1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.32 2018/05/19 14:23:16 jsing Exp $ */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #include <stdio.h> 152 153 #include "ssl_locl.h" 154 155 #include <openssl/bn.h> 156 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h> 158 #include <openssl/evp.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 161 #include <openssl/gost.h> 162 #endif 163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/objects.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 168 #include "bytestring.h" 169 #include "ssl_tlsext.h" 170 171 int 172 ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 173 { 174 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 175 unsigned long alg_k; 176 int ret = -1; 177 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 178 int listen = 0; 179 180 ERR_clear_error(); 181 errno = 0; 182 183 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) 184 cb = s->internal->info_callback; 185 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) 186 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; 187 188 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 189 listen = D1I(s)->listen; 190 191 /* init things to blank */ 192 s->internal->in_handshake++; 193 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 194 SSL_clear(s); 195 196 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 197 D1I(s)->listen = listen; 198 199 if (s->cert == NULL) { 200 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 201 ret = -1; 202 goto end; 203 } 204 205 for (;;) { 206 state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 207 208 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { 209 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 210 s->internal->renegotiate = 1; 211 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 212 213 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 214 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 215 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 216 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 217 s->server = 1; 218 if (cb != NULL) 219 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 220 221 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 222 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { 223 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 224 ret = -1; 225 goto end; 226 } 227 } else { 228 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 229 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 230 ret = -1; 231 goto end; 232 } 233 } 234 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 235 236 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { 237 ret = -1; 238 goto end; 239 } 240 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 241 ret = -1; 242 goto end; 243 } 244 245 s->internal->init_num = 0; 246 247 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 248 /* 249 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO 250 * so that the output is sent in a way that 251 * TCP likes :-) 252 */ 253 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 254 ret = -1; 255 goto end; 256 } 257 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 258 ret = -1; 259 goto end; 260 } 261 262 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 263 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++; 264 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) { 265 /* 266 * Server attempting to renegotiate with 267 * client that doesn't support secure 268 * renegotiation. 269 */ 270 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 271 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, 272 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 273 ret = -1; 274 goto end; 275 } else { 276 /* 277 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 278 * we will just send a HelloRequest. 279 */ 280 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 281 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 282 } 283 break; 284 285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 286 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 287 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 288 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 289 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); 290 dtls1_start_timer(s); 291 } 292 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 293 if (ret <= 0) 294 goto end; 295 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 296 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 297 else 298 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 299 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 300 s->internal->init_num = 0; 301 302 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 303 ret = -1; 304 goto end; 305 } 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 309 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 310 break; 311 312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 315 s->internal->shutdown = 0; 316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 317 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 318 if (ret <= 0) 319 goto end; 320 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 321 322 if (ret == 1 && 323 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) 324 S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; 325 else 326 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 327 328 s->internal->init_num = 0; 329 330 /* 331 * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain 332 * stateless while listening. 333 */ 334 if (listen) { 335 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_sequence, 336 S3I(s)->read_sequence, 337 sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence)); 338 } 339 340 /* If we're just listening, stop here */ 341 if (listen && S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 342 ret = 2; 343 D1I(s)->listen = 0; 344 /* 345 * Set expected sequence numbers to 346 * continue the handshake. 347 */ 348 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 2; 349 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 1; 350 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; 351 goto end; 352 } 353 } else { 354 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 355 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 356 if (ret <= 0) 357 goto end; 358 } 359 360 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 361 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 362 s->internal->init_num = 0; 363 } 364 break; 365 366 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: 367 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: 368 ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); 369 if (ret <= 0) 370 goto end; 371 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 372 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 373 374 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */ 375 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { 376 ret = -1; 377 goto end; 378 } 379 break; 380 381 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 382 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 383 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 384 s->internal->renegotiate = 2; 385 dtls1_start_timer(s); 386 } 387 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 388 if (ret <= 0) 389 goto end; 390 if (s->internal->hit) { 391 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 392 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 393 else 394 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 395 } else { 396 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 397 } 398 s->internal->init_num = 0; 399 break; 400 401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */ 404 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 405 SSL_aNULL)) { 406 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 407 dtls1_start_timer(s); 408 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 409 if (ret <= 0) 410 goto end; 411 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) 412 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 413 else 414 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 415 } else { 416 skip = 1; 417 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 418 } 419 s->internal->init_num = 0; 420 break; 421 422 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 423 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 424 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 425 426 /* 427 * Only send if using a DH key exchange. 428 * 429 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange 430 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other 431 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's 432 * public key for key exchange. 433 */ 434 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { 435 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 436 dtls1_start_timer(s); 437 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 438 if (ret <= 0) 439 goto end; 440 } else 441 skip = 1; 442 443 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 444 s->internal->init_num = 0; 445 break; 446 447 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 448 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 449 /* 450 * Determine whether or not we need to request a 451 * certificate. 452 * 453 * Do not request a certificate if: 454 * 455 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset). 456 * 457 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are 458 * renegotiating. 459 * 460 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites 461 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 462 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application 463 * insists on verification (against the specs, but 464 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3). 465 */ 466 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 467 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 468 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 469 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & 470 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode & 471 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { 472 /* No cert request. */ 473 skip = 1; 474 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0; 475 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 476 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 477 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 478 ret = -1; 479 goto end; 480 } 481 } 482 } else { 483 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1; 484 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 485 dtls1_start_timer(s); 486 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 487 if (ret <= 0) 488 goto end; 489 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 490 s->internal->init_num = 0; 491 } 492 break; 493 494 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 495 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 496 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 497 dtls1_start_timer(s); 498 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 499 if (ret <= 0) 500 goto end; 501 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 502 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 503 s->internal->init_num = 0; 504 break; 505 506 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 507 /* 508 * This code originally checked to see if 509 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 510 * and then flushed. This caused problems 511 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 512 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 513 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 514 * still exist. So instead we just flush 515 * unconditionally. 516 */ 517 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 518 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 519 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 520 /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */ 521 if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { 522 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 523 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 524 } 525 } 526 ret = -1; 527 goto end; 528 } 529 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 530 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; 531 break; 532 533 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 534 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 535 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 536 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 537 if (ret <= 0) 538 goto end; 539 } 540 s->internal->init_num = 0; 541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 542 break; 543 544 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 545 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 546 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 547 if (ret <= 0) 548 goto end; 549 550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 551 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 552 s->internal->init_num = 0; 553 } 554 555 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 556 if (ret == 2) { 557 /* 558 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when 559 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 560 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 561 * message is not sent. 562 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 563 * the client uses its key from the certificate 564 * for key exchange. 565 */ 566 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 567 s->internal->init_num = 0; 568 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) { 569 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 570 s->internal->init_num = 0; 571 if (!s->session->peer) 572 break; 573 /* 574 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer 575 * at this point and digest cached records. 576 */ 577 if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 578 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 579 ret = -1; 580 goto end; 581 } 582 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 583 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 584 ret = -1; 585 goto end; 586 } 587 } else { 588 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 589 s->internal->init_num = 0; 590 591 /* 592 * We need to get hashes here so if there is 593 * a client cert, it can be verified. 594 */ 595 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 596 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 597 ret = -1; 598 goto end; 599 } 600 } 601 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_value(s, 602 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 603 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md), 604 NULL)) { 605 ret = -1; 606 goto end; 607 } 608 } 609 break; 610 611 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 612 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 613 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 614 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 615 else 616 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 617 618 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 619 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 620 if (ret <= 0) 621 goto end; 622 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 623 s->internal->init_num = 0; 624 break; 625 626 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 627 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 629 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; 630 else 631 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 632 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 633 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 634 if (ret <= 0) 635 goto end; 636 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 637 dtls1_stop_timer(s); 638 if (s->internal->hit) 639 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; 640 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) 641 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 642 else 643 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 644 s->internal->init_num = 0; 645 break; 646 647 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 648 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 649 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 650 if (ret <= 0) 651 goto end; 652 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 653 s->internal->init_num = 0; 654 break; 655 656 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 657 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 658 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 659 if (ret <= 0) 660 goto end; 661 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 662 s->internal->init_num = 0; 663 break; 664 665 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 666 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 667 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; 668 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { 669 ret = -1; 670 goto end; 671 } 672 673 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 674 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 675 if (ret <= 0) 676 goto end; 677 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 678 s->internal->init_num = 0; 679 680 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, 681 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { 682 ret = -1; 683 goto end; 684 } 685 686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 687 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); 688 break; 689 690 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 691 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 692 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 693 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 694 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 695 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); 696 if (ret <= 0) 697 goto end; 698 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 699 if (s->internal->hit) 700 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 701 else 702 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 703 s->internal->init_num = 0; 704 break; 705 706 case SSL_ST_OK: 707 /* clean a few things up */ 708 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 709 710 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 711 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); 712 s->internal->init_buf = NULL; 713 } 714 715 /* remove buffering on output */ 716 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 717 718 s->internal->init_num = 0; 719 720 /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */ 721 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) { 722 s->internal->renegotiate = 0; 723 s->internal->new_session = 0; 724 725 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 726 727 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++; 728 /* s->server=1; */ 729 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 730 731 if (cb != NULL) 732 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 733 } 734 735 ret = 1; 736 737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 738 /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */ 739 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0; 740 /* Next message is server hello. */ 741 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 0; 742 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; 743 } 744 goto end; 745 /* break; */ 746 747 default: 748 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 749 ret = -1; 750 goto end; 751 /* break; */ 752 } 753 754 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 755 if (s->internal->debug) { 756 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 757 goto end; 758 } 759 760 761 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { 762 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; 763 S3I(s)->hs.state = state; 764 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 765 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; 766 } 767 } 768 skip = 0; 769 } 770 end: 771 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 772 s->internal->in_handshake--; 773 if (cb != NULL) 774 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 775 776 return (ret); 777 } 778 779 int 780 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 781 { 782 CBB cbb, hello; 783 784 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 785 786 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 787 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &hello, 788 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)) 789 goto err; 790 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 791 goto err; 792 793 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 794 } 795 796 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 797 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 798 799 err: 800 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 801 802 return (-1); 803 } 804 805 int 806 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 807 { 808 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; 809 CBS compression_methods; 810 uint16_t client_version; 811 uint8_t comp_method; 812 int comp_null; 813 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 814 long n; 815 unsigned long id; 816 SSL_CIPHER *c; 817 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 818 unsigned long alg_k; 819 const SSL_METHOD *method; 820 uint16_t shared_version; 821 unsigned char *end; 822 823 /* 824 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 825 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 826 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 827 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 828 * TLSv1. 829 */ 830 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 831 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 832 } 833 834 s->internal->first_packet = 1; 835 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 836 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 837 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 838 if (!ok) 839 return ((int)n); 840 s->internal->first_packet = 0; 841 842 if (n < 0) 843 goto err; 844 845 end = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg + n; 846 847 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 848 849 /* 850 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header. 851 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 852 */ 853 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version)) 854 goto truncated; 855 856 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) { 857 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 858 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 859 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) { 860 /* 861 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote 862 * version number. 863 */ 864 s->version = s->client_version; 865 } 866 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 867 goto f_err; 868 } 869 s->client_version = client_version; 870 s->version = shared_version; 871 872 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) 873 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version); 874 if (method == NULL) { 875 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 876 goto err; 877 } 878 s->method = method; 879 880 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) 881 goto truncated; 882 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) 883 goto truncated; 884 885 /* 886 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't 887 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 888 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 889 */ 890 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 891 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie)) 892 goto truncated; 893 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 894 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0) 895 return (1); 896 } 897 } 898 899 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random, 900 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL)) 901 goto err; 902 903 s->internal->hit = 0; 904 905 /* 906 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 907 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 908 * ignore resumption requests with flag 909 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag 910 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications 911 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older 912 * library versions). 913 * 914 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() 915 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session 916 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 917 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be 918 * ignored. 919 */ 920 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options & 921 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 922 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 923 goto err; 924 } else { 925 /* XXX - pass CBS through instead... */ 926 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, 927 (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&session_id), 928 CBS_len(&session_id), end); 929 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ 930 s->internal->hit = 1; 931 } else if (i == -1) 932 goto err; 933 else { 934 /* i == 0 */ 935 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 936 goto err; 937 } 938 } 939 940 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 941 /* 942 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify 943 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause 944 * an overflow. 945 */ 946 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) { 947 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 948 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 949 goto f_err; 950 } 951 952 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 953 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 954 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) { 955 size_t cookie_len; 956 957 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */ 958 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 959 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len)) 960 goto err; 961 962 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 963 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, 964 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { 965 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 966 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 967 goto f_err; 968 } 969 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 970 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */ 971 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, 972 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) { 973 /* default verification */ 974 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 975 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 976 goto f_err; 977 } 978 cookie_valid = 1; 979 } 980 } 981 982 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites)) 983 goto truncated; 984 985 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */ 986 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) { 987 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 988 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 989 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 990 goto f_err; 991 } 992 993 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 994 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, 995 &cipher_suites)) == NULL) 996 goto err; 997 } 998 999 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1000 /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */ 1001 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { 1002 j = 0; 1003 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1004 1005 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1006 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1007 if (c->id == id) { 1008 j = 1; 1009 break; 1010 } 1011 } 1012 if (j == 0) { 1013 /* 1014 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher 1015 * list if we are asked to reuse it 1016 */ 1017 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1018 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1019 goto f_err; 1020 } 1021 } 1022 1023 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods)) 1024 goto truncated; 1025 1026 comp_null = 0; 1027 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) { 1028 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method)) 1029 goto truncated; 1030 if (comp_method == 0) 1031 comp_null = 1; 1032 } 1033 if (comp_null == 0) { 1034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1035 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1036 goto f_err; 1037 } 1038 1039 if (!tlsext_clienthello_parse(s, &cbs, &al)) { 1040 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1041 goto f_err; 1042 } 1043 1044 if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) { 1045 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1046 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1047 goto f_err; 1048 } 1049 1050 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1051 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1052 goto err; 1053 } 1054 1055 /* 1056 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1057 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1058 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1059 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. 1060 */ 1061 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1062 1063 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1064 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1065 1066 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1067 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1068 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, 1069 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1070 s->internal->hit = 1; 1071 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1072 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1073 1074 ciphers = NULL; 1075 1076 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1077 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : 1078 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1079 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1080 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1081 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1082 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1083 goto f_err; 1084 } 1085 1086 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1087 1088 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1089 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id); 1090 1091 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1092 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id = 1093 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1094 } 1095 } 1096 1097 /* 1098 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1099 * pick a cipher 1100 */ 1101 1102 if (!s->internal->hit) { 1103 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1104 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1105 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1106 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1107 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1108 goto f_err; 1109 } 1110 ciphers = NULL; 1111 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, 1112 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1113 1114 if (c == NULL) { 1115 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1116 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1117 goto f_err; 1118 } 1119 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c; 1120 } else { 1121 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1122 } 1123 1124 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_init(s)) 1125 goto err; 1126 1127 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1128 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) || 1129 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1130 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1132 goto f_err; 1133 } 1134 } 1135 1136 /* 1137 * We now have the following setup. 1138 * client_random 1139 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1140 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1141 * compression - basically ignored right now 1142 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1143 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1144 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag 1145 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1146 */ 1147 1148 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1149 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1150 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1151 goto err; 1152 } 1153 1154 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1155 1156 if (0) { 1157 truncated: 1158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1159 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1160 f_err: 1161 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1162 } 1163 err: 1164 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1165 1166 return (ret); 1167 } 1168 1169 int 1170 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1171 { 1172 CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id; 1173 size_t sl; 1174 1175 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1176 1177 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1178 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_hello, 1179 SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) 1180 goto err; 1181 1182 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version)) 1183 goto err; 1184 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random, 1185 sizeof(s->s3->server_random))) 1186 goto err; 1187 1188 /* 1189 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1190 * back in the server hello: 1191 * 1192 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1193 * we send back the old session ID. 1194 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1195 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1196 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1197 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1198 * session ID. 1199 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1200 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1201 * 1202 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1203 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1204 * to send back. 1205 */ 1206 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1207 && !s->internal->hit) 1208 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1209 1210 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1211 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1212 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1213 goto err; 1214 } 1215 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id)) 1216 goto err; 1217 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) 1218 goto err; 1219 1220 /* Cipher suite. */ 1221 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, 1222 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher))) 1223 goto err; 1224 1225 /* Compression method (null). */ 1226 if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0)) 1227 goto err; 1228 1229 /* TLS extensions */ 1230 if (!tlsext_serverhello_build(s, &server_hello)) { 1231 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1232 goto err; 1233 } 1234 1235 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 1236 goto err; 1237 } 1238 1239 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1240 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1241 1242 err: 1243 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1244 1245 return (-1); 1246 } 1247 1248 int 1249 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1250 { 1251 CBB cbb, done; 1252 1253 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1254 1255 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1256 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &done, 1257 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)) 1258 goto err; 1259 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 1260 goto err; 1261 1262 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1263 } 1264 1265 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1266 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1267 1268 err: 1269 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1270 1271 return (-1); 1272 } 1273 1274 int 1275 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1276 { 1277 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1278 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1279 unsigned char *data; 1280 int al; 1281 1282 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1283 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) { 1284 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1285 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1286 goto f_err; 1287 } 1288 } else 1289 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp; 1290 1291 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) 1292 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1293 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)); 1294 1295 if (dhp == NULL) { 1296 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1297 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1298 goto f_err; 1299 } 1300 1301 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1302 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 goto err; 1304 } 1305 1306 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) { 1307 dh = dhp; 1308 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1309 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1310 goto err; 1311 } 1312 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh; 1313 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1314 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1315 goto err; 1316 } 1317 1318 /* 1319 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key. 1320 */ 1321 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p)) 1322 goto err; 1323 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p))) 1324 goto err; 1325 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data); 1326 1327 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g)) 1328 goto err; 1329 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g))) 1330 goto err; 1331 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data); 1332 1333 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys)) 1334 goto err; 1335 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key))) 1336 goto err; 1337 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data); 1338 1339 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1340 goto err; 1341 1342 return (1); 1343 1344 f_err: 1345 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1346 err: 1347 return (-1); 1348 } 1349 1350 static int 1351 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1352 { 1353 const EC_GROUP *group; 1354 const EC_POINT *pubkey; 1355 unsigned char *data; 1356 int encoded_len = 0; 1357 int curve_id = 0; 1358 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1359 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1360 CBB ecpoint; 1361 int al; 1362 1363 /* 1364 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1365 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1366 */ 1367 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1368 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1369 goto err; 1370 } 1371 1372 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1373 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1374 goto err; 1375 } 1376 1377 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { 1378 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1379 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1380 goto f_err; 1381 } 1382 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1383 1384 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1385 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1386 goto err; 1387 } 1388 if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL || 1389 (pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)) == NULL || 1390 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) { 1391 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1392 goto err; 1393 } 1394 1395 /* 1396 * Encode the public key. 1397 */ 1398 encoded_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, 1399 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); 1400 if (encoded_len == 0) { 1401 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1402 goto err; 1403 } 1404 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1405 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1406 goto err; 1407 } 1408 1409 /* 1410 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1411 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has: 1412 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1413 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1414 * the actual encoded point itself. 1415 */ 1416 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1417 goto err; 1418 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1419 goto err; 1420 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1421 goto err; 1422 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encoded_len)) 1423 goto err; 1424 if (EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1425 data, encoded_len, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1426 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1427 goto err; 1428 } 1429 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1430 goto err; 1431 1432 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1433 1434 return (1); 1435 1436 f_err: 1437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1438 err: 1439 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1440 1441 return (-1); 1442 } 1443 1444 static int 1445 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb) 1446 { 1447 uint8_t *public_key = NULL; 1448 int curve_id; 1449 CBB ecpoint; 1450 int ret = -1; 1451 1452 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */ 1453 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) { 1454 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1455 goto err; 1456 } 1457 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1458 goto err; 1459 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1460 goto err; 1461 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519); 1462 1463 /* Serialize public key. */ 1464 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) { 1465 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1466 goto err; 1467 } 1468 1469 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)) 1470 goto err; 1471 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id)) 1472 goto err; 1473 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) 1474 goto err; 1475 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) 1476 goto err; 1477 if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) 1478 goto err; 1479 1480 ret = 1; 1481 1482 err: 1483 free(public_key); 1484 1485 return (ret); 1486 } 1487 1488 static int 1489 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) 1490 { 1491 int nid; 1492 1493 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); 1494 1495 if (nid == NID_X25519) 1496 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb); 1497 1498 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb); 1499 } 1500 1501 int 1502 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1503 { 1504 CBB cbb; 1505 unsigned char *params = NULL; 1506 size_t params_len; 1507 unsigned char *q; 1508 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1509 unsigned int u; 1510 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1511 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1512 unsigned char *p, *d; 1513 int al, i, j, n, kn; 1514 unsigned long type; 1515 BUF_MEM *buf; 1516 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1517 1518 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1519 1520 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1521 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1522 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1523 1524 buf = s->internal->init_buf; 1525 1526 if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0)) 1527 goto err; 1528 1529 if (type & SSL_kDHE) { 1530 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1531 goto err; 1532 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { 1533 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1) 1534 goto err; 1535 } else { 1536 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1537 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1538 goto f_err; 1539 } 1540 1541 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, ¶ms, ¶ms_len)) 1542 goto err; 1543 1544 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { 1545 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey( 1546 s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { 1547 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1548 goto f_err; 1549 } 1550 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1551 } else { 1552 pkey = NULL; 1553 kn = 0; 1554 } 1555 1556 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 1557 params_len + kn)) { 1558 SSLerror(s, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 1562 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, 1563 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE); 1564 1565 memcpy(p, params, params_len); 1566 1567 free(params); 1568 params = NULL; 1569 1570 n = params_len; 1571 p += params_len; 1572 1573 /* not anonymous */ 1574 if (pkey != NULL) { 1575 /* 1576 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1577 * and p points to the space at the end. 1578 */ 1579 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1580 q = md_buf; 1581 j = 0; 1582 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5_sha1(), 1583 NULL)) 1584 goto err; 1585 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, 1586 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1587 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, 1588 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1589 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1590 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1591 (unsigned int *)&i); 1592 q += i; 1593 j += i; 1594 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1595 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1596 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); 1597 goto err; 1598 } 1599 s2n(u, p); 1600 n += u + 2; 1601 } else if (md) { 1602 /* Send signature algorithm. */ 1603 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1604 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1605 /* Should never happen */ 1606 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1607 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1608 goto f_err; 1609 } 1610 p += 2; 1611 } 1612 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1613 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1614 s->s3->client_random, 1615 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1616 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, 1617 s->s3->server_random, 1618 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1619 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n); 1620 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], 1621 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 1622 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 1623 goto err; 1624 } 1625 s2n(i, p); 1626 n += i + 2; 1627 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1628 n += 2; 1629 } else { 1630 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1631 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1632 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1633 goto f_err; 1634 } 1635 } 1636 1637 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); 1638 } 1639 1640 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1641 1642 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1643 1644 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1645 1646 f_err: 1647 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1648 err: 1649 free(params); 1650 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1651 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1652 1653 return (-1); 1654 } 1655 1656 int 1657 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1658 { 1659 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn; 1660 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 1661 X509_NAME *name; 1662 int i; 1663 1664 /* 1665 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4. 1666 */ 1667 1668 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 1669 1670 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 1671 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &cert_request, 1672 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) 1673 goto err; 1674 1675 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) 1676 goto err; 1677 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types)) 1678 goto err; 1679 1680 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1681 unsigned char *sigalgs_data; 1682 size_t sigalgs_len; 1683 1684 tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, &sigalgs_data, &sigalgs_len); 1685 1686 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) 1687 goto err; 1688 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len)) 1689 goto err; 1690 } 1691 1692 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth)) 1693 goto err; 1694 1695 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1696 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 1697 unsigned char *name_data; 1698 size_t name_len; 1699 1700 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 1701 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 1702 1703 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn)) 1704 goto err; 1705 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len)) 1706 goto err; 1707 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len) 1708 goto err; 1709 } 1710 1711 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 1712 goto err; 1713 1714 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1715 } 1716 1717 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1718 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 1719 1720 err: 1721 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1722 1723 return (-1); 1724 } 1725 1726 static int 1727 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1728 { 1729 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1730 unsigned char *pms = NULL; 1731 size_t pms_len = 0; 1732 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1733 RSA *rsa = NULL; 1734 CBS cbs, enc_pms; 1735 int decrypt_len; 1736 int al = -1; 1737 1738 if (n < 0) 1739 goto err; 1740 1741 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1742 1743 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey)); 1744 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1745 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1746 1747 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1748 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1749 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 1750 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1751 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1752 goto f_err; 1753 } 1754 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 1755 1756 pms_len = RSA_size(rsa); 1757 if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1758 goto err; 1759 if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL) 1760 goto err; 1761 p = pms; 1762 1763 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &enc_pms)) 1764 goto truncated; 1765 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) { 1766 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1767 goto err; 1768 } 1769 1770 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms), 1771 pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1772 1773 ERR_clear_error(); 1774 1775 if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 1776 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1777 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1778 } 1779 1780 if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && 1781 (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 1782 /* 1783 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number 1784 * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 1785 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 1786 * DH ciphersuites). 1787 * 1788 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1789 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1790 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1791 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1792 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that 1793 * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should 1794 * treat this just like any other decryption error. 1795 */ 1796 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1797 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1798 } 1799 1800 if (al != -1) { 1801 /* 1802 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead 1803 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack 1804 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 1805 * section 7.4.7.1). 1806 */ 1807 p = fakekey; 1808 } 1809 1810 s->session->master_key_length = 1811 tls1_generate_master_secret(s, 1812 s->session->master_key, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 1813 1814 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1815 1816 return (1); 1817 1818 truncated: 1819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1820 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1821 f_err: 1822 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1823 err: 1824 freezero(pms, pms_len); 1825 1826 return (-1); 1827 } 1828 1829 static int 1830 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1831 { 1832 BIGNUM *bn = NULL; 1833 int key_size, al; 1834 CBS cbs, dh_Yc; 1835 DH *dh; 1836 1837 if (n < 0) 1838 goto err; 1839 1840 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1841 1842 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc)) 1843 goto truncated; 1844 1845 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 1846 goto truncated; 1847 1848 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) { 1849 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1850 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1851 goto f_err; 1852 } 1853 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh; 1854 1855 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) { 1856 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1857 goto err; 1858 } 1859 1860 key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh); 1861 if (key_size <= 0) { 1862 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1863 BN_clear_free(bn); 1864 goto err; 1865 } 1866 1867 s->session->master_key_length = 1868 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1869 s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size); 1870 1871 explicit_bzero(p, key_size); 1872 1873 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh); 1874 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL; 1875 1876 BN_clear_free(bn); 1877 1878 return (1); 1879 1880 truncated: 1881 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1882 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 1883 f_err: 1884 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1885 err: 1886 return (-1); 1887 } 1888 1889 static int 1890 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1891 { 1892 EC_POINT *point = NULL; 1893 const EC_GROUP *group; 1894 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1895 EC_KEY *ecdh; 1896 int key_size; 1897 int ret = 1; 1898 int i; 1899 1900 /* 1901 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when 1902 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message. 1903 */ 1904 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh; 1905 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); 1906 1907 /* Let's get client's public key */ 1908 if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 1909 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1910 goto err; 1911 } 1912 1913 /* 1914 * Get client's public key from encoded point 1915 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 1916 */ 1917 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 1918 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1919 goto err; 1920 } 1921 1922 /* Get encoded point length */ 1923 if (n < 1) 1924 goto err; 1925 i = *p; 1926 p += 1; 1927 if (n != 1 + i) { 1928 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1929 goto err; 1930 } 1931 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 1932 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1933 goto err; 1934 } 1935 1936 /* 1937 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 1938 * currently, so set it to the start. 1939 */ 1940 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data; 1941 1942 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 1943 key_size = ECDH_size(ecdh); 1944 if (key_size <= 0) { 1945 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1946 goto err; 1947 } 1948 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, point, ecdh, NULL); 1949 if (i <= 0) { 1950 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1951 goto err; 1952 } 1953 1954 EC_POINT_free(point); 1955 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1956 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh); 1957 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 1958 1959 /* Compute the master secret */ 1960 s->session->master_key_length = 1961 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1962 s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 1963 1964 explicit_bzero(p, i); 1965 return (ret); 1966 1967 err: 1968 EC_POINT_free(point); 1969 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1970 return (-1); 1971 } 1972 1973 static int 1974 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 1975 { 1976 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL; 1977 CBS cbs, ecpoint; 1978 int ret = -1; 1979 1980 if (n < 0) 1981 goto err; 1982 1983 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 1984 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint)) 1985 goto err; 1986 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) 1987 goto err; 1988 1989 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1990 goto err; 1991 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint))) 1992 goto err; 1993 1994 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 1995 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL; 1996 1997 s->session->master_key_length = 1998 tls1_generate_master_secret( 1999 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 2000 2001 ret = 1; 2002 2003 err: 2004 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); 2005 2006 return (ret); 2007 } 2008 2009 static int 2010 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 2011 { 2012 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) 2013 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n); 2014 2015 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n); 2016 } 2017 2018 static int 2019 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n) 2020 { 2021 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2022 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2023 unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; 2024 unsigned long alg_a; 2025 size_t outlen = 32; 2026 CBS cbs, gostblob; 2027 int al; 2028 int ret = 0; 2029 2030 if (n < 0) 2031 goto err; 2032 2033 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n); 2034 2035 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2036 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2037 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2038 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2039 2040 if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL)) == NULL) 2041 goto err; 2042 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) 2043 goto gerr; 2044 2045 /* 2046 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, 2047 * maybe use it for key exchange. 2048 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because 2049 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for 2050 * authorization only. 2051 */ 2052 if ((client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) != NULL) { 2053 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, 2054 client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2055 ERR_clear_error(); 2056 } 2057 2058 /* Decrypt session key */ 2059 if (!CBS_get_asn1(&cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) 2060 goto truncated; 2061 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2062 goto truncated; 2063 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, 2064 CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) { 2065 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2066 goto gerr; 2067 } 2068 2069 /* Generate master secret */ 2070 s->session->master_key_length = 2071 tls1_generate_master_secret( 2072 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); 2073 2074 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2075 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, 2076 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2077 ret = 2; 2078 else 2079 ret = 1; 2080 gerr: 2081 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2082 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2083 if (ret) 2084 return (ret); 2085 else 2086 goto err; 2087 2088 truncated: 2089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2090 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2092 err: 2093 return (-1); 2094 } 2095 2096 int 2097 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2098 { 2099 unsigned long alg_k; 2100 unsigned char *p; 2101 int al, ok; 2102 long n; 2103 2104 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */ 2105 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2106 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2107 if (!ok) 2108 return ((int)n); 2109 2110 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2111 2112 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2113 2114 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2115 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1) 2116 goto err; 2117 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2118 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2119 goto err; 2120 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 2121 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1) 2122 goto err; 2123 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2124 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1) 2125 goto err; 2126 } else { 2127 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2128 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2129 goto f_err; 2130 } 2131 2132 return (1); 2133 2134 f_err: 2135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2136 err: 2137 return (-1); 2138 } 2139 2140 int 2141 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2142 { 2143 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2144 unsigned char *p; 2145 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2146 long n; 2147 int type = 0, i, j; 2148 X509 *peer; 2149 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2150 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2151 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2152 2153 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2154 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2155 if (!ok) 2156 return ((int)n); 2157 2158 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2159 peer = s->session->peer; 2160 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2161 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2162 } else { 2163 peer = NULL; 2164 pkey = NULL; 2165 } 2166 2167 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2168 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2169 if (peer != NULL) { 2170 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2171 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2172 goto f_err; 2173 } 2174 ret = 1; 2175 goto end; 2176 } 2177 2178 if (peer == NULL) { 2179 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2180 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2181 goto f_err; 2182 } 2183 2184 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2185 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2186 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2187 goto f_err; 2188 } 2189 2190 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) { 2191 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2192 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2193 goto f_err; 2194 } 2195 2196 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2197 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg; 2198 /* 2199 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites. 2200 * 2201 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare 2202 * signature without length field. 2203 */ 2204 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2205 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) { 2206 i = 64; 2207 } else { 2208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2209 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2210 /* Should never happen */ 2211 if (sigalg == -1) { 2212 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2214 goto f_err; 2215 } 2216 if (2 > n) 2217 goto truncated; 2218 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 2219 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 2220 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2222 goto f_err; 2223 } 2224 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 2225 if (md == NULL) { 2226 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2228 goto f_err; 2229 } 2230 p += 2; 2231 n -= 2; 2232 } 2233 if (2 > n) 2234 goto truncated; 2235 n2s(p, i); 2236 n -= 2; 2237 if (i > n) 2238 goto truncated; 2239 } 2240 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2241 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 2242 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2244 goto f_err; 2245 } 2246 2247 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2248 long hdatalen = 0; 2249 void *hdata; 2250 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2251 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2252 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2253 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2254 goto f_err; 2255 } 2256 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2257 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 2258 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2260 goto f_err; 2261 } 2262 2263 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 2264 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2265 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2266 goto f_err; 2267 } 2268 } else 2269 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 2270 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2271 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2272 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2273 if (i < 0) { 2274 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2275 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2276 goto f_err; 2277 } 2278 if (i == 0) { 2279 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2280 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2281 goto f_err; 2282 } 2283 } else 2284 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 2285 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2286 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2287 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 2288 if (j <= 0) { 2289 /* bad signature */ 2290 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2291 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2292 goto f_err; 2293 } 2294 } else 2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 2296 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2297 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 2298 long hdatalen = 0; 2299 void *hdata; 2300 unsigned char signature[128]; 2301 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature); 2302 int nid; 2303 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; 2304 2305 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 2306 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 2307 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2308 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2309 goto f_err; 2310 } 2311 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || 2312 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { 2313 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2314 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2315 goto f_err; 2316 } 2317 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 2318 if (!pctx) { 2319 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2320 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2321 goto f_err; 2322 } 2323 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || 2324 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || 2325 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) || 2326 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) || 2327 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || 2328 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, 2329 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, 2330 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, 2331 NULL) <= 0)) { 2332 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 2333 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2334 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2335 goto f_err; 2336 } 2337 2338 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) { 2339 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2340 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 2341 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2342 goto f_err; 2343 } 2344 2345 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2346 } else 2347 #endif 2348 { 2349 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2350 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2351 goto f_err; 2352 } 2353 2354 2355 ret = 1; 2356 if (0) { 2357 truncated: 2358 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2359 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2360 f_err: 2361 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2362 } 2363 end: 2364 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) { 2365 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer); 2366 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL; 2367 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 2368 } 2369 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 2370 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2371 return (ret); 2372 } 2373 2374 int 2375 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2376 { 2377 CBS cbs, client_certs; 2378 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 2379 X509 *x = NULL; 2380 long n; 2381 const unsigned char *q; 2382 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 2383 2384 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2385 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); 2386 2387 if (!ok) 2388 return ((int)n); 2389 2390 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 2391 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2392 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2393 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2394 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2395 goto f_err; 2396 } 2397 /* 2398 * If tls asked for a client cert, 2399 * the client must return a 0 list. 2400 */ 2401 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) { 2402 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 2403 ); 2404 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2405 goto f_err; 2406 } 2407 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2408 return (1); 2409 } 2410 2411 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 2412 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2413 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2414 goto f_err; 2415 } 2416 2417 if (n < 0) 2418 goto truncated; 2419 2420 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); 2421 2422 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 2423 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2424 goto err; 2425 } 2426 2427 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) || 2428 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) 2429 goto truncated; 2430 2431 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) { 2432 CBS cert; 2433 2434 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) { 2435 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2436 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2437 goto f_err; 2438 } 2439 2440 q = CBS_data(&cert); 2441 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); 2442 if (x == NULL) { 2443 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2444 goto err; 2445 } 2446 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { 2447 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2448 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2449 goto f_err; 2450 } 2451 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 2452 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2453 goto err; 2454 } 2455 x = NULL; 2456 } 2457 2458 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 2459 /* 2460 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned. 2461 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate. 2462 */ 2463 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2464 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 2465 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2466 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2467 goto f_err; 2468 } 2469 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 2470 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { 2471 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2472 goto f_err; 2473 } 2474 } else { 2475 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 2476 if (i <= 0) { 2477 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2478 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2479 goto f_err; 2480 } 2481 } 2482 2483 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2484 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 2485 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2486 2487 /* 2488 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2489 * when we arrive here 2490 */ 2491 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2492 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2493 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) { 2494 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2495 goto err; 2496 } 2497 } 2498 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2499 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 2500 2501 /* 2502 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2503 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 2504 */ 2505 2506 sk = NULL; 2507 2508 ret = 1; 2509 if (0) { 2510 truncated: 2511 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2512 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); 2513 f_err: 2514 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2515 } 2516 err: 2517 X509_free(x); 2518 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 2519 2520 return (ret); 2521 } 2522 2523 int 2524 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2525 { 2526 CBB cbb, server_cert; 2527 X509 *x; 2528 2529 /* 2530 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2. 2531 */ 2532 2533 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2534 2535 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 2536 if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) { 2537 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2538 return (0); 2539 } 2540 2541 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert, 2542 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) 2543 goto err; 2544 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x)) 2545 goto err; 2546 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 2547 goto err; 2548 2549 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2550 } 2551 2552 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2553 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2554 2555 err: 2556 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2557 2558 return (0); 2559 } 2560 2561 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 2562 int 2563 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2564 { 2565 unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart; 2566 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 2567 const unsigned char *const_p; 2568 int len, slen_full, slen; 2569 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2570 unsigned int hlen; 2571 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2572 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2573 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2574 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2575 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2576 2577 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 2578 /* get session encoding length */ 2579 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2580 /* 2581 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2582 * too long 2583 */ 2584 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 2585 goto err; 2586 senc = malloc(slen_full); 2587 if (!senc) 2588 goto err; 2589 p = senc; 2590 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2591 2592 /* 2593 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to 2594 * clean up 2595 */ 2596 const_p = senc; 2597 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 2598 if (sess == NULL) 2599 goto err; 2600 2601 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 2602 sess->session_id_length = 0; 2603 2604 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 2605 if (slen > slen_full) { 2606 /* shouldn't ever happen */ 2607 goto err; 2608 } 2609 p = senc; 2610 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 2611 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 2612 2613 /* 2614 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2615 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2616 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2617 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2618 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2619 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2620 */ 2621 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + 2622 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2623 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2624 goto err; 2625 2626 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET); 2627 2628 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2629 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2630 2631 /* 2632 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2633 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2634 * from parent ctx. 2635 */ 2636 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2637 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, 2638 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { 2639 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2640 goto err; 2641 } 2642 } else { 2643 arc4random_buf(iv, 16); 2644 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2645 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2646 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 2647 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2648 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2649 } 2650 2651 /* 2652 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 2653 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session 2654 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new 2655 * sessions will live as long as their sessions. 2656 */ 2657 l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 2658 2659 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2660 p += 2; 2661 /* Output key name */ 2662 macstart = p; 2663 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2664 p += 16; 2665 /* output IV */ 2666 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2667 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2668 /* Encrypt session data */ 2669 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2670 p += len; 2671 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len); 2672 p += len; 2673 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2674 2675 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2676 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2677 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2678 p += hlen; 2679 2680 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2681 /* Total length */ 2682 len = p - d; 2683 2684 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */ 2685 p = d + 4; 2686 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */ 2687 2688 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len); 2689 2690 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2691 2692 freezero(senc, slen_full); 2693 } 2694 2695 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2696 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2697 2698 err: 2699 freezero(senc, slen_full); 2700 2701 return (-1); 2702 } 2703 2704 int 2705 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2706 { 2707 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp; 2708 2709 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); 2710 2711 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 2712 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &certstatus, 2713 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS)) 2714 goto err; 2715 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type)) 2716 goto err; 2717 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp)) 2718 goto err; 2719 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, 2720 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2721 goto err; 2722 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb)) 2723 goto err; 2724 2725 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2726 } 2727 2728 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2729 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); 2730 2731 err: 2732 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 2733 2734 return (-1); 2735 } 2736