History log of /llvm-project/llvm/lib/Target/X86/X86Subtarget.cpp (Results 76 – 100 of 516)
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Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.1, llvmorg-6.0.1-rc3
# 5aa26980 09-Jun-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] NFC Use member initialization in X86Subtarget

The separate initializeEnvironment function was sort of
useless since r217071.
ARM did this move already with r273556.

llvm-svn: 334345


Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.1-rc2
# d2f1ab1b 25-May-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[x86] invpcid LLVM intrinsic

Re-add the feature flag for invpcid, which was removed in r294561.
Add an intrinsic, which always uses a 32 bit integer as first argument,
while the instruction actually

[x86] invpcid LLVM intrinsic

Re-add the feature flag for invpcid, which was removed in r294561.
Add an intrinsic, which always uses a 32 bit integer as first argument,
while the instruction actually uses a 64 bit register in 64 bit mode
for the INVPCID_TYPE argument.

Reviewers: craig.topper

Reviewed By: craig.topper

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47141

llvm-svn: 333255

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# 5c54742d 18-May-2018 Alexander Ivchenko <alexander.ivchenko@intel.com>

[X86][CET] Changing -fcf-protection behavior to comply with gcc (LLVM part)

This patch aims to match the changes introduced in gcc by
https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-cvs/2018-04/msg00534.html. The
IBT fe

[X86][CET] Changing -fcf-protection behavior to comply with gcc (LLVM part)

This patch aims to match the changes introduced in gcc by
https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-cvs/2018-04/msg00534.html. The
IBT feature definition is removed, with the IBT instructions
being freely available on all X86 targets. The shadow stack
instructions are also being made freely available, and the
use of all these CET instructions is controlled by the module
flags derived from the -fcf-protection clang option. The hasSHSTK
option remains since clang uses it to determine availability of
shadow stack instruction intrinsics, but it is no longer directly used.

Comes with a clang patch (D46881).

Patch by mike.dvoretsky

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46882

llvm-svn: 332705

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# d34e60ca 14-May-2018 Nicola Zaghen <nicola.zaghen@imgtec.com>

Rename DEBUG macro to LLVM_DEBUG.

The DEBUG() macro is very generic so it might clash with other projects.
The renaming was done as follows:
- git grep -l 'DEBUG' | xargs sed -i 's/\bDEBUG\s\?(/

Rename DEBUG macro to LLVM_DEBUG.

The DEBUG() macro is very generic so it might clash with other projects.
The renaming was done as follows:
- git grep -l 'DEBUG' | xargs sed -i 's/\bDEBUG\s\?(/LLVM_DEBUG(/g'
- git diff -U0 master | ../clang/tools/clang-format/clang-format-diff.py -i -p1 -style LLVM
- Manual change to APInt
- Manually chage DOCS as regex doesn't match it.

In the transition period the DEBUG() macro is still present and aliased
to the LLVM_DEBUG() one.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43624

llvm-svn: 332240

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# a3b58190 10-May-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] Initialize HasPTWRITE member of X86Subtarget

This was missing from r331961.
Caught by sanitizer bots.

llvm-svn: 332024


# 2b5e9600 08-May-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[x86] Introduce the pconfig instruction

Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi

Reviewed By: craig.topper

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46430

llvm-svn: 331739


# c8ded04e 01-May-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] movdiri and movdir64b instructions

Reviewers: spatel, craig.topper, RKSimon

Reviewed By: craig.topper, RKSimon

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45983

llvm-svn: 331248


# 1a2ce572 23-Apr-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] Revert r330638 - accidental commit

llvm-svn: 330640


# 213a7cda 23-Apr-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] movdiri and movdir64b instructions

Reviewers: craig.topper
llvm-svn: 330638


# 31fa8025 20-Apr-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] WaitPKG instructions

Three new instructions:

umonitor - Sets up a linear address range to be
monitored by hardware and activates the monitor.
The address range should be a writeback memory
ca

[X86] WaitPKG instructions

Three new instructions:

umonitor - Sets up a linear address range to be
monitored by hardware and activates the monitor.
The address range should be a writeback memory
caching type.

umwait - A hint that allows the processor to
stop instruction execution and enter an
implementation-dependent optimized state
until occurrence of a class of events.

tpause - Directs the processor to enter an
implementation-dependent optimized state
until the TSC reaches the value in EDX:EAX.

Also modifying the description of the mfence
instruction, as the rep prefix (0xF3) was allowed
before, which would conflict with umonitor during
disassembly.

Before:
$ echo 0xf3,0x0f,0xae,0xf0 | llvm-mc -disassemble
.text
mfence

After:
$ echo 0xf3,0x0f,0xae,0xf0 | llvm-mc -disassemble
.text
umonitor %rax

Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi

Reviewed By: craig.topper

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45253

llvm-svn: 330462

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Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.1-rc1
# 0e74e504 13-Apr-2018 Simon Pilgrim <llvm-dev@redking.me.uk>

[X86] Remove remaining itinerary support from instructions and target (PR37093)

llvm-svn: 330035


# 604be442 13-Apr-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] Introduce cldemote instruction

Hint to hardware to move the cache line containing the
address to a more distant level of the cache without
writing back to memory.

Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi

[X86] Introduce cldemote instruction

Hint to hardware to move the cache line containing the
address to a more distant level of the cache without
writing back to memory.

Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi

Reviewed By: craig.topper

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45256

llvm-svn: 329992

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# 2ef36f35 11-Apr-2018 Gabor Buella <gabor.buella@intel.com>

[X86] Describe wbnoinvd instruction

Similar to the wbinvd instruction, except this
one does not invalidate caches. Ring 0 only.
The encoding matches a wbinvd instruction with
an F3 prefix.

Reviewer

[X86] Describe wbnoinvd instruction

Similar to the wbinvd instruction, except this
one does not invalidate caches. Ring 0 only.
The encoding matches a wbinvd instruction with
an F3 prefix.

Reviewers: craig.topper, zvi, ashlykov

Reviewed By: craig.topper

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43816

llvm-svn: 329847

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Revision tags: llvmorg-5.0.2, llvmorg-5.0.2-rc2, llvmorg-5.0.2-rc1, llvmorg-6.0.0
# 609f8c01 23-Feb-2018 Sriraman Tallam <tmsriram@google.com>

Intrinsics calls should avoid the PLT when "RtLibUseGOT" metadata is present.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42216

llvm-svn: 325962


Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.0-rc3
# 24d3b28d 11-Feb-2018 Craig Topper <craig.topper@intel.com>

[X86] Don't make 512-bit vectors legal when preferred vector width is 256 bits and 512 bits aren't required

This patch adds a new function attribute "required-vector-width" that can be set by the fr

[X86] Don't make 512-bit vectors legal when preferred vector width is 256 bits and 512 bits aren't required

This patch adds a new function attribute "required-vector-width" that can be set by the frontend to indicate the maximum vector width present in the original source code. The idea is that this would be set based on ABI requirements, intrinsics or explicit vector types being used, maybe simd pragmas, etc. The backend will then use this information to determine if its save to make 512-bit vectors illegal when the preference is for 256-bit vectors.

For code that has no vectors in it originally and only get vectors through the loop and slp vectorizers this allows us to generate code largely similar to our AVX2 only output while still enabling AVX512 features like mask registers and gather/scatter. The loop vectorizer doesn't always obey TTI and will create oversized vectors with the expectation the backend will legalize it. In order to avoid changing the vectorizer and potentially harm our AVX2 codegen this patch tries to make the legalizer behavior similar.

This is restricted to CPUs that support AVX512F and AVX512VL so that we have good fallback options to use 128 and 256-bit vectors and still get masking.

I've qualified every place I could find in X86ISelLowering.cpp and added tests cases for many of them with 2 different values for the attribute to see the codegen differences.

We still need to do frontend work for the attribute and teach the inliner how to merge it, etc. But this gets the codegen layer ready for it.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42724

llvm-svn: 324834

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Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.0-rc2
# 02bdac53 29-Jan-2018 Simon Pilgrim <llvm-dev@redking.me.uk>

[X86] Emit 11-byte or 15-byte NOPs on recent AMD targets, else default to 10-byte NOPs (PR22965)

We currently emit up to 15-byte NOPs on all targets (apart from Silvermont), which stalls performance

[X86] Emit 11-byte or 15-byte NOPs on recent AMD targets, else default to 10-byte NOPs (PR22965)

We currently emit up to 15-byte NOPs on all targets (apart from Silvermont), which stalls performance on some targets with decoders that struggle with 2 or 3 more '66' prefixes.

This patch flags recent AMD targets (btver1/znver1) to still emit 15-byte NOPs and bdver* targets to emit 11-byte NOPs. All other targets now emit 10-byte NOPs apart from SilverMont CPUs which still emit 7-byte NOPS.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42616

llvm-svn: 323693

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# c58f2166 22-Jan-2018 Chandler Carruth <chandlerc@gmail.com>

Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", an

Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..

Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html

The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.

The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.

However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.

On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.

This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.

There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.

The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.

For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.

When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.

When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.

However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.

We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.

This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.

Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer

Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723

llvm-svn: 323155

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# 77a21dba 22-Jan-2018 Marina Yatsina <marina.yatsina@intel.com>

Break false dependencies for POPCNT, LZCNT, TZCNT

Add POPCNT, LZCNT, TZCNT to the list of instructions that have false dependency.
Add a test to make sure BreakFalseDeps breaks the dependencies for

Break false dependencies for POPCNT, LZCNT, TZCNT

Add POPCNT, LZCNT, TZCNT to the list of instructions that have false dependency.
Add a test to make sure BreakFalseDeps breaks the dependencies for these instructions.
Update affected tests.

This fixes bugzilla https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33869

This is the final of multiple patches that fix this bugzilla.
Most of the patches are intended at refactoring the existent code.

Reviews of the refactoring done to enable this change:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D40330
https://reviews.llvm.org/D40331
https://reviews.llvm.org/D40332
https://reviews.llvm.org/D40333

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40334

Change-Id: If95cbf1a3f5c7dccff8f1b22ecb397542147303d
llvm-svn: 323096

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# 0d797a34 20-Jan-2018 Craig Topper <craig.topper@intel.com>

[X86] Add support for passing 'prefer-vector-width' function attribute into X86Subtarget and exposing via X86's getRegisterWidth TTI interface.

This will cause the vectorizers to do some limiting of

[X86] Add support for passing 'prefer-vector-width' function attribute into X86Subtarget and exposing via X86's getRegisterWidth TTI interface.

This will cause the vectorizers to do some limiting of the vector widths they create. This is not a strict limit. There are reasons I know of that the loop vectorizer will generate larger vectors for.

I've written this in such a way that the interface will only return a properly supported width(0/128/256/512) even if the attribute says something funny like 384 or 10.

This has been split from D41895 with the remainder in a follow up commit.

llvm-svn: 323015

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# 84b26b90 18-Jan-2018 Craig Topper <craig.topper@intel.com>

[X86] Add intrinsic support for the RDPID instruction

This adds a new instrinsic to support the rdpid instruction. The implementation is a bit weird because the intrinsic is defined as always return

[X86] Add intrinsic support for the RDPID instruction

This adds a new instrinsic to support the rdpid instruction. The implementation is a bit weird because the intrinsic is defined as always returning 32-bits, but the assembler support thinks the instruction produces a 64-bit register in 64-bit mode. But really it zeros the upper 32 bits. So I had to add separate patterns where 64-bit mode uses an extract_subreg.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42205

llvm-svn: 322910

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Revision tags: llvmorg-6.0.0-rc1
# 505f38a0 10-Jan-2018 Craig Topper <craig.topper@intel.com>

[X86] Move HasNOPL to a subtarget feature bit. Plumb MCSubtargetInfo through the MCAsmBackend constructor

After D41349, we can no get a MCSubtargetInfo into the MCAsmBackend constructor. This allows

[X86] Move HasNOPL to a subtarget feature bit. Plumb MCSubtargetInfo through the MCAsmBackend constructor

After D41349, we can no get a MCSubtargetInfo into the MCAsmBackend constructor. This allows us to get NOPL from a subtarget feature rather than a CPU name blacklist.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41721

llvm-svn: 322227

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# e2873a17 22-Dec-2017 Craig Topper <craig.topper@intel.com>

[X86] Add missing initialization for the HasPREFETCHWT1 subtarget variable.

llvm-svn: 321340


# 3feaf2a2 19-Dec-2017 Simon Pilgrim <llvm-dev@redking.me.uk>

[X86] Fix uninitialized variable sanitizer warning from rL321074

llvm-svn: 321076


# a4852d2c 18-Dec-2017 Matthias Braun <matze@braunis.de>

X86/AArch64/ARM: Factor out common sincos_stret logic; NFCI

Note:
- X86ISelLowering: setLibcallName(SINCOS) was superfluous as
InitLibcalls() already does it.
- ARMISelLowering: Setting libcallnam

X86/AArch64/ARM: Factor out common sincos_stret logic; NFCI

Note:
- X86ISelLowering: setLibcallName(SINCOS) was superfluous as
InitLibcalls() already does it.
- ARMISelLowering: Setting libcallnames for sincos/sincosf seemed
superfluous as in the darwin case it wouldn't be used while for all
other cases InitLibcalls already does it.

llvm-svn: 321036

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# a92cecfb 18-Dec-2017 Matthias Braun <matze@braunis.de>

AArch64/X86: Factor out common bzero logic; NFC

llvm-svn: 321035


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