fix problem with using macros in rules; change configuration to send
different flags when destined for arpanet vs. berknet hosts, etc.

finally make suppression of sender in mailing lists work -- this version
also works correctly on simple aliases.

finally make suppression of sender in mailing lists work -- this version
also works correctly on simple aliases.

fix suppression of from address in mailing lists.

fix suppression of from address in mailing lists.

be more careful in resetting uid

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf f

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf file?

show more ...

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf f

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf file?

show more ...

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf f

don't let a mailer ever execute as root (that should solve the
security problems!) -- essentially just map root into someone else.
Adds yet another configuration variable (should this be in the .cf file?

show more ...

take underscore as well as space to separate parts of a person's
full name. Dot notation should be made to work someday also.

have .forward ownership stick harder than :include: ownership:
this prevents cretins from using writable root files for nastiness.
all this is pointless if /usr/lib/aliases is writable though....

have .forward ownership stick harder than :include: ownership:
this prevents cretins from using writable root files for nastiness.
all this is pointless if /usr/lib/aliases is writable though....

be REALLY clever and inherit uid/gid from owner of :include:
files also... solves problem of alias to non-secure file

be REALLY clever and inherit uid/gid from owner of :include:
files also... solves problem of alias to non-secure file

last delta was too paranoid -- this increases the number of
cases that work (but is still safe -- I hope)

last delta was too paranoid -- this increases the number of
cases that work (but is still safe -- I hope)

last delta was too paranoid -- this increases the number of
cases that work (but is still safe -- I hope)

run as the user forwarding mail after a .forward operation;
fix a bug in .forwarding that caused recursive expansion;
restrict mail to programs, files, and with :include: for security
reasons.

run as the user forwarding mail after a .forward operation;
fix a bug in .forwarding that caused recursive expansion;
restrict mail to programs, files, and with :include: for security
reasons.

run as the user forwarding mail after a .forward operation;
fix a bug in .forwarding that caused recursive expansion;
restrict mail to programs, files, and with :include: for security
reasons.

run as the user forwarding mail after a .forward operation;
fix a bug in .forwarding that caused recursive expansion;
restrict mail to programs, files, and with :include: for security
reasons.

check MAXATOM overflow; increase MAXATOM value

check MAXATOM overflow; increase MAXATOM value

check MAXATOM overflow; increase MAXATOM value

fix but in mailers that only take one address at a time