1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_local.h"
14
tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
17 size_t chainidx)
18 {
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
20 if (!s->renegotiate)
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
22
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
31 }
32
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
34 }
35
tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
38 size_t chainidx)
39 {
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 }
58
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60 }
61
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 size_t chainidx)
66 {
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
69
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
71 /*-
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
74 */
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
83 }
84
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
86 }
87
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
91 {
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
95
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
109 }
110
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
112 }
113 #endif
114
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
use_ecc(SSL * s)116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
117 {
118 int i, end, ret = 0;
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
121 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
122 size_t num_groups, j;
123
124 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
125 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
126 return 0;
127
128 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
129 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
130 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
131 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
132
133 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
134 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
135 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
136 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
137 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
138 ret = 1;
139 break;
140 }
141 }
142
143 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
144 if (!ret)
145 return 0;
146
147 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
148 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
149 for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
150 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
151
152 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
153 return 1;
154 }
155
156 return 0;
157 }
158
tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)159 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
160 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
161 size_t chainidx)
162 {
163 const unsigned char *pformats;
164 size_t num_formats;
165
166 if (!use_ecc(s))
167 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
168
169 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
170 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
171
172 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
173 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
174 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
175 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
176 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
178 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
179 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
180 }
181
182 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
183 }
184
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)185 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
186 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
187 size_t chainidx)
188 {
189 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
190 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
191
192 if (!use_ecc(s))
193 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
194
195 /*
196 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
197 */
198 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
199 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
200
201 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
202 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
203 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
204 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
206 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
208 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
209 }
210 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
211 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
212 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
213
214 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
215 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
217 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
219 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
220 }
221 }
222 }
223 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
225 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
228 }
229
230 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
231 }
232 #endif
233
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)234 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
235 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
236 size_t chainidx)
237 {
238 size_t ticklen;
239
240 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
241 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
242
243 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
244 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
245 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
246 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
247 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
248 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
249 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
250 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
251 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
253 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
256 }
257 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
258 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
259 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
260 } else {
261 ticklen = 0;
262 }
263
264 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
265 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
266 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
267
268 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
269 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
271 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
273 }
274
275 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
276 }
277
tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)278 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
279 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
280 size_t chainidx)
281 {
282 size_t salglen;
283 const uint16_t *salg;
284
285 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
286 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
287
288 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
290 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
291 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
292 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
293 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
294 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
295 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
296 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
299 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
300 }
301
302 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
303 }
304
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)306 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
307 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
308 size_t chainidx)
309 {
310 int i;
311
312 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
313 if (x != NULL)
314 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
315
316 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
317 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
318
319 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
320 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
321 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
322 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
323 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
324 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
326 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
328 }
329 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
330 unsigned char *idbytes;
331 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
332 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
333
334 if (idlen <= 0
335 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
336 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
337 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
339 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
341 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
342 }
343 }
344 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
345 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
348 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
349 }
350 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
351 unsigned char *extbytes;
352 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
353
354 if (extlen < 0) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
356 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
358 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
359 }
360 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
361 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
362 != extlen) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
364 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
366 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
367 }
368 }
369 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
371 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
372 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
373 }
374
375 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
376 }
377 #endif
378
379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)380 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
381 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
382 {
383 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
384 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
385
386 /*
387 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
388 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
389 */
390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
391 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
394 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
395 }
396
397 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
398 }
399 #endif
400
tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)401 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
402 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
403 {
404 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
405
406 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
407 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
408
409 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
410 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
411 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
413 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
414 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
416 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
417 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
418 }
419 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
420
421 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
422 }
423
424
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)426 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
427 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
428 size_t chainidx)
429 {
430 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
431 int i, end;
432
433 if (clnt == NULL)
434 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
435
436 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
437 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
438 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
439 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
440 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
442 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
444 }
445
446 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
447 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
448 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
449 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
450
451 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
453 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
455 }
456 }
457 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
458 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
459 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
460 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
464 }
465
466 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
467 }
468 #endif
469
tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)470 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
471 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
472 {
473 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
474 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
475
476 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
477 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
479 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
480 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
481 }
482
483 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
484 }
485
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)487 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
488 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
489 {
490 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
491 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
492
493 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
494 if (x != NULL)
495 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
496
497 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
498 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
501 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
502 }
503
504 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
505 }
506 #endif
507
tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)508 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
509 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
510 {
511 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
512 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
515 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
516 }
517
518 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
519 }
520
tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)521 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
522 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
523 size_t chainidx)
524 {
525 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
526
527 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
528 if (reason != 0) {
529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
530 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
531 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
532 }
533
534 /*
535 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
536 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
537 */
538 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
539 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
540
541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
542 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
543 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
547 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
548 }
549
550 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
551 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
553 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
555 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
556 }
557 }
558 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
561 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
562 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
563 }
564
565 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
566 }
567
568 /*
569 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
570 */
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)571 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
572 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
573 size_t chainidx)
574 {
575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
576 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
577
578 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
579 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
580 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
581 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
582 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
583 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
584 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
586 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
587 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
588 }
589
590 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
591 if (nodhe)
592 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
593 #endif
594
595 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
596 }
597
598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
add_key_share(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int curve_id)599 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
600 {
601 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
602 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
603 size_t encodedlen;
604
605 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
606 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
608 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
609 return 0;
610 }
611 /*
612 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
613 */
614 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
615 } else {
616 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
617 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
618 /* SSLfatal() already called */
619 return 0;
620 }
621 }
622
623 /* Encode the public key. */
624 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
625 &encoded_point);
626 if (encodedlen == 0) {
627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
628 goto err;
629 }
630
631 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
632 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
633 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
635 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 goto err;
637 }
638
639 /*
640 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
641 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
642 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
643 */
644 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
645 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
646 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
647
648 return 1;
649 err:
650 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
651 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
652 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
653 return 0;
654 }
655 #endif
656
tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)657 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
658 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
659 size_t chainidx)
660 {
661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
662 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
663 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
664 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
665
666 /* key_share extension */
667 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
668 /* Extension data sub-packet */
669 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
670 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
671 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
673 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
674 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
675 }
676
677 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
678
679 /*
680 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
681 * now, just send one
682 */
683 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
684 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
685 } else {
686 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
687
688 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
689 continue;
690
691 curve_id = pgroups[i];
692 break;
693 }
694 }
695
696 if (curve_id == 0) {
697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
698 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
699 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
700 }
701
702 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
704 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
705 }
706
707 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
709 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
710 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
711 }
712 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
713 #else
714 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
715 #endif
716 }
717
tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)718 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
719 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
720 {
721 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
722
723 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
724 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
725 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
726
727 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
728 /* Extension data sub-packet */
729 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
730 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
731 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
732 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
734 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
735 goto end;
736 }
737
738 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
739 end:
740 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
741 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
742 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
743
744 return ret;
745 }
746
tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)747 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
748 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
749 size_t chainidx)
750 {
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
752 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
753 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
754 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
755 size_t idlen = 0;
756 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
757 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
758 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
759
760 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
761 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
762
763 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
764 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
765 || (psksess != NULL
766 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
767 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
769 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
770 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
771 }
772
773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
774 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
775 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
776 size_t psklen = 0;
777
778 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
779 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
780 psk, sizeof(psk));
781
782 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
785 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
786 } else if (psklen > 0) {
787 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
788 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
789
790 idlen = strlen(identity);
791 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
793 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
794 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
795 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
796 }
797 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
798
799 /*
800 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
801 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
802 */
803 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
804 if (cipher == NULL) {
805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
806 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
808 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
809 }
810
811 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
812 if (psksess == NULL
813 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
814 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
815 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
817 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
819 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
820 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
821 }
822 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
823 }
824 }
825 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
826
827 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
828 s->psksession = psksess;
829 if (psksess != NULL) {
830 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
831 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
832 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
833 s->psksession_id_len = 0;
834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
835 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
836 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
837 }
838 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
839 }
840
841 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
842 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
843 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
844 s->max_early_data = 0;
845 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
846 }
847 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
848 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
849
850 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
851 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
852 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
853 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
855 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
856 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
857 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
858 }
859 }
860
861 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
863 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
864 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
865 }
866
867 /*
868 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
869 * data.
870 */
871 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
872 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
873 int found = 0;
874
875 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
877 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
879 }
880 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
881 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
882 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
883 found = 1;
884 break;
885 }
886 }
887 if (!found) {
888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
889 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
890 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
891 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
892 }
893 }
894
895 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
896 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
897 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
900 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
901 }
902
903 /*
904 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
905 * extension, we set it to accepted.
906 */
907 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
908 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
909
910 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
911 }
912
913 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
914 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
915
916 /*
917 * PSK pre binder overhead =
918 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
919 * 2 bytes for extension length
920 * 2 bytes for identities list length
921 * 2 bytes for identity length
922 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
923 * 2 bytes for binder list length
924 * 1 byte for binder length
925 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
926 * subsequent binder bytes
927 */
928 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
929
tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)930 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
931 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
932 size_t chainidx)
933 {
934 unsigned char *padbytes;
935 size_t hlen;
936
937 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
938 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
939
940 /*
941 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
942 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
943 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
944 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
945 */
946 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
949 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
950 }
951
952 /*
953 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
954 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
955 */
956 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
957 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
958 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
959 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
960
961 if (md != NULL) {
962 /*
963 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
964 * length.
965 */
966 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
967 + EVP_MD_size(md);
968 }
969 }
970
971 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
972 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
973 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
974
975 /*
976 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
977 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
978 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
979 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
980 */
981 if (hlen > 4)
982 hlen -= 4;
983 else
984 hlen = 1;
985
986 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
987 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
991 }
992 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
993 }
994
995 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
996 }
997
998 /*
999 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
1000 */
tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1001 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1002 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1003 {
1004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1005 uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
1006 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
1007 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
1008 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
1009 int dores = 0;
1010
1011 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1012
1013 /*
1014 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1015 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1016 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1017 */
1018
1019 /*
1020 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1021 * so don't add this extension.
1022 */
1023 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1024 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1025 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1026
1027 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1028 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1029
1030 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1031 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1032 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1036 }
1037 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1038 if (mdres == NULL) {
1039 /*
1040 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1041 * Ignore it
1042 */
1043 goto dopsksess;
1044 }
1045
1046 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1047 /*
1048 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1049 * so we can't use it.
1050 */
1051 goto dopsksess;
1052 }
1053
1054 /*
1055 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1056 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1057 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1058 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1059 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1060 * issue.
1061 */
1062 agesec = (uint32_t)(time(NULL) - s->session->time);
1063 /*
1064 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1065 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1066 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1067 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1068 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1069 * happen.
1070 */
1071 if (agesec > 0)
1072 agesec--;
1073
1074 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1075 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1076 goto dopsksess;
1077 }
1078
1079 /*
1080 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1081 * good enough.
1082 */
1083 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1084
1085 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1086 /*
1087 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1088 * If so we just ignore it.
1089 */
1090 goto dopsksess;
1091 }
1092
1093 /*
1094 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1095 * to be mod 2^32.
1096 */
1097 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1098
1099 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1100 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1101 dores = 1;
1102 }
1103
1104 dopsksess:
1105 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1106 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1107
1108 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1109 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1110 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1111 /*
1112 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1113 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1114 */
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1116 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1117 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1118 }
1119
1120 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1121 /*
1122 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1123 * session. This is an application bug.
1124 */
1125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1126 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1127 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1128 }
1129
1130 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1131 }
1132
1133 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1135 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1136 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1138 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1140 }
1141
1142 if (dores) {
1143 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1144 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1145 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1149 }
1150 }
1151
1152 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1153 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1154 s->psksession_id_len)
1155 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1159 }
1160 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1161 }
1162
1163 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1164 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1165 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1166 || (dores
1167 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1168 || (s->psksession != NULL
1169 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1170 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1171 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1172 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1173 /*
1174 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1175 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1176 */
1177 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1181 }
1182
1183 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1184
1185 if (dores
1186 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1187 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1189 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1190 }
1191
1192 if (s->psksession != NULL
1193 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1194 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1195 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1196 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1197 }
1198
1199 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1200 #else
1201 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1202 #endif
1203 }
1204
tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL * s,WPACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1205 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1206 unsigned int context,
1207 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1208 {
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1210 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1211 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1212
1213 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1214 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1215 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1216 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1218 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1221 }
1222
1223 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1224
1225 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1226 #else
1227 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1228 #endif
1229 }
1230
1231
1232 /*
1233 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1234 */
tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1235 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1236 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1237 {
1238 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1239 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1240 size_t ilen;
1241 const unsigned char *data;
1242
1243 /* Check for logic errors */
1244 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1245 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1246 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1247 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 return 0;
1251 }
1252
1253 /* Parse the length byte */
1254 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1256 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 /* Consistency check */
1261 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1263 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1264 return 0;
1265 }
1266
1267 /* Check that the extension matches */
1268 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1270 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1271 return 0;
1272 }
1273
1274 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1275 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1276 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1278 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1279 return 0;
1280 }
1281
1282 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1283 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1284 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1286 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1287 return 0;
1288 }
1289 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1290
1291 return 1;
1292 }
1293
1294 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1295 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1296 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1297 {
1298 unsigned int value;
1299
1300 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1302 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305
1306 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1307 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1309 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1310 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1311 return 0;
1312 }
1313
1314 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1315 /*-
1316 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1317 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1318 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1319 */
1320 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1322 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1323 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1324 return 0;
1325 }
1326
1327 /*
1328 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1329 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1330 */
1331 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1332
1333 return 1;
1334 }
1335
tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1336 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1337 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1338 {
1339 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1341 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 return 0;
1343 }
1344
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1347 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1348 return 0;
1349 }
1350
1351 if (!s->hit) {
1352 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1354 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1355 return 0;
1356 }
1357 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1358 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 return 0;
1362 }
1363 }
1364
1365 return 1;
1366 }
1367
1368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1369 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1370 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1371 {
1372 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1373 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1374
1375 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1377 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1378 return 0;
1379 }
1380 if (!s->hit) {
1381 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1382 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1384 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387
1388 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1389 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1390 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1391 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
1392 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1394 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 return 0;
1396 }
1397
1398 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1399
1400 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1401 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
1402 ecpointformats_len)) {
1403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1404 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 return 0;
1406 }
1407 }
1408
1409 return 1;
1410 }
1411 #endif
1412
tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1413 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1414 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1415 {
1416 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1417 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1418 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1419 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1421 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1422 return 0;
1423 }
1424
1425 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1427 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1428 return 0;
1429 }
1430 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1432 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1433 return 0;
1434 }
1435
1436 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1437
1438 return 1;
1439 }
1440
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1442 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1443 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1444 {
1445 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1446 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1447 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1448 return 1;
1449 }
1450
1451 /*
1452 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1453 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1454 */
1455 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1457 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1458 return 0;
1459 }
1460 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1462 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1463 return 0;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1467 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1468 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1469 */
1470 if (chainidx != 0)
1471 return 1;
1472
1473 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1474 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1475 }
1476
1477 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1478 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1479
1480 return 1;
1481 }
1482 #endif
1483
1484
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1486 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1487 size_t chainidx)
1488 {
1489 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1490 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1491 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1492 return 1;
1493 }
1494
1495 /*
1496 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1497 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1498 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1499 */
1500 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1501 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1502
1503 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1504 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1505 s->ext.scts = NULL;
1506
1507 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1508 if (size > 0) {
1509 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1510 if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
1511 s->ext.scts_len = 0;
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1513 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1514 return 0;
1515 }
1516 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1518 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 return 0;
1520 }
1521 }
1522 } else {
1523 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1524 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1525
1526 /*
1527 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1528 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1529 */
1530 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1531 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1532 NULL) == NULL) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1534 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1535 return 0;
1536 }
1537
1538 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1539 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1540 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1541 x, chainidx)) {
1542 /* SSLfatal already called */
1543 return 0;
1544 }
1545 }
1546
1547 return 1;
1548 }
1549 #endif
1550
1551
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1553 /*
1554 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1555 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1556 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1557 */
ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt)1558 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1559 {
1560 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1561
1562 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1563 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1564 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1566 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1567 return 0;
1568 }
1569 }
1570
1571 return 1;
1572 }
1573
tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1574 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1575 size_t chainidx)
1576 {
1577 unsigned char *selected;
1578 unsigned char selected_len;
1579 PACKET tmppkt;
1580
1581 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1582 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1583 return 1;
1584
1585 /* We must have requested it. */
1586 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1588 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1589 return 0;
1590 }
1591
1592 /* The data must be valid */
1593 tmppkt = *pkt;
1594 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1596 return 0;
1597 }
1598 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1599 PACKET_data(pkt),
1600 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1601 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1602 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1604 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1605 return 0;
1606 }
1607
1608 /*
1609 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1610 * a single Serverhello
1611 */
1612 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1613 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1614 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1615 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
1616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 return 0;
1619 }
1620
1621 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1622 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1623 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1624
1625 return 1;
1626 }
1627 #endif
1628
tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1629 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1630 size_t chainidx)
1631 {
1632 size_t len;
1633
1634 /* We must have requested it. */
1635 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1637 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 /*-
1641 * The extension data consists of:
1642 * uint16 list_length
1643 * uint8 proto_length;
1644 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1645 */
1646 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1647 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1648 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1650 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1651 return 0;
1652 }
1653 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1654 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1655 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1656 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1658 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 return 0;
1660 }
1661 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1663 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1664 return 0;
1665 }
1666 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1667
1668 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1669 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1670 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1671 != 0) {
1672 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1673 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1674 }
1675 if (!s->hit) {
1676 /*
1677 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1678 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1679 */
1680 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 return 0;
1684 }
1685 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1686 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1687 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1688 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 return 0;
1692 }
1693 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1694 }
1695
1696 return 1;
1697 }
1698
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1700 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1701 size_t chainidx)
1702 {
1703 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1704 int i;
1705 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1706 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1707
1708 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1709 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1710 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1711 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1713 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1714 return 0;
1715 }
1716
1717 if (mki != 0) {
1718 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1720 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1721 return 0;
1722 }
1723
1724 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1725 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1726 if (clnt == NULL) {
1727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1728 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1729 return 0;
1730 }
1731
1732 /*
1733 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1734 * presumably offered)
1735 */
1736 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1737 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1738
1739 if (prof->id == id) {
1740 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1741 return 1;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1746 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1747 return 0;
1748 }
1749 #endif
1750
tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1751 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1752 size_t chainidx)
1753 {
1754 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1755 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1756 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1757 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
1758 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1759 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1760 s->ext.use_etm = 1;
1761
1762 return 1;
1763 }
1764
tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1765 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1766 size_t chainidx)
1767 {
1768 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1769 if (!s->hit)
1770 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1771
1772 return 1;
1773 }
1774
tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1775 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1776 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1777 {
1778 unsigned int version;
1779
1780 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1781 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1784 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1785 return 0;
1786 }
1787
1788 /*
1789 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1790 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1791 */
1792 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1794 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1795 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1796 return 0;
1797 }
1798
1799 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1800 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1801 return 1;
1802
1803 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1804 s->version = version;
1805
1806 return 1;
1807 }
1808
tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1809 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1810 size_t chainidx)
1811 {
1812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1813 unsigned int group_id;
1814 PACKET encoded_pt;
1815 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1816
1817 /* Sanity check */
1818 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1821 return 0;
1822 }
1823
1824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1826 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1827 return 0;
1828 }
1829
1830 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1831 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1832 size_t i, num_groups;
1833
1834 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1836 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1837 return 0;
1838 }
1839
1840 /*
1841 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1842 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1843 */
1844 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1846 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1847 return 0;
1848 }
1849
1850 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1851 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1852 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1853 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1854 break;
1855 }
1856 if (i >= num_groups
1857 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1859 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1860 return 0;
1861 }
1862
1863 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1864 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1865 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1866 return 1;
1867 }
1868
1869 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1870 /*
1871 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1872 * key_share!
1873 */
1874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1875 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1876 return 0;
1877 }
1878
1879 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1880 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1882 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1883 return 0;
1884 }
1885
1886 skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1887 if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1889 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1890 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1891 return 0;
1892 }
1893 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1894 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1896 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1897 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1898 return 0;
1899 }
1900
1901 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1903 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1904 return 0;
1905 }
1906 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1907 #endif
1908
1909 return 1;
1910 }
1911
tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1912 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1913 size_t chainidx)
1914 {
1915 PACKET cookie;
1916
1917 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1918 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1919 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1921 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1922 return 0;
1923 }
1924
1925 return 1;
1926 }
1927
tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1928 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1929 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1930 {
1931 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1932 unsigned long max_early_data;
1933
1934 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1935 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1937 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1938 return 0;
1939 }
1940
1941 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1942
1943 return 1;
1944 }
1945
1946 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1948 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1949 return 0;
1950 }
1951
1952 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1953 || !s->hit) {
1954 /*
1955 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1956 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1957 * server should not be accepting it.
1958 */
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1960 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1961 return 0;
1962 }
1963
1964 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1965
1966 return 1;
1967 }
1968
tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL * s,PACKET * pkt,unsigned int context,X509 * x,size_t chainidx)1969 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1970 size_t chainidx)
1971 {
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1973 unsigned int identity;
1974
1975 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1977 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1978 return 0;
1979 }
1980
1981 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1983 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1984 return 0;
1985 }
1986
1987 /*
1988 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1989 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1990 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1991 */
1992 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
1993 s->hit = 1;
1994 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1995 s->psksession = NULL;
1996 return 1;
1997 }
1998
1999 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
2000 /* Should never happen */
2001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
2002 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2003 return 0;
2004 }
2005
2006 /*
2007 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
2008 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
2009 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
2010 */
2011 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
2012 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
2013 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
2014 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2015 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2016
2017 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2018 s->session = s->psksession;
2019 s->psksession = NULL;
2020 s->hit = 1;
2021 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2022 if (identity != 0)
2023 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2024 #endif
2025
2026 return 1;
2027 }
2028