f;
275 	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r;
276 	struct stat st;
277 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
278 
279 	*_proto = proto;
280 	*_data = data;
281 	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
282 
283 	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
284 		if (display != NULL)
285 			logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
286 			    display);
287 		return -1;
288 	}
289 	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
290 		debug("No xauth program.");
291 		xauth_path = NULL;
292 	}
293 
294 	if (xauth_path != NULL) {
295 		/*
296 		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
297 		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
298 		 * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
299 		 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
300 		 *      is not perfect.
301 		 */
302 		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
303 			if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
304 			    display + 10)) < 0 ||
305 			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
306 				error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
307 				return -1;
308 			}
309 			display = xdisplay;
310 		}
311 		if (trusted == 0) {
312 			/*
313 			 * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
314 			 *
315 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
316 			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
317 			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
318 			 */
319 			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
320 			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
321 				error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
322 				    __func__, strerror(errno));
323 				return -1;
324 			}
325 			do_unlink = 1;
326 			if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
327 			    "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
328 			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
329 				error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
330 				rmdir(xauthdir);
331 				return -1;
332 			}
333 
334 			if (timeout == 0) {
335 				/* auth doesn't time out */
336 				xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
337 				    "untrusted 2>%s",
338 				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
339 				    SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL);
340 			} else {
341 				/* Add some slack to requested expiry */
342 				if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
343 					x11_timeout_real = timeout +
344 					    X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
345 				else {
346 					/* Don't overflow on long timeouts */
347 					x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
348 				}
349 				xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
350 				    "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s",
351 				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
352 				    SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real,
353 				    _PATH_DEVNULL);
354 			}
355 			debug2("%s: xauth command: %s", __func__, cmd);
356 
357 			if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) {
358 				now = monotime() + 1;
359 				if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
360 					x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
361 				else
362 					x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
363 				channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh,
364 				    x11_refuse_time);
365 			}
366 			if (system(cmd) == 0)
367 				generated = 1;
368 			free(cmd);
369 		}
370 
371 		/*
372 		 * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
373 		 * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
374 		 * above.
375 		 */
376 		if (trusted || generated) {
377 			xasprintf(&cmd,
378 			    "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
379 			    xauth_path,
380 			    generated ? "-f " : "" ,
381 			    generated ? xauthfile : "",
382 			    display);
383 			debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
384 			f = popen(cmd, "r");
385 			if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
386 			    sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
387 				got_data = 1;
388 			if (f)
389 				pclose(f);
390 			free(cmd);
391 		}
392 	}
393 
394 	if (do_unlink) {
395 		unlink(xauthfile);
396 		rmdir(xauthdir);
397 	}
398 
399 	/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
400 	if (!trusted && !got_data) {
401 		error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
402 		    "xauth key data not generated");
403 		return -1;
404 	}
405 
406 	/*
407 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
408 	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
409 	 * response anyway, and substitute this data.  The X11
410 	 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
411 	 * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
412 	 * for the local connection.
413 	 */
414 	if (!got_data) {
415 		u_int8_t rnd[16];
416 		u_int i;
417 
418 		logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
419 		    "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
420 		strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
421 		arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
422 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) {
423 			snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
424 			    rnd[i]);
425 		}
426 	}
427 
428 	return 0;
429 }
430 
431 /*
432  * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
433  * the server if so.  The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
434  * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
435  * appropriate.
436  */
437 
438 static void
439 client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh)
440 {
441 	if (!received_window_change_signal)
442 		return;
443 	received_window_change_signal = 0;
444 	debug2("%s: changed", __func__);
445 	channel_send_window_changes(ssh);
446 }
447 
448 static int
449 client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
450 {
451 	struct global_confirm *gc;
452 
453 	if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
454 		return 0;
455 	if (gc->cb != NULL)
456 		gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx);
457 	if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
458 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
459 		freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
460 	}
461 
462 	ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
463 	return 0;
464 }
465 
466 static void
467 server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
468 {
469 	int r;
470 
471 	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) {
472 		logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
473 		cleanup_exit(255);
474 	}
475 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
476 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
477 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||		/* boolean: want reply */
478 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
479 		fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
480 	/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
481 	client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
482 }
483 
484 /*
485  * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
486  * one of the file descriptors).
487  */
488 static void
489 client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
490     fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
491     int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
492 {
493 	struct timeval tv, *tvp;
494 	int timeout_secs;
495 	time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
496 	int r, ret;
497 
498 	/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
499 	channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
500 	    nallocp, &minwait_secs);
501 
502 	/* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
503 	if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) &&
504 	    !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
505 		/* clear mask since we did not call select() */
506 		memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
507 		memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
508 		return;
509 	}
510 
511 	FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
512 
513 	/* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
514 	if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
515 		FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
516 
517 	/*
518 	 * Wait for something to happen.  This will suspend the process until
519 	 * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
520 	 * event pending, or a timeout expires.
521 	 */
522 
523 	timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
524 	if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
525 		timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
526 		server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
527 	}
528 	if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying)
529 		timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
530 		    ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
531 	set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh);
532 	if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
533 		timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
534 			control_persist_exit_time - now);
535 		if (timeout_secs < 0)
536 			timeout_secs = 0;
537 	}
538 	if (minwait_secs != 0)
539 		timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
540 	if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
541 		tvp = NULL;
542 	else {
543 		tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
544 		tv.tv_usec = 0;
545 		tvp = &tv;
546 	}
547 
548 	ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
549 	if (ret == -1) {
550 		/*
551 		 * We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
552 		 * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
553 		 * set by the signal handlers.
554 		 */
555 		memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
556 		memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
557 
558 		if (errno == EINTR)
559 			return;
560 		/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
561 		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
562 		    "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0)
563 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
564 		quit_pending = 1;
565 	} else if (ret == 0) {
566 		/*
567 		 * Timeout.  Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
568 		 * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
569 		 */
570 		if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
571 			server_alive_check(ssh);
572 	}
573 
574 }
575 
576 static void
577 client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr)
578 {
579 	/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
580 	if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0)
581 		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout),
582 		    sshbuf_len(bout));
583 	if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0)
584 		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr),
585 		    sshbuf_len(berr));
586 
587 	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
588 
589 	sshbuf_reset(bin);
590 	sshbuf_reset(bout);
591 	sshbuf_reset(berr);
592 
593 	/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
594 	kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
595 
596 	/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
597 	received_window_change_signal = 1;
598 
599 	enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
600 }
601 
602 static void
603 client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset)
604 {
605 	char buf[8192];
606 	int r, len;
607 
608 	/*
609 	 * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
610 	 * the packet subsystem.
611 	 */
612 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
613 		/* Read as much as possible. */
614 		len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
615 		if (len == 0) {
616 			/*
617 			 * Received EOF.  The remote host has closed the
618 			 * connection.
619 			 */
620 			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
621 			    "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
622 			    host)) != 0)
623 				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
624 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
625 			quit_pending = 1;
626 			return;
627 		}
628 		/*
629 		 * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
630 		 * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
631 		 */
632 		if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
633 			len = 0;
634 
635 		if (len == -1) {
636 			/*
637 			 * An error has encountered.  Perhaps there is a
638 			 * network problem.
639 			 */
640 			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
641 			    "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
642 			    host, strerror(errno))) != 0)
643 				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
644 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
645 			quit_pending = 1;
646 			return;
647 		}
648 		ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len);
649 	}
650 }
651 
652 static void
653 client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
654 {
655 	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
656 	char errmsg[256];
657 	int r, tochan;
658 
659 	/*
660 	 * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
661 	 * one is fatal.
662 	 */
663 	if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
664 	    (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
665 	    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
666 		cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
667 
668 	/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
669 	tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
670 	    c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
671 
672 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
673 		debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
674 		    cr->request_type, c->self);
675 	} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
676 		if (tochan) {
677 			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
678 			    "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
679 		} else {
680 			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
681 			    "%s request failed on channel %d",
682 			    cr->request_type, c->self);
683 		}
684 		/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
685 		if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
686 			fatal("%s", errmsg);
687 		/*
688 		 * If error occurred on mux client, append to
689 		 * their stderr.
690 		 */
691 		if (tochan) {
692 			if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg,
693 			    strlen(errmsg))) != 0)
694 				fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__,
695 				    ssh_err(r));
696 		} else
697 			error("%s", errmsg);
698 		if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
699 			/*
700 			 * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
701 			 * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
702 			 */
703 			if (c->self == session_ident)
704 				leave_raw_mode(0);
705 			else
706 				mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c);
707 		} else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
708 			chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
709 			chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
710 		}
711 	}
712 	free(cr);
713 }
714 
715 static void
716 client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx)
717 {
718 	free(ctx);
719 }
720 
721 void
722 client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request,
723     enum confirm_action action)
724 {
725 	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
726 
727 	cr->request_type = request;
728 	cr->action = action;
729 
730 	channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm,
731 	    client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
732 }
733 
734 void
735 client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
736 {
737 	struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
738 
739 	/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
740 	last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
741 	if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
742 		if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
743 			fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
744 			    __func__, last_gc->ref_count);
745 		return;
746 	}
747 
748 	gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
749 	gc->cb = cb;
750 	gc->ctx = ctx;
751 	gc->ref_count = 1;
752 	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
753 }
754 
755 static void
756 process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
757 {
758 	void (*handler)(int);
759 	char *s, *cmd;
760 	int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
761 	struct Forward fwd;
762 
763 	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
764 
765 	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
766 	handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
767 	cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
768 	if (s == NULL)
769 		goto out;
770 	while (isspace((u_char)*s))
771 		s++;
772 	if (*s == '-')
773 		s++;	/* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
774 	if (*s == '\0')
775 		goto out;
776 
777 	if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
778 		logit("Commands:");
779 		logit("      -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
780 		    "Request local forward");
781 		logit("      -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
782 		    "Request remote forward");
783 		logit("      -D[bind_address:]port                  "
784 		    "Request dynamic forward");
785 		logit("      -KL[bind_address:]port                 "
786 		    "Cancel local forward");
787 		logit("      -KR[bind_address:]port                 "
788 		    "Cancel remote forward");
789 		logit("      -KD[bind_address:]port                 "
790 		    "Cancel dynamic forward");
791 		if (!options.permit_local_command)
792 			goto out;
793 		logit("      !args                                  "
794 		    "Execute local command");
795 		goto out;
796 	}
797 
798 	if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
799 		s++;
800 		ssh_local_cmd(s);
801 		goto out;
802 	}
803 
804 	if (*s == 'K') {
805 		delete = 1;
806 		s++;
807 	}
808 	if (*s == 'L')
809 		local = 1;
810 	else if (*s == 'R')
811 		remote = 1;
812 	else if (*s == 'D')
813 		dynamic = 1;
814 	else {
815 		logit("Invalid command.");
816 		goto out;
817 	}
818 
819 	while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
820 		;
821 
822 	/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
823 	if (delete) {
824 		/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
825 		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
826 			logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
827 			goto out;
828 		}
829 		if (remote)
830 			ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0;
831 		else if (dynamic)
832 			ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
833 			    0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
834 		else
835 			ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
836 			    CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
837 			    &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
838 		if (!ok) {
839 			logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
840 			goto out;
841 		}
842 		logit("Canceled forwarding.");
843 	} else {
844 		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
845 			logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
846 			goto out;
847 		}
848 		if (local || dynamic) {
849 			if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
850 			    &options.fwd_opts)) {
851 				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
852 				goto out;
853 			}
854 		} else {
855 			if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) {
856 				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
857 				goto out;
858 			}
859 		}
860 		logit("Forwarding port.");
861 	}
862 
863 out:
864 	ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler);
865 	enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
866 	free(cmd);
867 	free(fwd.listen_host);
868 	free(fwd.listen_path);
869 	free(fwd.connect_host);
870 	free(fwd.connect_path);
871 }
872 
873 /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
874 #define SUPPRESS_NEVER		0	/* never suppress, always show */
875 #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT	1	/* don't show in mux client sessions */
876 #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER	2	/* don't show in mux master sessions */
877 #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG		4	/* don't show when logging to syslog */
878 struct escape_help_text {
879 	const char *cmd;
880 	const char *text;
881 	unsigned int flags;
882 };
883 static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
884     {".",  "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
885     {".",  "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
886 	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
887     {"B",  "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
888     {"C",  "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
889     {"R",  "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
890     {"V/v",  "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
891     {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
892     {"#",  "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
893     {"&",  "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
894 	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
895     {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
896 };
897 
898 static void
899 print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client,
900     int using_stderr)
901 {
902 	unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
903 	int r;
904 
905 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
906 	    "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0)
907 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
908 
909 	suppress_flags =
910 	    (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
911 	    (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
912 	    (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
913 
914 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
915 		if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
916 			continue;
917 		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
918 		    escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0)
919 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
920 	}
921 
922 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
923 	    " %c%c   - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
924 	    "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
925 	    "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0)
926 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
927 }
928 
929 /*
930  * Process the characters one by one.
931  */
932 static int
933 process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
934     struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr,
935     const char *buf, int len)
936 {
937 	pid_t pid;
938 	int r, bytes = 0;
939 	u_int i;
940 	u_char ch;
941 	char *s;
942 	struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ?
943 	    NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
944 
945 	if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
946 		return 0;
947 
948 	if (len <= 0)
949 		return (0);
950 
951 	for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
952 		/* Get one character at a time. */
953 		ch = buf[i];
954 
955 		if (efc->escape_pending) {
956 			/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
957 			/* Clear the flag now. */
958 			efc->escape_pending = 0;
959 
960 			/* Process the escaped character. */
961 			switch (ch) {
962 			case '.':
963 				/* Terminate the connection. */
964 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n",
965 				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
966 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
967 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
968 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
969 					chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
970 					chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
971 					if (c->detach_user) {
972 						c->detach_user(ssh,
973 						    c->self, NULL);
974 					}
975 					c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
976 					sshbuf_reset(c->input);
977 					chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
978 					return 0;
979 				} else
980 					quit_pending = 1;
981 				return -1;
982 
983 			case 'Z' - 64:
984 				/* XXX support this for mux clients */
985 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
986 					char b[16];
987  noescape:
988 					if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
989 						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
990 					else
991 						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
992 					if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
993 					    "%c%s escape not available to "
994 					    "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
995 					    efc->escape_char, b)) != 0)
996 						fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
997 						    __func__, ssh_err(r));
998 					continue;
999 				}
1000 				/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
1001 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
1002 				    "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n",
1003 				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
1004 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1005 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1006 
1007 				/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
1008 				client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
1009 
1010 				/* We have been continued. */
1011 				continue;
1012 
1013 			case 'B':
1014 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
1015 				    "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
1016 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1017 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1018 				channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0);
1019 				if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 ||
1020 				    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
1021 					fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__,
1022 					    ssh_err(r));
1023 				continue;
1024 
1025 			case 'R':
1026 				if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
1027 					logit("Server does not "
1028 					    "support re-keying");
1029 				else
1030 					need_rekeying = 1;
1031 				continue;
1032 
1033 			case 'V':
1034 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
1035 			case 'v':
1036 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
1037 					goto noescape;
1038 				if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
1039 					if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
1040 					    "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
1041 					    efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0)
1042 						fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1043 						    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1044 					continue;
1045 				}
1046 				if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
1047 				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
1048 					log_change_level(--options.log_level);
1049 				if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
1050 				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
1051 					log_change_level(++options.log_level);
1052 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
1053 				    "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n",
1054 				    efc->escape_char, ch,
1055 				    log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0)
1056 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1057 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1058 				continue;
1059 
1060 			case '&':
1061 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
1062 					goto noescape;
1063 				/*
1064 				 * Detach the program (continue to serve
1065 				 * connections, but put in background and no
1066 				 * more new connections).
1067 				 */
1068 				/* Restore tty modes. */
1069 				leave_raw_mode(
1070 				    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
1071 
1072 				/* Stop listening for new connections. */
1073 				channel_stop_listening(ssh);
1074 
1075 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
1076 				    "%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char))
1077 				     != 0)
1078 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1079 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1080 
1081 				/* Fork into background. */
1082 				pid = fork();
1083 				if (pid == -1) {
1084 					error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1085 					continue;
1086 				}
1087 				if (pid != 0) {	/* This is the parent. */
1088 					/* The parent just exits. */
1089 					exit(0);
1090 				}
1091 				/* The child continues serving connections. */
1092 				/* fake EOF on stdin */
1093 				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0)
1094 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1095 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1096 				return -1;
1097 			case '?':
1098 				print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char,
1099 				    (c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
1100 				    log_is_on_stderr());
1101 				continue;
1102 
1103 			case '#':
1104 				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n",
1105 				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
1106 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1107 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1108 				s = channel_open_message(ssh);
1109 				if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
1110 					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1111 					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1112 				free(s);
1113 				continue;
1114 
1115 			case 'C':
1116 				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
1117 					goto noescape;
1118 				process_cmdline(ssh);
1119 				continue;
1120 
1121 			default:
1122 				if (ch != efc->escape_char) {
1123 					if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin,
1124 					    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
1125 						fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1126 						    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1127 					bytes++;
1128 				}
1129 				/* Escaped characters fall through here */
1130 				break;
1131 			}
1132 		} else {
1133 			/*
1134 			 * The previous character was not an escape char.
1135 			 * Check if this is an escape.
1136 			 */
1137 			if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) {
1138 				/*
1139 				 * It is. Set the flag and continue to
1140 				 * next character.
1141 				 */
1142 				efc->escape_pending = 1;
1143 				continue;
1144 			}
1145 		}
1146 
1147 		/*
1148 		 * Normal character.  Record whether it was a newline,
1149 		 * and append it to the buffer.
1150 		 */
1151 		last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
1152 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0)
1153 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1154 		bytes++;
1155 	}
1156 	return bytes;
1157 }
1158 
1159 /*
1160  * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
1161  * there are packets available.
1162  *
1163  * Any unknown packets received during the actual
1164  * session cause the session to terminate.  This is
1165  * intended to make debugging easier since no
1166  * confirmations are sent.  Any compatible protocol
1167  * extensions must be negotiated during the
1168  * preparatory phase.
1169  */
1170 
1171 static void
1172 client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
1173 {
1174 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
1175 }
1176 
1177 /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
1178 
1179 /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
1180 void *
1181 client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
1182 {
1183 	struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
1184 
1185 	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
1186 	ret->escape_pending = 0;
1187 	ret->escape_char = escape_char;
1188 	return (void *)ret;
1189 }
1190 
1191 /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
1192 void
1193 client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx)
1194 {
1195 	free(ctx);
1196 }
1197 
1198 int
1199 client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *buf,
1200     int len)
1201 {
1202 	if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
1203 		return 0;
1204 
1205 	return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended,
1206 	    buf, len);
1207 }
1208 
1209 static void
1210 client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
1211 {
1212 	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
1213 	session_closed = 1;
1214 	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
1215 }
1216 
1217 /*
1218  * Implements the interactive session with the server.  This is called after
1219  * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
1220  * remote host.  If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
1221  * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
1222  */
1223 int
1224 client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
1225     int ssh2_chan_id)
1226 {
1227 	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
1228 	double start_time, total_time;
1229 	int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len;
1230 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
1231 	u_int nalloc = 0;
1232 	char buf[100];
1233 
1234 	debug("Entering interactive session.");
1235 
1236 #ifdef __OpenBSD__
1237 	if (options.control_master &&
1238 	    !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
1239 		debug("pledge: id");
1240 		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty",
1241 		    NULL) == -1)
1242 			fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1243 
1244 	} else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
1245 		debug("pledge: exec");
1246 		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
1247 		    NULL) == -1)
1248 			fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1249 
1250 	} else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
1251 		debug("pledge: filesystem full");
1252 		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
1253 		    NULL) == -1)
1254 			fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1255 
1256 	} else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
1257 	    fork_after_authentication_flag) {
1258 		debug("pledge: proc");
1259 		if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
1260 			fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1261 
1262 	} else {
1263 		debug("pledge: network");
1264 		if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
1265 			fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1266 	}
1267 #endif
1268 
1269 	start_time = monotime_double();
1270 
1271 	/* Initialize variables. */
1272 	last_was_cr = 1;
1273 	exit_status = -1;
1274 	connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
1275 	connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
1276 	max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
1277 
1278 	quit_pending = 0;
1279 
1280 	/* Initialize buffer. */
1281 	if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1282 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1283 
1284 	client_init_dispatch(ssh);
1285 
1286 	/*
1287 	 * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
1288 	 * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
1289 	 */
1290 	if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
1291 		ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
1292 	if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
1293 		ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
1294 	if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
1295 		ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
1296 	if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
1297 		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
1298 	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
1299 
1300 	if (have_pty)
1301 		enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
1302 
1303 	session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
1304 	if (session_ident != -1) {
1305 		if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
1306 			channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
1307 			    client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
1308 			    client_filter_cleanup,
1309 			    client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
1310 			    escape_char_arg));
1311 		}
1312 		channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident,
1313 		    client_channel_closed, 0);
1314 	}
1315 
1316 	/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
1317 	while (!quit_pending) {
1318 
1319 		/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
1320 		client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
1321 
1322 		if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh))
1323 			break;
1324 
1325 		if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
1326 			debug("rekeying in progress");
1327 		} else if (need_rekeying) {
1328 			/* manual rekey request */
1329 			debug("need rekeying");
1330 			if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
1331 				fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__,
1332 				    ssh_err(r));
1333 			need_rekeying = 0;
1334 		} else {
1335 			/*
1336 			 * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
1337 			 * enqueue them for sending to the server.
1338 			 */
1339 			if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
1340 				channel_output_poll(ssh);
1341 
1342 			/*
1343 			 * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
1344 			 * message about it to the server if so.
1345 			 */
1346 			client_check_window_change(ssh);
1347 
1348 			if (quit_pending)
1349 				break;
1350 		}
1351 		/*
1352 		 * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
1353 		 * available on one of the descriptors).
1354 		 */
1355 		max_fd2 = max_fd;
1356 		client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset,
1357 		    &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh));
1358 
1359 		if (quit_pending)
1360 			break;
1361 
1362 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
1363 		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
1364 			channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
1365 
1366 		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
1367 		client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
1368 
1369 		if (quit_pending)
1370 			break;
1371 
1372 		/*
1373 		 * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
1374 		 * sender.
1375 		 */
1376 		if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
1377 			if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) < 0) {
1378 				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
1379 				    "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__);
1380 			}
1381 		}
1382 
1383 		/*
1384 		 * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
1385 		 * timeout has expired without any active client
1386 		 * connections, then quit.
1387 		 */
1388 		if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
1389 			if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
1390 				debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
1391 				break;
1392 			}
1393 		}
1394 	}
1395 	free(readset);
1396 	free(writeset);
1397 
1398 	/* Terminate the session. */
1399 
1400 	/* Stop watching for window change. */
1401 	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
1402 
1403 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
1404 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 ||
1405 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 ||
1406 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||	/* language tag */
1407 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
1408 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) < 0)
1409 		fatal("%s: send disconnect: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1410 
1411 	channel_free_all(ssh);
1412 
1413 	if (have_pty)
1414 		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
1415 
1416 	/* restore blocking io */
1417 	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
1418 		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
1419 	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
1420 		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
1421 	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
1422 		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
1423 
1424 	/*
1425 	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
1426 	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
1427 	 * connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
1428 	 */
1429 	if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
1430 		received_signal = 0;
1431 		exit_status = 0;
1432 	}
1433 
1434 	if (received_signal) {
1435 		verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
1436 		cleanup_exit(0);
1437 	}
1438 
1439 	/*
1440 	 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
1441 	 * that the connection has been closed.
1442 	 */
1443 	if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
1444 		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
1445 		    "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0)
1446 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1447 	}
1448 
1449 	/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
1450 	if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) {
1451 		len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
1452 		    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(stderr_buffer),
1453 		    sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer));
1454 		if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer))
1455 			error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
1456 		else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0)
1457 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1458 	}
1459 
1460 	/* Clear and free any buffers. */
1461 	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
1462 	sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer);
1463 
1464 	/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
1465 	total_time = monotime_double() - start_time;
1466 	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
1467 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
1468 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
1469 	if (total_time > 0)
1470 		verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
1471 		    obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
1472 	/* Return the exit status of the program. */
1473 	debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
1474 	return exit_status;
1475 }
1476 
1477 /*********/
1478 
1479 static Channel *
1480 client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type,
1481     int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack)
1482 {
1483 	Channel *c = NULL;
1484 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
1485 	char *listen_address, *originator_address;
1486 	u_int listen_port, originator_port;
1487 	int r;
1488 
1489 	/* Get rest of the packet */
1490 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
1491 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 ||
1492 	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
1493 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
1494 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1495 		fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1496 
1497 	debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
1498 	    listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
1499 
1500 	if (listen_port > 0xffff)
1501 		error("%s: invalid listen port", __func__);
1502 	else if (originator_port > 0xffff)
1503 		error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
1504 	else {
1505 		c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh,
1506 		    listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip",
1507 		    originator_address);
1508 	}
1509 
1510 	if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
1511 		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
1512 			error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
1513 			goto out;
1514 		}
1515 		/* reconstruct and send to muxclient */
1516 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 ||	/* padlen */
1517 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
1518 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 ||
1519 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 ||
1520 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 ||
1521 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 ||
1522 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 ||
1523 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 ||
1524 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 ||
1525 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 ||
1526 		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) {
1527 			error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__,
1528 			    ssh_err(r));
1529 			goto out;
1530 		}
1531 	}
1532 
1533  out:
1534 	sshbuf_free(b);
1535 	free(originator_address);
1536 	free(listen_address);
1537 	return c;
1538 }
1539 
1540 static Channel *
1541 client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh,
1542     const char *request_type, int rchan)
1543 {
1544 	Channel *c = NULL;
1545 	char *listen_path;
1546 	int r;
1547 
1548 	/* Get the remote path. */
1549 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 ||
1550 	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* reserved */
1551 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1552 		fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1553 
1554 	debug("%s: request: %s", __func__, listen_path);
1555 
1556 	c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path,
1557 	    "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
1558 	free(listen_path);
1559 	return c;
1560 }
1561 
1562 static Channel *
1563 client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
1564 {
1565 	Channel *c = NULL;
1566 	char *originator;
1567 	u_int originator_port;
1568 	int r, sock;
1569 
1570 	if (!options.forward_x11) {
1571 		error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
1572 		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
1573 		    "malicious server.");
1574 		return NULL;
1575 	}
1576 	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
1577 		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
1578 		    "expired");
1579 		return NULL;
1580 	}
1581 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
1582 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
1583 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1584 		fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1585 	/* XXX check permission */
1586 	/* XXX range check originator port? */
1587 	debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator,
1588 	    originator_port);
1589 	free(originator);
1590 	sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
1591 	if (sock < 0)
1592 		return NULL;
1593 	/* again is this really necessary for X11? */
1594 	if (options.hpn_disabled)
1595 	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
1596 	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
1597 	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
1598 	else
1599 		c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
1600 		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
1601 		    options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
1602 	c->force_drain = 1;
1603 	return c;
1604 }
1605 
1606 static Channel *
1607 client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
1608 {
1609 	Channel *c = NULL;
1610 	int r, sock;
1611 
1612 	if (!options.forward_agent) {
1613 		error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
1614 		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
1615 		    "malicious server.");
1616 		return NULL;
1617 	}
1618 	if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) {
1619 		r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock);
1620 	} else {
1621 		r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock);
1622 	}
1623 	if (r != 0) {
1624 		if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
1625 			debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
1626 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1627 		return NULL;
1628 	}
1629 	if (options.hpn_disabled)
1630 	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
1631 	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
1632 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
1633 	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
1634 	else
1635 		c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
1636 		    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
1637 		    options.hpn_buffer_size, options.hpn_buffer_size, 0,
1638 		    "authentication agent connection", 1);
1639 	c->force_drain = 1;
1640 	return c;
1641 }
1642 
1643 char *
1644 client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
1645     int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx)
1646 {
1647 	Channel *c;
1648 	int r, fd;
1649 	char *ifname = NULL;
1650 
1651 	if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
1652 		return 0;
1653 
1654 	debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
1655 
1656 	/* Open local tunnel device */
1657 	if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) {
1658 		error("Tunnel device open failed.");
1659 		return NULL;
1660 	}
1661 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
1662 
1663 	if(options.hpn_disabled)
1664 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
1665 	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
1666 	else
1667 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
1668 	    options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
1669 	c->datagram = 1;
1670 
1671 	if (cb != NULL)
1672 		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx);
1673 
1674 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
1675 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
1676 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
1677 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 ||
1678 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
1679 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 ||
1680 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 ||
1681 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
1682 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
1683 
1684 	return ifname;
1685 }
1686 
1687 /* XXXX move to generic input handler */
1688 static int
1689 client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
1690 {
1691 	Channel *c = NULL;
1692 	char *ctype = NULL;
1693 	int r;
1694 	u_int rchan;
1695 	size_t len;
1696 	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow;
1697 
1698 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 ||
1699 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
1700 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
1701 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
1702 		goto out;
1703 
1704 	debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
1705 	    ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
1706 
1707 	if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
1708 		c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow,
1709 		    rmaxpack);
1710 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
1711 		c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan);
1712 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
1713 		c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan);
1714 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
1715 		c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan);
1716 	}
1717 	if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
1718 		debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype);
1719 	} else if (c != NULL) {
1720 		debug("confirm %s", ctype);
1721 		c->remote_id = rchan;
1722 		c->have_remote_id = 1;
1723 		c->remote_window = rwindow;
1724 		c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
1725 		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
1726 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
1727 			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
1728 			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
1729 			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
1730 			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
1731 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
1732 				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
1733 		}
1734 	} else {
1735 		debug("failure %s", ctype);
1736 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
1737 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
1738 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 ||
1739 		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 ||
1740 		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
1741 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
1742 			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
1743 	}
1744 	r = 0;
1745  out:
1746 	free(ctype);
1747 	return r;
1748 }
1749 
1750 static int
1751 client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
1752 {
1753 	Channel *c = NULL;
1754 	char *rtype = NULL;
1755 	u_char reply;
1756 	u_int id, exitval;
1757 	int r, success = 0;
1758 
1759 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0)
1760 		return r;
1761 	if (id <= INT_MAX)
1762 		c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
1763 	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
1764 		return 0;
1765 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
1766 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0)
1767 		goto out;
1768 
1769 	debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d",
1770 	    id, rtype, reply);
1771 
1772 	if (c == NULL) {
1773 		error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
1774 		    "unknown channel", id);
1775 	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
1776 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1777 			goto out;
1778 		chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
1779 	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
1780 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0)
1781 			goto out;
1782 		if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
1783 			mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval);
1784 			success = 1;
1785 		} else if ((int)id == session_ident) {
1786 			/* Record exit value of local session */
1787 			success = 1;
1788 			exit_status = exitval;
1789 		} else {
1790 			/* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
1791 			debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
1792 			    __func__, id);
1793 		}
1794 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1795 			goto out;
1796 	}
1797 	if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
1798 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
1799 			fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
1800 			    __func__, c->self);
1801 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
1802 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
1803 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
1804 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
1805 			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
1806 	}
1807 	r = 0;
1808  out:
1809 	free(rtype);
1810 	return r;
1811 }
1812 
1813 struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
1814 	/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
1815 	char *host_str, *ip_str;
1816 
1817 	/*
1818 	 * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
1819 	 * whether they already exist in known_hosts.
1820 	 * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
1821 	 * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
1822 	 */
1823 	struct sshkey **keys;
1824 	int *keys_seen;
1825 	size_t nkeys, nnew;
1826 
1827 	/*
1828 	 * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
1829 	 * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
1830 	 * Filled in by hostkeys_find().
1831 	 */
1832 	struct sshkey **old_keys;
1833 	size_t nold;
1834 };
1835 
1836 static void
1837 hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
1838 {
1839 	size_t i;
1840 
1841 	if (ctx == NULL)
1842 		return;
1843 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
1844 		sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
1845 	free(ctx->keys);
1846 	free(ctx->keys_seen);
1847 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
1848 		sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
1849 	free(ctx->old_keys);
1850 	free(ctx->host_str);
1851 	free(ctx->ip_str);
1852 	free(ctx);
1853 }
1854 
1855 static int
1856 hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
1857 {
1858 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
1859 	size_t i;
1860 	struct sshkey **tmp;
1861 
1862 	if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
1863 		return 0;
1864 
1865 	/* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
1866 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
1867 		if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
1868 			debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
1869 			    sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
1870 			ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
1871 			return 0;
1872 		}
1873 	}
1874 	/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
1875 	debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
1876 	    sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
1877 	if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1,
1878 	    sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
1879 		fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu",
1880 		    __func__, ctx->nold);
1881 	ctx->old_keys = tmp;
1882 	ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
1883 	l->key = NULL;
1884 
1885 	return 0;
1886 }
1887 
1888 static void
1889 hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel)
1890 {
1891 	do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys.");
1892 	do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's "
1893 	    "existing trusted key.");
1894 }
1895 
1896 static void
1897 update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
1898 {
1899 	int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1;
1900 	int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK;
1901 	LogLevel loglevel = asking ?  SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
1902 	char *fp, *response;
1903 	size_t i;
1904 	struct stat sb;
1905 
1906 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
1907 		if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
1908 			continue;
1909 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
1910 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1911 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
1912 		if (first && asking)
1913 			hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
1914 		do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
1915 		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
1916 		first = 0;
1917 		free(fp);
1918 	}
1919 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
1920 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
1921 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1922 			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
1923 		if (first && asking)
1924 			hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
1925 		do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
1926 		    sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
1927 		first = 0;
1928 		free(fp);
1929 	}
1930 	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
1931 		if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
1932 			leave_raw_mode(1);
1933 			was_raw = 1;
1934 		}
1935 		response = NULL;
1936 		for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
1937 			free(response);
1938 			response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
1939 			    "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
1940 			if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
1941 				break;
1942 			else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
1943 			    strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
1944 				options.update_hostkeys = 0;
1945 				break;
1946 			} else {
1947 				do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
1948 				    "\"yes\" or \"no\"");
1949 			}
1950 		}
1951 		if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
1952 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
1953 		free(response);
1954 		if (was_raw)
1955 			enter_raw_mode(1);
1956 	}
1957 	if (options.update_hostkeys == 0)
1958 		return;
1959 	/*
1960 	 * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
1961 	 * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
1962 	 * cancel the operation).
1963 	 */
1964 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
1965 		/*
1966 		 * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we
1967 		 * just delete the hostname entries.
1968 		 */
1969 		if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) {
1970 			if (errno == ENOENT) {
1971 				debug("%s: known hosts file %s does not exist",
1972 				    __func__, strerror(errno));
1973 			} else {
1974 				error("%s: known hosts file %s inaccessible",
1975 				    __func__, strerror(errno));
1976 			}
1977 			continue;
1978 		}
1979 		if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i],
1980 		    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
1981 		    i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0,
1982 		    options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
1983 		    options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) {
1984 			error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s: %s",
1985 			    __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
1986 		}
1987 	}
1988 }
1989 
1990 static void
1991 client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
1992     u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
1993 {
1994 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
1995 	size_t i, ndone;
1996 	struct sshbuf *signdata;
1997 	int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
1998 	const u_char *sig;
1999 	size_t siglen;
2000 
2001 	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
2002 		fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
2003 	if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
2004 		error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
2005 		    "private host keys");
2006 		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
2007 		return;
2008 	}
2009 	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
2010 	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
2011 
2012 	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
2013 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
2014 	/* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
2015 	if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
2016 		fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
2017 	/*
2018 	 * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
2019 	 * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
2020 	 * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
2021 	 */
2022 	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
2023 		if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
2024 			continue;
2025 		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
2026 		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
2027 		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
2028 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
2029 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
2030 		    ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
2031 		    (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
2032 			fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
2033 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2034 		/* Extract and verify signature */
2035 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
2036 			error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
2037 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2038 			goto out;
2039 		}
2040 		/*
2041 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
2042 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
2043 		 */
2044 		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
2045 		    sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
2046 		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
2047 		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
2048 		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
2049 		    NULL)) != 0) {
2050 			error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
2051 			    __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
2052 			goto out;
2053 		}
2054 		/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
2055 		ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
2056 		ndone++;
2057 	}
2058 	if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
2059 		fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
2060 		    ndone, ctx->nnew);  /* Shouldn't happen */
2061 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
2062 		error("%s: protocol error", __func__);
2063 		goto out;
2064 	}
2065 
2066 	/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
2067 	update_known_hosts(ctx);
2068  out:
2069 	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
2070 }
2071 
2072 /*
2073  * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
2074  * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
2075  */
2076 static int
2077 key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
2078 {
2079 	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
2080 	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms;
2081 
2082 	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
2083 		return 0;
2084 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
2085 	    (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
2086 	    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
2087 		return 1;
2088 	return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
2089 }
2090 
2091 /*
2092  * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
2093  * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
2094  * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
2095  */
2096 static int
2097 client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
2098 {
2099 	const u_char *blob = NULL;
2100 	size_t i, len = 0;
2101 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
2102 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
2103 	int r;
2104 	char *fp;
2105 	static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
2106 	extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
2107 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
2108 
2109 	if (hostkeys_seen)
2110 		fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
2111 	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
2112 	    options.batch_mode)
2113 		return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
2114 	if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
2115 		return 1;
2116 
2117 	ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
2118 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
2119 		sshkey_free(key);
2120 		key = NULL;
2121 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
2122 			error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
2123 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2124 			goto out;
2125 		}
2126 		if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
2127 			do_log2(r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ?
2128 			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
2129 			    "%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2130 			continue;
2131 		}
2132 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
2133 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
2134 		debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
2135 		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
2136 		free(fp);
2137 
2138 		if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
2139 			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
2140 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
2141 			continue;
2142 		}
2143 		/* Skip certs */
2144 		if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
2145 			debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
2146 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
2147 			continue;
2148 		}
2149 		/* Ensure keys are unique */
2150 		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
2151 			if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
2152 				error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
2153 				    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
2154 				goto out;
2155 			}
2156 		}
2157 		/* Key is good, record it */
2158 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
2159 		    sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
2160 			fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
2161 			    __func__, ctx->nkeys);
2162 		ctx->keys = tmp;
2163 		ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
2164 		key = NULL;
2165 	}
2166 
2167 	if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
2168 		debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
2169 		goto out;
2170 	}
2171 
2172 	if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
2173 	    sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
2174 		fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
2175 
2176 	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
2177 	    options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
2178 	    options.port, &ctx->host_str,
2179 	    options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
2180 
2181 	/* Find which keys we already know about. */
2182 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
2183 		debug("%s: searching %s for %s / %s", __func__,
2184 		    options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
2185 		    ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
2186 		if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
2187 		    hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
2188 		    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
2189 			if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
2190 				debug("%s: hostkeys file %s does not exist",
2191 				    __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
2192 				continue;
2193 			}
2194 			error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
2195 			    __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
2196 			goto out;
2197 		}
2198 	}
2199 
2200 	/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
2201 	ctx->nnew = 0;
2202 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
2203 		if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
2204 			ctx->nnew++;
2205 	}
2206 
2207 	debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
2208 	    __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
2209 
2210 	if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
2211 		/* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
2212 		update_known_hosts(ctx);
2213 	} else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
2214 		/*
2215 		 * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
2216 		 * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
2217 		 */
2218 		debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
2219 		    __func__, ctx->nnew);
2220 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
2221 		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
2222 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
2223 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
2224 			fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
2225 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2226 		if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
2227 			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
2228 		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
2229 			if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
2230 				continue;
2231 			sshbuf_reset(buf);
2232 			if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
2233 				fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
2234 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2235 			if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
2236 				fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
2237 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2238 		}
2239 		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2240 			fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2241 		client_register_global_confirm(
2242 		    client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
2243 		ctx = NULL;  /* will be freed in callback */
2244 	}
2245 
2246 	/* Success */
2247  out:
2248 	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
2249 	sshkey_free(key);
2250 	sshbuf_free(buf);
2251 	/*
2252 	 * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
2253 	 * what the client does with its hosts file.
2254 	 */
2255 	return 1;
2256 }
2257 
2258 static int
2259 client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
2260 {
2261 	char *rtype;
2262 	u_char want_reply;
2263 	int r, success = 0;
2264 
2265 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
2266 	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
2267 		goto out;
2268 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
2269 	    rtype, want_reply);
2270 	if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
2271 		success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh);
2272 	if (want_reply) {
2273 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :
2274 		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
2275 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
2276 		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
2277 			goto out;
2278 	}
2279 	r = 0;
2280  out:
2281 	free(rtype);
2282 	return r;
2283 }
2284 
2285 void
2286 client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
2287     const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd,
2288     char **env)
2289 {
2290 	int i, j, matched, len, r;
2291 	char *name, *val;
2292 	Channel *c = NULL;
2293 
2294 	debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
2295 
2296 	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
2297 		fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id);
2298 
2299 	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty,
2300 	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
2301 
2302 	if (want_tty) {
2303 		struct winsize ws;
2304 
2305 		/* Store window size in the packet. */
2306 		if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
2307 			memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
2308 
2309 		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1);
2310 		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
2311 		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : ""))
2312 		    != 0 ||
2313 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
2314 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
2315 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
2316 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0)
2317 			fatal("%s: build packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2318 		if (tiop == NULL)
2319 			tiop = get_saved_tio();
2320 		ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop);
2321 		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2322 			fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2323 		/* XXX wait for reply */
2324 		c->client_tty = 1;
2325 	}
2326 
2327 	/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
2328 	if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
2329 		debug("Sending environment.");
2330 		for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
2331 			/* Split */
2332 			name = xstrdup(env[i]);
2333 			if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
2334 				free(name);
2335 				continue;
2336 			}
2337 			*val++ = '\0';
2338 
2339 			matched = 0;
2340 			for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
2341 				if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
2342 					matched = 1;
2343 					break;
2344 				}
2345 			}
2346 			if (!matched) {
2347 				debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
2348 				free(name);
2349 				continue;
2350 			}
2351 
2352 			debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
2353 			channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
2354 			if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
2355 			    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
2356 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
2357 				fatal("%s: send packet: %s",
2358 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2359 			}
2360 			free(name);
2361 		}
2362 	}
2363 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
2364 		/* Split */
2365 		name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
2366 		if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
2367 			free(name);
2368 			continue;
2369 		}
2370 		*val++ = '\0';
2371 
2372 		debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val);
2373 		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
2374 		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
2375 		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
2376 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2377 			fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2378 		free(name);
2379 	}
2380 
2381 	len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
2382 	if (len > 0) {
2383 		if (len > 900)
2384 			len = 900;
2385 		if (want_subsystem) {
2386 			debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
2387 			    len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
2388 			channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1);
2389 			client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem",
2390 			    CONFIRM_CLOSE);
2391 		} else {
2392 			debug("Sending command: %.*s",
2393 			    len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
2394 			channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1);
2395 			client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
2396 		}
2397 		if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 ||
2398 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2399 			fatal("%s: send command: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2400 	} else {
2401 		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1);
2402 		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
2403 		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
2404 			fatal("%s: send shell request: %s",
2405 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
2406 		}
2407 	}
2408 }
2409 
2410 static void
2411 client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
2412 {
2413 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
2414 
2415 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
2416 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
2417 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
2418 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
2419 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
2420 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
2421 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
2422 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
2423 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
2424 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
2425 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
2426 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
2427 
2428 	/* rekeying */
2429 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
2430 
2431 	/* global request reply messages */
2432 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
2433 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
2434 }
2435 
2436 void
2437 client_stop_mux(void)
2438 {
2439 	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
2440 		unlink(options.control_path);
2441 	/*
2442 	 * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
2443 	 * should close when all active channels are closed.
2444 	 */
2445 	if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
2446 		session_closed = 1;
2447 		setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
2448 	}
2449 }
2450 
2451 /* client specific fatal cleanup */
2452 void
2453 cleanup_exit(int i)
2454 {
2455 	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
2456 	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
2457 		unlink(options.control_path);
2458 	ssh_kill_proxy_command();
2459 	_exit(i);
2460 }
2461