1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <stdio.h> 11 #include <limits.h> 12 #include <errno.h> 13 #include "../ssl_local.h" 14 #include <openssl/evp.h> 15 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 16 #include <openssl/rand.h> 17 #include "record_local.h" 18 #include "../packet_local.h" 19 20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 21 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \ 22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 24 ) 25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 27 #endif 28 29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 30 { 31 rl->s = s; 32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 34 } 35 36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 37 { 38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 39 40 /* 41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 43 * that right? 44 */ 45 46 rl->packet = NULL; 47 rl->packet_length = 0; 48 rl->wnum = 0; 49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 51 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 52 rl->wpend_type = 0; 53 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 55 56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 58 rl->numrpipes = 0; 59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 60 61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 63 64 if (rl->d) 65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 66 } 67 68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 69 { 70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 75 } 76 77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 79 { 80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 81 } 82 83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 85 { 86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 88 89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 90 curr_rec++; 91 92 return curr_rec < num_recs; 93 } 94 95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 96 { 97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 99 } 100 101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 102 { 103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 104 } 105 106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 107 { 108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 109 } 110 111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 112 { 113 size_t i, num = 0; 114 115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 116 return 0; 117 118 /* Take into account DTLS buffered app data */ 119 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 120 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 121 pitem *item, *iter; 122 123 iter = pqueue_iterator(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); 124 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { 125 rdata = item->data; 126 num += rdata->rrec.length; 127 } 128 } 129 130 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 131 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 132 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 133 return num; 134 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 135 } 136 137 return num; 138 } 139 140 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 141 { 142 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 143 } 144 145 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 146 { 147 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 148 } 149 150 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 151 { 152 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 153 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 154 return "read header"; 155 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 156 return "read body"; 157 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 158 return "read done"; 159 default: 160 return "unknown"; 161 } 162 } 163 164 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 165 { 166 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 167 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 168 return "RH"; 169 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 170 return "RB"; 171 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 172 return "RD"; 173 default: 174 return "unknown"; 175 } 176 } 177 178 /* 179 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 180 */ 181 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 182 size_t *readbytes) 183 { 184 /* 185 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 186 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 187 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and 188 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may 189 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 190 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 191 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 192 */ 193 size_t len, left, align = 0; 194 unsigned char *pkt; 195 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 196 197 if (n == 0) 198 return 0; 199 200 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 201 if (rb->buf == NULL) 202 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 203 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 204 return -1; 205 } 206 207 left = rb->left; 208 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 209 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 210 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 211 #endif 212 213 if (!extend) { 214 /* start with empty packet ... */ 215 if (left == 0) 216 rb->offset = align; 217 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 218 /* 219 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 220 * alignment... 221 */ 222 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 223 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 224 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 225 /* 226 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 227 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 228 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 229 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 230 * overrun can be triggered. 231 */ 232 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 233 rb->offset = align; 234 } 235 } 236 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 237 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 238 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 239 } 240 241 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 242 pkt = rb->buf + align; 243 /* 244 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 245 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 246 */ 247 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 248 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 249 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 250 rb->offset = len + align; 251 } 252 253 /* 254 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 255 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 256 * the buffer). 257 */ 258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 259 if (left == 0 && extend) 260 return 0; 261 if (left > 0 && n > left) 262 n = left; 263 } 264 265 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 266 if (left >= n) { 267 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 268 rb->left = left - n; 269 rb->offset += n; 270 *readbytes = n; 271 return 1; 272 } 273 274 /* else we need to read more data */ 275 276 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 277 /* does not happen */ 278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 279 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 280 return -1; 281 } 282 283 /* 284 * Ktls always reads full records. 285 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS. 286 */ 287 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead 288 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 289 /* ignore max parameter */ 290 max = n; 291 } else { 292 if (max < n) 293 max = n; 294 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 295 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 296 } 297 298 while (left < n) { 299 size_t bioread = 0; 300 int ret; 301 302 /* 303 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 304 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 305 * possible) 306 */ 307 308 clear_sys_error(); 309 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 310 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 311 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 312 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 313 if (ret >= 0) 314 bioread = ret; 315 } else { 316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 317 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 318 ret = -1; 319 } 320 321 if (ret <= 0) { 322 rb->left = left; 323 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 324 if (len + left == 0) 325 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 326 return ret; 327 } 328 left += bioread; 329 /* 330 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 331 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 332 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 333 */ 334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 335 if (n > left) 336 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 337 } 338 } 339 340 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 341 rb->offset += n; 342 rb->left = left - n; 343 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 344 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 345 *readbytes = n; 346 return 1; 347 } 348 349 /* 350 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 351 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 352 */ 353 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 354 size_t *written) 355 { 356 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 357 size_t tot; 358 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 359 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 360 size_t nw; 361 #endif 362 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 363 int i; 364 size_t tmpwrit; 365 366 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 367 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 368 /* 369 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 370 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 371 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 372 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 373 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 374 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 375 * report the error in a way the user will notice 376 */ 377 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 378 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 380 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 381 return -1; 382 } 383 384 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 385 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 386 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 387 return -1; 388 } 389 390 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 391 392 /* 393 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we 394 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first. 395 */ 396 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) 397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 398 399 /* 400 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 401 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 402 * messages yet. 403 */ 404 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 405 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 406 i = s->handshake_func(s); 407 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 408 if (i < 0) 409 return i; 410 if (i == 0) { 411 return -1; 412 } 413 } 414 415 /* 416 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 417 * will happen with non blocking IO 418 */ 419 if (wb->left != 0) { 420 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 421 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 422 &tmpwrit); 423 if (i <= 0) { 424 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 425 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 426 return i; 427 } 428 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 429 } 430 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 431 /* 432 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 433 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 434 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 435 * compromise is considered worthy. 436 */ 437 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 438 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && 439 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 440 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 441 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) && 442 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & 443 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 444 unsigned char aad[13]; 445 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 446 size_t packlen; 447 int packleni; 448 449 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 450 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 451 max_send_fragment -= 512; 452 453 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 454 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 455 456 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 457 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 458 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 459 460 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 461 packlen *= 8; 462 else 463 packlen *= 4; 464 465 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 466 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 467 return -1; 468 } 469 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 470 /* free jumbo buffer */ 471 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 472 *written = tot; 473 return 1; 474 } 475 476 n = (len - tot); 477 for (;;) { 478 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 479 /* free jumbo buffer */ 480 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 481 break; 482 } 483 484 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 485 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 486 if (i <= 0) { 487 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 488 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 489 return i; 490 } 491 } 492 493 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 494 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 495 else 496 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 497 498 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 499 aad[8] = type; 500 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 501 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 502 aad[11] = 0; 503 aad[12] = 0; 504 mb_param.out = NULL; 505 mb_param.inp = aad; 506 mb_param.len = nw; 507 508 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 509 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 510 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 511 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 512 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 513 /* free jumbo buffer */ 514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 515 break; 516 } 517 518 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 519 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 520 mb_param.len = nw; 521 522 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 523 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 524 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 525 return -1; 526 527 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 528 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 529 int j = 6; 530 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 531 } 532 533 wb->offset = 0; 534 wb->left = packlen; 535 536 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 537 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 538 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 539 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 540 541 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 542 if (i <= 0) { 543 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 544 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 545 /* free jumbo buffer */ 546 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 547 } 548 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 549 return i; 550 } 551 if (tmpwrit == n) { 552 /* free jumbo buffer */ 553 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 554 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 555 return 1; 556 } 557 n -= tmpwrit; 558 tot += tmpwrit; 559 } 560 } else 561 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 562 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 563 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 564 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 565 566 *written = tot; 567 return 1; 568 } 569 570 n = (len - tot); 571 572 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 573 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 574 /* 575 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 576 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 577 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 578 * explicit IVs 579 */ 580 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 581 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 582 /* 583 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 584 * shouldn't get here 585 */ 586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 587 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 588 return -1; 589 } 590 if (maxpipes == 0 591 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 592 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 593 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) 594 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 595 maxpipes = 1; 596 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 597 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 598 /* 599 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 600 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 601 */ 602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 604 return -1; 605 } 606 607 for (;;) { 608 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 609 size_t numpipes, j; 610 611 if (n == 0) 612 numpipes = 1; 613 else 614 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 615 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 616 numpipes = maxpipes; 617 618 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { 619 /* 620 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 621 * pipelines 622 */ 623 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 624 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; 625 } 626 } else { 627 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 628 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 629 remain = n % numpipes; 630 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 631 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 632 if (j < remain) 633 pipelens[j]++; 634 } 635 } 636 637 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 638 &tmpwrit); 639 if (i <= 0) { 640 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 641 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 642 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 643 return i; 644 } 645 646 if (tmpwrit == n || 647 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 648 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 649 /* 650 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 651 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 652 */ 653 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 654 655 if (tmpwrit == n 656 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 657 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 658 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 659 660 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 661 return 1; 662 } 663 664 n -= tmpwrit; 665 tot += tmpwrit; 666 } 667 } 668 669 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 670 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 671 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 672 { 673 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 674 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 675 WPACKET *thispkt; 676 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 677 unsigned char *recordstart; 678 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 679 size_t prefix_len = 0; 680 int eivlen = 0; 681 size_t align = 0; 682 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 683 SSL_SESSION *sess; 684 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 685 size_t j; 686 687 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 688 totlen += pipelens[j]; 689 /* 690 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 691 * will happen with non blocking IO 692 */ 693 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 694 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 695 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 696 } 697 698 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 699 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 700 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 701 if (i <= 0) { 702 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 703 return i; 704 } 705 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 706 } 707 708 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 709 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 710 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 711 return -1; 712 } 713 } 714 715 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 716 return 0; 717 718 sess = s->session; 719 720 if ((sess == NULL) || 721 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 722 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 723 mac_size = 0; 724 } else { 725 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ 726 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 727 if (mac_size < 0) { 728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 730 goto err; 731 } 732 } 733 734 /* 735 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 736 */ 737 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 738 /* 739 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 740 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 741 */ 742 743 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 744 /* 745 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 746 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 747 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 748 * payload) 749 */ 750 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 751 int ret; 752 753 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 754 if (ret <= 0) { 755 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 756 goto err; 757 } 758 759 if (prefix_len > 760 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 761 /* insufficient space */ 762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 764 goto err; 765 } 766 } 767 768 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 769 } 770 771 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 772 /* 773 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to 774 * discard the const qualifier. 775 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when 776 * switching to ktls. 777 */ 778 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); 779 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); 780 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1); 781 goto wpacket_init_complete; 782 } 783 784 if (create_empty_fragment) { 785 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 786 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 787 /* 788 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 789 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 790 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 791 */ 792 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 793 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 794 #endif 795 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 796 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 797 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 798 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 801 goto err; 802 } 803 wpinited = 1; 804 } else if (prefix_len) { 805 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 806 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 807 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 808 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 809 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 810 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 813 goto err; 814 } 815 wpinited = 1; 816 } else { 817 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 818 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 819 820 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 821 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 822 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 823 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 824 #endif 825 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 826 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 827 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 828 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 831 goto err; 832 } 833 wpinited++; 834 } 835 } 836 837 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 838 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 839 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 840 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 841 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ 842 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 843 if (eivlen <= 1) 844 eivlen = 0; 845 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 846 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 847 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 848 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 849 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 850 } 851 } 852 853 wpacket_init_complete: 854 855 totlen = 0; 856 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 857 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 858 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 859 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 860 : s->version; 861 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 862 size_t maxcomplen; 863 unsigned int rectype; 864 865 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 866 thiswr = &wr[j]; 867 868 /* 869 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 870 * record type 871 */ 872 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 873 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 874 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 875 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 876 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 877 else 878 rectype = type; 879 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 880 881 /* 882 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 883 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 884 */ 885 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 886 && !s->renegotiate 887 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 888 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 889 version = TLS1_VERSION; 890 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 891 892 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 893 if (s->compress != NULL) 894 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 895 896 /* 897 * When using offload kernel will write the header. 898 * Otherwise write the header now 899 */ 900 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 901 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 902 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 903 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 904 || (eivlen > 0 905 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 906 || (maxcomplen > 0 907 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 908 &compressdata)))) { 909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 911 goto err; 912 } 913 914 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 915 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 916 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 917 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 918 totlen += pipelens[j]; 919 920 /* 921 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 922 * thiswr->data 923 */ 924 925 /* first we compress */ 926 if (s->compress != NULL) { 927 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 928 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 930 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 931 goto err; 932 } 933 } else { 934 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 935 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); 936 } else { 937 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 940 goto err; 941 } 942 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 943 } 944 } 945 946 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 947 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 948 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 949 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 950 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 951 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 952 953 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 956 goto err; 957 } 958 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 959 960 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 961 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 962 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 963 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 964 size_t padding = 0; 965 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 966 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 967 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 968 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 969 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 970 size_t remainder; 971 972 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 973 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 974 remainder = rlen & mask; 975 else 976 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 977 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 978 if (remainder == 0) 979 padding = 0; 980 else 981 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 982 } 983 if (padding > 0) { 984 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 985 if (padding > max_padding) 986 padding = max_padding; 987 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 990 goto err; 991 } 992 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 993 } 994 } 995 } 996 997 /* 998 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 999 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 1000 * in the wb->buf 1001 */ 1002 1003 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1004 unsigned char *mac; 1005 1006 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1007 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1010 goto err; 1011 } 1012 } 1013 1014 /* 1015 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. 1016 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using 1017 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. 1018 */ 1019 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1020 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, 1021 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 1022 NULL) 1023 /* 1024 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 1025 * sub-packet 1026 */ 1027 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 1028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1030 goto err; 1031 } 1032 1033 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 1034 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 1035 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 1036 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 1037 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 1038 } 1039 } 1040 1041 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 1042 /* 1043 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 1044 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 1045 */ 1046 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1047 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1050 } 1051 goto err; 1052 } 1053 } else { 1054 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1055 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1056 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1058 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1059 } 1060 goto err; 1061 } 1062 } 1063 } 1064 1065 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1066 size_t origlen; 1067 1068 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1069 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1070 1071 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) 1072 goto mac_done; 1073 1074 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1075 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1076 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1077 || origlen > thiswr->length 1078 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1079 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1080 thiswr->length - origlen, 1081 NULL))) { 1082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1083 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1084 goto err; 1085 } 1086 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1087 unsigned char *mac; 1088 1089 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1090 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1093 goto err; 1094 } 1095 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1096 } 1097 1098 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1099 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1101 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1102 goto err; 1103 } 1104 1105 if (s->msg_callback) { 1106 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1107 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1108 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1109 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1110 s->msg_callback_arg); 1111 1112 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1113 unsigned char ctype = type; 1114 1115 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1116 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1117 } 1118 } 1119 1120 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1123 goto err; 1124 } 1125 1126 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ 1127 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1128 1129 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1130 /* 1131 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1132 * out anything here 1133 */ 1134 if (j > 0) { 1135 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1138 goto err; 1139 } 1140 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1141 return 1; 1142 } 1143 1144 mac_done: 1145 /* 1146 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1147 * is thiswr->length long 1148 */ 1149 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1150 * debugging */ 1151 1152 /* now let's set up wb */ 1153 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1154 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1155 } 1156 1157 /* 1158 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1159 * retries later 1160 */ 1161 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1162 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1163 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1164 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1165 1166 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1167 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1168 err: 1169 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1170 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1171 return -1; 1172 } 1173 1174 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1175 * 1176 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1177 */ 1178 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1179 size_t *written) 1180 { 1181 int i; 1182 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1183 size_t currbuf = 0; 1184 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1185 1186 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1187 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1188 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1189 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1191 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1192 return -1; 1193 } 1194 1195 for (;;) { 1196 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1197 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1198 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1199 currbuf++; 1200 continue; 1201 } 1202 clear_sys_error(); 1203 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1204 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1205 1206 /* 1207 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, 1208 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO 1209 */ 1210 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1211 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1212 if (i <= 0) 1213 return i; 1214 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); 1215 } 1216 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ 1217 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1218 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1219 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1220 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1221 if (i >= 0) 1222 tmpwrit = i; 1223 } else { 1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1225 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1226 i = -1; 1227 } 1228 1229 /* 1230 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, 1231 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte 1232 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. 1233 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte 1234 * writes to permit this case. 1235 */ 1236 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1237 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1238 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1239 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1240 continue; 1241 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1242 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1243 return 1; 1244 } else if (i <= 0) { 1245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1246 /* 1247 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1248 * using a datagram service 1249 */ 1250 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1251 } 1252 return i; 1253 } 1254 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1255 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1256 } 1257 } 1258 1259 /*- 1260 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1261 * 'type' is one of the following: 1262 * 1263 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1264 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1265 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1266 * 1267 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1268 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1269 * 1270 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1271 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1272 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| 1273 * argument is non NULL. 1274 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1275 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1276 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1277 * Change cipher spec protocol 1278 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1279 * Alert protocol 1280 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1281 * Handshake protocol 1282 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1283 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1284 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1285 * Application data protocol 1286 * none of our business 1287 */ 1288 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1289 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1290 { 1291 int i, j, ret; 1292 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1293 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1294 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1295 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1296 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1297 1298 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1299 1300 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1301 /* Not initialized yet */ 1302 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1303 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1304 return -1; 1305 } 1306 } 1307 1308 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1309 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1310 && (type != 1311 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return -1; 1315 } 1316 1317 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1318 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1319 { 1320 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1321 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1322 unsigned int k; 1323 1324 /* peek == 0 */ 1325 n = 0; 1326 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1327 *dst++ = *src++; 1328 len--; 1329 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1330 n++; 1331 } 1332 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1333 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1334 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1335 1336 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1337 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1338 1339 *readbytes = n; 1340 return 1; 1341 } 1342 1343 /* 1344 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1345 */ 1346 1347 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1348 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1349 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1350 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1351 if (i < 0) 1352 return i; 1353 if (i == 0) 1354 return -1; 1355 } 1356 start: 1357 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1358 1359 /*- 1360 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1361 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1362 * rr[i].data, - data 1363 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1364 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1365 */ 1366 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1367 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1368 1369 do { 1370 /* get new records if necessary */ 1371 if (num_recs == 0) { 1372 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1373 if (ret <= 0) { 1374 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1375 return ret; 1376 } 1377 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1378 if (num_recs == 0) { 1379 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1381 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1382 return -1; 1383 } 1384 } 1385 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1386 for (curr_rec = 0; 1387 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1388 curr_rec++) ; 1389 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1390 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1391 num_recs = 0; 1392 curr_rec = 0; 1393 } 1394 } while (num_recs == 0); 1395 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1396 1397 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1398 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1399 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1401 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1402 return -1; 1403 } 1404 1405 /* 1406 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1407 * record that isn't an alert. 1408 */ 1409 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1410 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1411 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1412 1413 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1414 1415 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1416 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1417 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1419 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1420 return -1; 1421 } 1422 1423 /* 1424 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1425 * 'peek' mode) 1426 */ 1427 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1428 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1429 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1430 return 0; 1431 } 1432 1433 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1434 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1435 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1436 && !is_tls13)) { 1437 /* 1438 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1439 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1440 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1441 */ 1442 /* 1443 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1444 * doing a handshake for the first time 1445 */ 1446 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1447 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1449 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1450 return -1; 1451 } 1452 1453 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1454 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1455 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1457 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1458 return -1; 1459 } 1460 1461 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1462 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1463 1464 if (len == 0) { 1465 /* 1466 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1467 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1468 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1469 */ 1470 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1471 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1472 return 0; 1473 } 1474 1475 totalbytes = 0; 1476 do { 1477 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1478 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1479 else 1480 n = len - totalbytes; 1481 1482 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1483 buf += n; 1484 if (peek) { 1485 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1486 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1487 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1488 } else { 1489 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1490 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1491 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1492 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1494 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1495 } 1496 } 1497 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1498 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1499 curr_rec++; 1500 rr++; 1501 } 1502 totalbytes += n; 1503 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1504 && totalbytes < len); 1505 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1506 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1507 goto start; 1508 } 1509 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1510 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1511 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1512 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1513 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1514 return 1; 1515 } 1516 1517 /* 1518 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1519 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1520 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1521 */ 1522 1523 /* 1524 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1525 */ 1526 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1527 /* 1528 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1529 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1530 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1531 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1532 */ 1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1535 return -1; 1536 } 1537 1538 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1539 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1540 /* 1541 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1542 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with 1543 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything 1544 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. 1545 */ 1546 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1548 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1549 return -1; 1550 } 1551 1552 /*- 1553 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1554 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1555 */ 1556 1557 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1558 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1559 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1560 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1561 PACKET alert; 1562 1563 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1564 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1565 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1566 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1568 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1569 return -1; 1570 } 1571 1572 if (s->msg_callback) 1573 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1574 s->msg_callback_arg); 1575 1576 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1577 cb = s->info_callback; 1578 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1579 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1580 1581 if (cb != NULL) { 1582 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1583 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1584 } 1585 1586 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1587 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1588 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1589 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1590 1591 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1592 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1594 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1595 return -1; 1596 } 1597 } 1598 1599 /* 1600 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1601 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1602 */ 1603 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1604 goto start; 1605 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1606 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1607 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1608 return 0; 1609 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1610 char tmp[16]; 1611 1612 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1613 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1615 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1616 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1617 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1618 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1619 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1620 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1621 return 0; 1622 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1623 /* 1624 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1625 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1626 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1627 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1628 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1629 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1630 */ 1631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1632 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1633 return -1; 1634 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1635 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1636 goto start; 1637 } 1638 1639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1641 return -1; 1642 } 1643 1644 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1645 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1646 BIO *rbio; 1647 1648 /* 1649 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1650 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1651 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1652 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1653 * sent close_notify. 1654 */ 1655 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1656 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1657 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1658 1659 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1660 goto start; 1661 1662 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1663 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1664 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1665 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1666 return -1; 1667 } 1668 } else { 1669 /* 1670 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1671 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1672 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1673 * above. 1674 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1675 */ 1676 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1677 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1679 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1680 return -1; 1681 } 1682 } 1683 1684 /* 1685 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1686 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1687 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1688 * that we're just going to discard. 1689 */ 1690 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1691 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1692 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1693 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1694 1695 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1697 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1698 1699 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1700 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1701 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1702 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1703 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1704 *dest_len += n; 1705 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1706 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1707 1708 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1709 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1710 } 1711 1712 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1714 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1715 return -1; 1716 } 1717 1718 /* 1719 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1720 * protocol violation) 1721 */ 1722 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1723 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1724 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1725 1726 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1727 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1728 1729 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1731 if (i < 0) 1732 return i; 1733 if (i == 0) { 1734 return -1; 1735 } 1736 1737 /* 1738 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1739 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1740 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1741 */ 1742 if (ined) 1743 return -1; 1744 1745 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1746 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1747 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1748 BIO *bio; 1749 /* 1750 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1751 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1752 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1753 * problems in the blocking world 1754 */ 1755 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1756 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1757 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1758 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1759 return -1; 1760 } 1761 } 1762 goto start; 1763 } 1764 1765 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1766 default: 1767 /* 1768 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1769 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1770 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1771 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1772 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1773 */ 1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1775 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1776 return -1; 1777 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1778 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1779 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1780 /* 1781 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1782 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1783 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1784 */ 1785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1787 return -1; 1788 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1789 /* 1790 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1791 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1792 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1793 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1794 * started), we will indulge it. 1795 */ 1796 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1797 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1798 return -1; 1799 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1800 /* 1801 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1802 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1803 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1804 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1805 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1806 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1807 * record. 1808 */ 1809 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1810 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1812 return -1; 1813 } 1814 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1815 goto start; 1816 } else { 1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1818 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1819 return -1; 1820 } 1821 } 1822 } 1823 1824 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1825 { 1826 int i; 1827 1828 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1829 ++seq[i]; 1830 if (seq[i] != 0) 1831 break; 1832 } 1833 } 1834 1835 /* 1836 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1837 * format and false otherwise. 1838 */ 1839 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1840 { 1841 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1842 } 1843 1844 /* 1845 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1846 */ 1847 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1848 { 1849 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1850 } 1851